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This dissertation investigates the construction of the soybean industry in Mato 
Grosso, Brazil, and the relations between farmers, agribusiness, and the state that have 
given rise to a model of agricultural production that is suggestive of a new, third food 
regime.  Soybean cultivation began in earnest in Mato Grosso in the 1980, but it was 
not until the mid-1990s that the state became a significant competitor with the US for 
soybean export markets.  This dissertation argues that the soybean industry in Mato 
Grosso is structured by a “private international soy regime” consisting of government, 
corporate, and farmer interests that work to integrate production into global markets, 
albeit through a contested and contradictory process.  The concept of ‘food regimes’ 
helps to clarify those contradictions as well as they ways in which this mode of 
production differs from earlier historical periods. 
Chapter 2 explores the place of Brazil and Mato Grosso in the global soybean 
commodity system both historically and analytically.  This chapter located Brazil 
within a chronology of food regime development and decline and argues that the 
emergence of the Mato Grosso soy sector signals a departure from previous modes of 
political-economic organization of production.  This chapter uses the concept of the 
“corporate food regime” to highlight the contradictions inherent in this historical 
moment. 
Chapter 3 looks in detail at the experience of the food regime on the ground in 
Mato Grosso through qualitative research with farmers, agribusiness employees, and 
community members in 5 towns throughout the state.  This chapter argues that the 
 category of “agribusiness” must be disaggregated and the experiences of soy farmers 
themselves taken seriously in order to understand how power is accomplished in a 
global commodity network governed by a private regime, such as soy. 
Chapter 4 examines private governance at the global level by investigating 
Brazil’s role in the World Trade Organization and the constitutionalization of market 
rule.  I argue here that various WTO mechanisms allow for and enable the exercise of 
private authority in ways that are often obscured by the political language of trade 
negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: BRAZILIAN SOY AND THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
AGRO-FOOD REGIME 
 
 Since the 1930s, when soybeans were first traded on international markets, the 
US has been the undisputed leader in global soy production.  In the last twenty years, 
its closest competitors have been Brazil and Argentina, but only since the mid-1990s 
has Brazil begun to seriously challenge the US’s status as the world’s top exporter of 
soybeans. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Percentage of world soy exports by country.  Source: data from 
FAS PS&D (2008). 
 
Most of the growth in Brazilian soy production has taken place in the central-west 
region of the country, and specifically in a state called Mato Grosso whose capital is 
the geodesic center of the South American continent.  The explosion in soy production 
here has significantly contributed to Brazil’s overall economic growth over the last 
decade, and, as I argue in this dissertation, its geo-political rise to power in the global 
trade arena as well. 
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Figure 2.  Brazilian soy production, consumption, and exports.  Source: data 
from IBGE (2007). 
 
In many ways, the significance of the soybean industry in Mato Grosso extends 
far beyond the remote towns at the epicenter of the boom.  The meteoric rise in 
Brazil’s soybean production has taken place concurrently with other important global 
trends in agricultural production, trade, and governance.  The convergence of global 
credit, food, and energy crises is bringing agriculture to the center of mainstream 
political, economic, and environmental debates.  Since World War II our global food 
system has been defined on the one hand by the production of vast agricultural 
surpluses and also the dual and ironic rise of both hunger and obesity.  Industrial 
agricultural production is responsible for 30 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, 
hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, and food deserts that threaten the food security of 
billions of poor people around the world. 
 But despite the global reach of these problems, what brought me to this 
research was a very personal experience.  When I first began living and working on an 
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organic small grains farm in Newfield, New York, buckwheat was one of our best 
crops.  Well suited to the rocky and acidic soil south of Ithaca, buckwheat was also 
attractive because Birkett Mills, the largest organic buckwheat mill east of the 
Mississippi, was located in Penn Yan, just 50 miles away.  In 2003, however, Birkett 
Mills began buying organic buckwheat from China cheaper than we could grow it less 
than an hour’s drive away.  Incidentally, it was during this time that Brazil was 
emerging on the scene as a major soy exporter.  US farmers, including those of us in 
Newfield, were getting nervous about all of this new competition from abroad.  
Finally, the fiery collapse of WTO negotiations in Seattle just a couple of years before 
had refocused attention on the intractability of a new Agreement on Agriculture.  In 
the course of some idle Internet investigation, I noticed on Cargill’s website that they 
were at that time listed as the largest exporter of soy from both the US and Brazil.  
Further investigation revealed that soy trading, processing, and exports are dominated 
by the same 4 companies in nearly every country in the world with a significant import 
or export market for soy.  Why, then, all of the political wrangling over agriculture in 
the WTO?  Why the fierce nationalism among farm constituencies in the US and 
Brazil when all farmers are selling to (and therefore also being squeezed by) the same 
4 corporations? 
The problematic that this dissertation addresses begins with this: what is 
obscured about the role of agribusiness in governing global commodity markets when 
‘national’ farmer constituencies are politically deployed against one another in the 
international trade arena?  My own experiences as a farmer “competing” in 
international markets directly conflicted with the rhetoric that comparative advantages 
are ‘natural’ and that markets are politically neutral.  It seemed to me that the scare 
being put into US farmers about new “competition” from the emerging Brazilian soy 
sector, in particular, was directly in service to agribusiness, sending farmers 
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scrambling to cut costs and lower farm gate prices.  This all on the premise that 
countries, and by extension their agrarian citizenries, are responsible for maximizing 
their comparative advantages in a battle for global market share. 
But when I realized that Cargill was the largest exporter of soybeans in the US 
and the largest exporter of soybeans in Brazil, the neat separation of productive 
markets by national boundaries began to break down.  I wondered then, why farmers 
in Brazil are any more or less my competitors than my neighbor down the road.  After 
years of research and writing on the subject I now see these early questions for their 
simplicity, but the initial impulse to understand the relationship between the political 
and economic construction of markets continued to animate this project.  My initial 
curiosity led me to the broader question of how, why, and to what effect the political 
and economic construction of international agricultural markets are rhetorically 
separated, and how that fictitious separation both reflects and reinforces neo-liberal 
ideology.  Upon peeling back the utopian vision of the self-regulating market 
juxtaposed with a separate and oppositional ‘state’ or political sphere, then, what is 
revealed about the role of the private sector in governance? 
The case of soy in Mato Grosso, Brazil seemed an ideal location to examine 
this problematic because the development of the sector was a relatively recent 
historical phenomenon, and it happened as the result of a unique convergence of 
‘nationalist’ government policy, transnational corporate investment, technological 
advancement, and the creation of a new agrarian entrepreneurial class.  Historically 
speaking, the rise of Mato Grosso soy coincided with 1) the crisis of global trade 
governance that began with the Seattle protests at the WTO ministerial meetings; 2) 
Brazil’s rise to power in that arena as leader of the G-20; 3) shifting global patterns of 
agricultural production and consumption around the world—from traditional 
  5
production and consumption centers in the global north to more south-south trade; and 
4) the historical dénouement of the industrial food regime. 
It was not until after I returned from the field that I chose the ‘food regime’ 
concept as a way to make sense of my research findings (which I discuss in more 
detail below), but I did enter the field armed with Claire Cutler’s concept of ‘private 
international regimes’ as a way to understand the dynamics of private governance.  
Because I was interested in understanding the relations of soy production and the 
political dynamics between soy farmers, firms, governments, and other public and 
private actors, I pursued a research strategy of interviewing key informants, collecting 
and analyzing textual materials (from archives, libraries, and the private offices of 
corporations and industry groups), and some participant observation (riding around in 
combines and tractors with farmers and laborers).  From the beginning of this project I 
knew that I wanted to understand the dynamics of the private soy regime at the local, 
national, and international level.  My fieldwork, therefore, took me to industry and 
university offices in São Paulo and Rio, the soy towns of Mato Grosso, and the halls 
of government in Brasília. 
To understand how the private soy regime is accomplished on the ground in 
local contexts, I decided to spend a month in each of 5 communities in the state of 
Mato Grosso in order to get an understanding of the commonalities and differences in 
the experiences of soy farmers and the ways that TNCs operate. After my preliminary 
field visit in the summer of 2004, I selected 5 communities that I felt represented 
different chapters of the Mato Grosso story.  Cuiabá, the state capital, is the political 
heart of the central-west soy regime, while Rondonópolis represents its industrial 
center.  Sorriso was one of the first soy towns to be established and leads the state in 
municipal soy production.  Sapezal, on the other hand, sits right on the edge of the soy 
frontier.  One of the newer, more remote, and least diversified soy towns, Sapezal 
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typifies the extreme economic dependence on soy that is much more intensive on the 
‘periphery’ than in the older and more economically robust towns of the state’s ‘core’.  
Finally, Campo Novo dos Parecís occupies the middle ground between Sorriso and 
Sapezal, boasting a thriving producer cooperative and rural union, but still far enough 
from the industrial and commercial centers surrounding the capital to be heavily 
dependent on primary soy production with little investment in industrialization. 
In each of these towns I sought out soy farmers, rural producers’ unions, 
cooperatives, local agricultural service providers, equipment dealers, employees of 
transnational agribusiness corporations (brokers and traders, mainly), farm workers, 
highway associations, and anyone otherwise involved in the soy industry.  I also talked 
to video store clerks, Internet café owners, cab drivers, waitresses, secretaries, and 
anyone who had something to say about how the soy regime affected their lives and 
livelihoods.  These informal conversations contributed to my overall understanding of 
the texture of life on the soy frontier, which then helped me to further refine the 
questions I asked in my formal interviews. 
In São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília, I interviewed representatives from 
industry groups, research institutes, agribusiness firms, the national development bank 
(BNDES), congresspeople, agricultural economists, sociologists, trade lawyers, and 
representatives from government ministries.  In short, I pursued interviews with the 
actors I judged to be part of or have insight into the private soy regime, its functioning 
and the dynamics between its public and private constituents.  From these interviews I 
began to piece together some of the particular animating dynamics of the Mato Grosso 
soy regime—such as credit relations and infrastructure at the local level, ministerial 
policy at the national level, and Brazil’s leadership in the G-20 at the international 
level—that suggested a distinctiveness that begged theorizing.  The logic of my 
inquiry, then, was to investigate the dynamics of production and the dynamics of 
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governance to see both how they shaped one another as well as what larger whole they 
interacted to produce.  In order to understand that larger whole, I turned to concept of 
‘food regimes’. 
 
Mato Grosso Soy and the Corporate Food Regime: A new take on the concept 
 In a 1989 article, Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael developed the 
concept of a ‘food regime’ to describe specific historical periods when hegemonic 
political-economic powers strategically configured food systems to support 
geopolitical ends.  They identified 2 particular food regimes: 1) the first or colonial 
food regime, and 2) the second or surplus/industrial/US food regime.  This concept 
remains one of the most persistent theoretical tools that political economists employ to 
explain the world-historical configuration of global food systems (Le Heron, 1993; 
Moran, Blunden et al., 1996; Pritchard, 1998; Friedmann, 2005; McMichael, 2005).  
However, there is a lack of consensus among scholars about what the third/corporate 
food regime looks like, whether it has arrived, or whether it is still emerging. 
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Table 1.  Food regimes. 
 
Name Historical 
Period 
Political Organization Economic 
Organization 
British/Colonial FR 1870-1914 • British-led 
colonial system 
• Consolidating 
colonial power 
• Supplied 
cheap food to 
industrializing 
Britain 
• Free trade 
imperialism 
US Industrial/Surplus 
FR 
1945-1980s • US-led state 
support of 
surplus 
production 
• Containing 
Soviet empire 
• Fordist 
response to 
Great 
Depression 
• Food aid 
imperialism 
Corporate/Corporate- 
Environmental FR 
????-???? • Private 
agribusiness 
regime 
• Facilitated by 
WTO 
• Integrating 
national 
agricultures 
into global 
markets 
• Uneven 
liberalization 
 
 The first 2 food regimes describe historical periods wherein food production 
and distribution was organized to serve the geopolitical ends of the reigning hegemon.  
  9
In the first, the productive channels ran between the colonies and the British Empire as 
the peripheral production of foodstuffs was developed to feed an industrializing and 
hungry United Kingdom.  McMichael describes this food regime as being driven by 
‘free trade imperialism’ characterized by the “deployment of a policy of economic 
liberalism to gain access to the economies and colonial empires of rival European 
states” (McMichael, 2005).  The first fractures in this food regime came with the 
overlapping crises of the 1970s that prompted embargoes of exports from the US and 
the cultivation of new agricultural markets in places like Brazil (Friedmann, 1989). 
The second food regime was based on state support of surplus production in 
the US and the strategic deployment of food aid through Public Law 480.  It grew out 
of the post-depression era where supporting the domestic farm sector was seen as key 
to economic recovery and was concretized in the drive to contain the soviet empire by 
creating dependency on US food exports.  This regime has shaped agricultural markets 
all over the world for decades, and despite the fact that those markets are shifting in 
significant ways (cf. John Wilkinson’s forthcoming work on Brazil and China) it is 
clear that elements of this system—namely state support for overproduction, a focus 
on highly industrialized production methods and monocultures, etc.—still characterize 
the current historical moment.  However, the failure of the WTO to provide a coherent 
legal superstructure for global agricultural governance points to a destabilization of 
this regime and suggests the emergence of a new regime. 
There is a distinct lack of consensus on what characterizes the third food 
regime, whether it is here, or whether it is still emerging.  One of Friedmann’s most 
recent contributions specifies a corporate-environmental food regime wherein global 
food supply chains are organized to cater to transnational classes of rich and poor 
consumers and the private sector ‘governs’ itself by coordinating standards across 
national borders (Friedmann, 2005).  Alternatively, McMichael sees the corporate 
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food regime as an expression of the neo-liberal moment, codified in the Agreement on 
Agriculture as a “distinctive form of economic liberalism geared to deepening market 
relations via the privatization of states” (McMichael, 2005).  Finally, Pritchard argues 
that the 2008 collapse of the Doha Round demonstrates the failure of the WTO to 
resolve the conflicts of the second food regime and therefore that the contours of a 
third food regime have yet to emerge (Pritchard forthcoming). 
 All of these recent interventions note the increasing importance of non-state 
actors (social movements, corporations, etc.) and the interactions between them in 
shaping the global agro-food sector.  While all the authors point at least obliquely to 
the increasing influence of private actors and “privatization” of public functions and 
institutions in the dynamics of the emerging food regime, Friedmann comes the closest 
to positing a particular private governance regime in her discussion of quality and 
environmental standards imposed by private firms on themselves in response to high-
end consumer demand (2005: 253).  This is an example of a historical understanding 
of a private regime—one that has been conditioned by the social relations of 
production and regulation that came before it.  The food regime concept, therefore, 
provides a historical dimension to the conceptual category that “private regimes” 
represent in the international relations literature. 
 
Specifying the ‘Private International Soy Regime’: Bringing IR regime theory to an 
understanding of food systems 
 Just as food regime analysis has yet to incorporate a robust theory of private 
governance, traditional regime theory in the international relations tradition has been 
squarely state-centric.  In Haufler’s words, “…the prevailing focus in International 
Relations [is that] private sector actors only provide the background against which the 
actions of states are show-cased” (Haufler, 1993).  However, many political 
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economists are now turning their attention to the private sector in order to understand 
the dynamics of governance in the neoliberal era (Cutler, Haufler et al., 1999; Sell, 
1999; Cutler, 2002; Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Sassen, 2002). 
 Much has been made about the fate of the state vis a vis transnational capital in 
the era of globalization.  Some argue that the state is being eclipsed while others argue 
that the capital is becoming even more dependent on the state as agent, negotiator, and 
setter-of-terms in trade agreements.  I argue, as Sassen (2000) does, that power is not 
zero-sum between the public and private sectors.  On the contrary, the interaction 
between the state and private firms in the global trade arena marks a reformulation of 
each via the other, and suggests a qualitatively different relationship than simply one 
as agent of the other.  Instead of the state being the principle agent of nationally 
competitive economies (Polanyi, 1944), the state has become the purveyor of the 
social lynchpin of global neo-liberalism: political legitimacy. 
As many argue, legitimacy is a crucial element of any hegemonic order (Gill, 
2000; Jacobson, 1998; Ruggie, 2002).  By political legitimacy I mean the sanctioning 
by the state of the self-regulating market as a system of rule.  Politics are not irrelevant 
to the market.  Rather, the political realm creates and houses the social regulation (the 
legal system) upon which the market depends for protection of property rights as well 
as the reproduction of the “market mentality”.  The legitimacy of the neo-liberal 
regime has not arisen out of the ether.  Regardless of the political program, be it 
protectionist or liberal, the political legitimacy of the “self-regulating market” must be 
continually reproduced through a symbiotic relationship between capital and the state. 
 Those developing the concept of private international regimes are working to 
specify the form of this relationship in the neo-liberal historical moment.  They begin 
by specifying the distinction between power and authority in order to point out that in 
order for private regimes to function as agents of governance, their power must be 
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legitimized as authority.  They then go on to specify several different forms of private 
authority, including informal industry norms, cartels, and private regimes, among 
others.  What sets private regimes apart is that they exercise governance over a much 
broader area than other types of private cooperation, and most importantly, that they 
include organizations other than firms in their scope (Cutler et al., 1999).  This 
conceptualization helps to specify the broader political-economic trend that scholars 
like Sassen and Gill describe by pinpointing the particular forms of institutionalized 
authority wielded by particular actors in the global economy.  In this dissertation, I use 
Cutler’s concept of “private international regimes” to specify private authority—
particularly that wielded by the private regime that dominates the global soy 
industry—within a particular historical moment characterized by the formulation of a 
third, corporate, food regime. 
By weaving together the private international regime concept with the food 
regime concept, I bring Cutler and her colleagues’ contributions to IR regime theory to 
the food regime debate.  In this dissertation, I make 3 interventions in this debate.  
First, rather than taking the food regime as a given—as a stable, historically specific 
rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale 
(Friedmann, 1993)—I use the concept as an analytic to examine the contradictions 
present within the current global agro-food system.  In his forthcoming article, 
Pritchard points to the “hangover” from the second food regime that has caused the 
WTO to languish for its inability to resolve the internal contradictions of northern 
agricultural subsidies.  He argues that the WTO, rather than a first step toward an 
agricultural free-market and new corporate food regime, is actually an expression of 
the politics of crisis in the second food regime.1  In an earlier article, Pritchard argues 
                                                 
1 Pritchard’s article is scheduled to appear in an upcoming special issue of Agriculture and Human 
Values dedicated to the food regime debate. 
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that the supposedly neutral Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO is actually a political 
mechanism for extending market liberalization (Pritchard, 2005).  I extend Pritchard’s 
argument by adding to this somewhat state-centric analysis of legalism in the WTO 
the concept of the ‘private international regime’ as a way to explicitly bring the private 
sector into the processes of governing. 
 I argue that it is in an examination of the role of private actors in dispute 
settlement at the WTO, policy making at the federal level, and the construction of 
markets in the soy towns of Mato Grosso that the contradictions of the current global 
food system begin to point towards corporate food regime.  Much food regime 
scholarship centers on the strategic political deployment of food and agriculture by 
states without explicit analysis of the role of the private sector in constructing the food 
regime.  I marry Claire Cutler’s concept of a ‘private international regime’ with a 
‘food regime’ analysis to emphasize the increasing importance of agribusiness in 
determining the contours of food systems.  Friedmann, McMichael, and others 
certainly point to private actors as important determinants of food regimes, but my 
research looks pointedly at particular corporations—primarily Cargill, ADM, Bunge, 
Louis-Dreyfus, and the Brazilian conglomerate Groupo Maggi—and their actions at 
all political levels in order to specify the concept of ‘private governance’ in the 
context of the food system in the neo-liberal era. 
 Finally, by looking at the specific actions of these corporations ‘on the 
ground’, I also advance an understanding of how farmers experience of the corporate 
food regime.  As I argue in Chapter 3, this experience is contradictory, as farmers at 
once profit from and are exploited by corporate monopsony. Moran et al. (1996) 
emphasize the importance of the historical specificity of food regimes, but also argue 
that analysis must be multi-layered, encompassing more detail than a purely 
institutional perspective would provide.  They write: 
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If the forces influencing the uneven transformation of food and 
agricultural production in different nations and regions are to be 
understood we also need to know much more about the organization 
and control of their agro-commodity chains at different periods. Some 
components of the agro-commodity chain, notably the processing and 
marketing of products and supply of inputs, are especially influential.  
In the debates of the last decade over the subsumption of agriculture, 
regardless of the protagonists' conclusions, one of the most important 
forces influencing the organization of farm production is the 
relationship of the forms of production to the rest of the capitalist 
system. We suggest that by more clearly specifying the various 
elements of the agro-commodity chain at different periods and in 
different nations and regions the forces influencing uneven 
development and the expression of different food regimes will be 
clarified. 
 
Rather than limiting my analysis to the institutional, market, or state level, my 
qualitative fieldwork with farmers, local businesspeople, and civic associations allows 
for a more textured understanding of the complexity and tensions within the food 
regime.  The discrepancies I discovered in my fieldwork between the ‘official’ version 
of the relationship between farmers and agribusiness and the lived one—informal 
discounts to the CBOT spot price for soy, lax enforcement of environmental 
regulations, loosely negotiated buying contracts, etc.—far from being merely 
anecdotal, reveal a picture of a food regime much more complex than the official, top-
down, institutionally defined version.  These three extensions of food regime 
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scholarship correspond (roughly, with significant overlap) to the three substantive 
chapters of my dissertation. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized into 3 substantive chapters.  The 
thread that runs through all three is the “regime theme”—weaving together the ‘food’ 
and ‘private international’ regime concepts to both conceptualize the rise of soy in 
Mato Grosso and elaborate the regime that arises from this process.  Throughout the 
dissertation I examine this process at different levels of governance and real-world 
experience, from the soy fields to the halls of federal government and many locations 
in between.  Beyond differences in scale and location, however, each chapter also asks 
a unique analytical question that stems from the broader issue of private governance. 
 Chapter 2 looks at the history of the Mato Grosso soy sector and asks whether 
it represents a prototype of the ‘third corporate food regime’.  In this chapter I 
introduce the idea of using the food regime concept as an analytic rather than a thing 
in order to understand the contradictions present in the emerging relations of global 
food production and consumption and to show how Mato Grosso is, in many ways, an 
exemplar of those new relations.  I argue that soy came to Mato Grosso as the result of 
a convergence of state and corporate interests that encompass the Brazilian ‘national 
project’ to colonize the interior of the country and raise foreign exchange earnings, as 
well as the international soy regime’s ‘project’ to cultivate new sources of soy for the 
world market and construct a productive zone that is tailor-made to the needs of 
industrial food production.  The result, I argue, is a productive system that anticipates 
the relations (contradictory as well as complimentary) of a corporate food regime 
within which national agricultures are integrated into global markets via the mediation 
of the transnational corporations that dominate them.  I argue that the state as well as 
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other private constituents are active participants in this process, and that in fact the 
regime needs the state to support, legitimize, and institutionalize its functioning. 
 In Chapter 3 I look at how these processes are institutionalized at the local 
level in the soy towns of Mato Grosso.  As a starting point, I argue that in order to 
understand how the regime is accomplished on the ground, we must take a critical 
look at the essentialized categories of ‘peasant’ or ‘family farmer’ and of 
‘agribusiness’.  I argue that this reductionism has 2 primary purposes.  First, the 
juxtaposition of these two categories serves the neo-liberal project by deeming only 
the latter relevant to ‘economic development’ and therefore justifying the political 
marginalization of the interests and productive practices of the former group.  Second, 
by lumping large latifúndio farmers in with corporations in the category of 
‘agribusiness’, the exploitation of these farmers receives little attention, and is even 
explicitly denied.  To disaggregate the category of ‘agribusiness’, then, reveals the 
interdependence of farms and firms in the private soy regime and the entrenchment of 
exploitative relationships between foreign companies and supposedly independent soy 
producers.  This forces us to take a closer look at the choices that soy farmers make 
and acknowledge the complex economic situation that they face, characterized 
primarily by the pressing need for ever-increasing production and cost-cutting while at 
the same time operating under the magnifying glass of the international environmental 
movement that has vilified soy farmers as rapists of the Amazon. 
 In this investigation of how the relations between farmers and agribusiness 
advance the soy regime project, the following themes emerged: 1) the importance of 
the credit relation as a tool of control; 2) private involvement in infrastructure and 
other public works projects that maximize agribusiness efficiency (and therefore 
profit); 3) the particularity of the contract relation in Mato Grosso that both sustains 
soy farmers and at the same time engages them in progressively more exploitative 
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relationships with TNCs.  Most interestingly, this all takes place against the backdrop 
of the widespread belief in Mato Grosso’s ‘natural’ comparative advantage in soy 
production that quickly breaks down as soon as markets, weather, or macroeconomic 
conditions begin to falter.  The experience of the soy regime on the ground, therefore, 
reveals the true restriction of market freedom for individual producers despite an 
ideology of liberalization.  It also reveals the diversity of experience among soy 
farmers and the tyranny of informality that allows TNCs greater power by subverting 
rather than establishing, ‘a stable set of rules governing the production and 
consumption of food’. 
 In a different but related argument, Chapter 4 analyzes the creative use of the 
‘rules based system’ of international trade governance by states and firms to further 
the private agribusiness regime’s agenda.  This chapter examines the involvement of 
the private sector in setting trade agendas, negotiating agreements, and litigating 
disputes in the WTO system.  I specifically focus on dispute settlement in the WTO as 
a location where private interests are being institutionalized through litigious means 
that, through legal precedent, configure state policy.  This is where I make most direct 
use of Cutler’s private regime concept as a way to highlight the network or 
constellation of actors and interests that participate in configuring a particular 
“economic issue area” at the international level.  This allows us to look beyond a state-
centric conceptualization of ‘food regimes’ that centers on the state’s interest in 
strategic deployment of agriculture to the cooperation and conflict between states, 
firms, NGOs, and others.  I do not argue that the power of the state is being eclipsed 
by capital.  Rather, I argue that instead of national agricultures being integrated into a 
global system through the harmonization of trade rules, we see national agricultures 
being integrated into global markets through the extensification and intensification of 
global commodity networks.  With the failure of WTO negotiations, the private 
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agribusiness regime turns to dispute settlement to advance its agenda through an 
iterative process of litigation, one commodity or policy at a time. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MAGIC BEANS: BRAZIL’S SOY MIRACLE AND THE 
CORPORATE FOOD REGIME 
 
Introduction 
 As laid out in the introduction to this dissertation, the ‘food regime’ concept is 
languishing in the stalemate of the WTO and the failure of an institutionalized system 
of rules governing the current global agro-food system to emerge.  There appears to be 
a governance vacuum when it comes to agriculture, and since the ‘food regime’ 
concept was developed to explain systems of rules and regulations governing the 
global agro-food sector that are geographically and historically specific as well as—
most importantly—stable and enduring (Friedmann, McMichael, Pechlaner and 
Otero), it appears to some that we are still awaiting the arrival of the 3rd food regime 
(Friedmann).  This is only true, however, if we require the food regime to be an 
historically specific and stable set of rules, or a static a priori system that persists over 
time.  Alternatively, the current historical conjuncture suggests that points of tension 
between competing food regimes are what animate and drive changes in the global 
governance system.  If we use the food regime concept to elaborate those points of 
tension and look at ways in which each food regime contains within it vestiges of the 
former and seeds of the next, the concept becomes more dynamic, and more useful in 
the current era. 
 In many ways, the Brazilian soybean complex highlights these points of 
tension in the 3rd, or corporate, food regime.  As this dissertation elaborates, from 
small Brazilian soy towns and all the way to the WTO, the Brazilian case 
demonstrates how the corporate food regime absorbs certain elements of the US-led 
surplus regime while at the same time using those relationships to reconfigure the role 
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of transnational agribusiness, allowing the private sector unprecedented participation 
in global governance.  This chapter examines the emergence of the Brazilian soy 
complex in world-historical perspective in order to illustrate the ways in which Brazil 
exemplifies the corporate food regime including its contradictory relations and the 
ways in which it is conditioned by and incorporates residual effects of the second 
industrial/surplus regime.  In this way, then, the case of the Brazilian soy complex can 
allow us to reformulate the food regime concept in such a way as to make it more 
useful and relevant as a tool for making sense of what appears at first glance to be a 
fractured and incoherent system of agro-food governance. 
 The aim here is not to fetishize the food regime concept or fix it in a particular 
static moment or form.  Rather, the ways in which the concept has been elaborated by 
various scholars has the potential to be useful as a way of highlighting contradictory 
relations within global agro-food complexes that both reveal the nature of corporate 
market rule in agriculture and indicate points of weakness where social movements 
have found entrée into the debate over the future of food.  Insofar as the Brazilian soy 
complex exemplifies the “new” food regime in both its structures of governance and 
relations of production and consumption, it represents an opportunity to put this 
concept to use in new ways. 
 While the following chapters of this dissertation show the machinations of the 
corporate food regime through farmers’ experiences of the Brazilian soy complex on 
the ground (Chapter 3) and at the level of the WTO (Chapter 4), this chapter traces the 
development of the complex in world-historical perspective, with particular focus on 
the aspects of the industrial/surplus regime that do and do not prove relevant in the 
current era.  In other words, aspects of the industrial food regime—such as state 
support for overproduction—persist in the corporate regime, but in a different 
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historical moment and therefore for different political ends.  This will be explained 
below. 
 This chapter situates the Brazilian soy complex at the very frontier of the 
corporate food regime, both temporally and spatially, as well as politically and 
technologically.  The case of Brazil, however, far from providing a neat example of a 
wholly new and stable institutionalization of the new rules of the game, rather allows 
us to see how principles and interests that have dictated relations of agro-food 
production for decades are not eclipsed but reformulated to serve a regime that is no 
longer predicated on state-centered political aims, but rather on corporate-centered 
integration of national agricultures into global markets.  National agricultures, 
therefore, are oriented outwards, toward export markets, while transnational 
corporations shape those markets to take advantage of natural and politically-
constructed efficiencies that that allow them to continually lower costs and increase 
profits. 
This is not to say that agriculture does not still play an important geopolitical 
role; to the contrary, agriculture is still deployed (very effectively) to assert political 
power on the global stage.  This is easily seen in both the ability of Brazil to 
effectively skewer the US/EU agenda for the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture2, and 
the ability of the US and EU to effectively evade the liberalization prescribed by that 
very institution (and vehemently at the behest of countries like Brazil).  Still, in 
contrast to the surplus regime in which we see agricultural development, protection, 
and overproduction deployed by the US as a tool to guarantee that country’s 
hegemony, what we see today is an agro-food system configured to serve the interests 
of capital—particularly the large agribusiness companies that have created effective 
                                                 
2 This is most clearly seen in Brazil’s leadership of the G-20 that brought the Seattle negotiations to a 
halt in 1999, and also in Brazil’s successful cases against US cotton and EU sugar subsidies via WTO 
dispute settlement. 
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oligopolies in nearly every single sector pertaining to agricultural production in nearly 
every single country in the world.  Some of the old surplus regime policies remain in 
place insofar as they serve that end, while others have been rendered obsolete.  The 
point is that analysis of the corporate food regime allows us to draw attention to the 
tensions—between states, policies, markets, farmers, ideologies, firms—that draw the 
very contours of the modern neo-liberal agro-food system.  I use the corporate food 
regime as an historically specific, multi-dimensional, and complex analytic to show 
how the Brazilian soy complex represents a distinct shift in the terms upon which the 
global agro-food system is organized, exploited, and contested. 
 
The Brazilian Soy Complex: The making of a corporate food regime 
In 2005, the soybean complex was the third largest exporting sector in the 
Brazilian economy3, responsible for more revenue than the oil and gas sector.  In 
1985, Brazil’s soybean exports were only about 10% of what they are today.  Many 
soy farmers, government officials, and others will argue that Brazil’s ‘natural’ 
comparative advantage in producing soy is responsible for the rapid and dramatic 
growth in soy production and exports in the last 20 years.  The central-west region of 
the country is at the heart of this comparative advantage, boasting unimaginable tracts 
of unexploited land with predictable rains and fertile soil.  But if this advantage is as 
‘natural’ as we are to believe, why has soy taken off here only so recently?  This 
chapter will show how the development of a soy complex in the central-west region of 
Brazil is a key moment in the world-history of the global agro-food system because it 
exemplifies the emergent factors of the corporate food regime while still engaging the 
residual effects of the previous US-centered regime. 
                                                 
3 Transport materials and metallurgic products were #s 1 and 2, respectively.  Source: Itamaraty. 
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This chapter situates the Brazilian soy explosion within the context of the 
historical trajectory of changing food regimes as elaborated by Harriet Friedmann 
(1993) and Philip McMichael.  Their food regime analysis shows how relations of 
food production and consumption are forged within particular political projects (i.e., 
colonialism, the development project, neoliberalism), and that the configuration of a 
“rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale 
(Friedmann, 1993)” is both reflective of and embedded within an historically specific 
political-economic paradigm.  In order to understand the arrival of soy in Mato 
Grosso, therefore, it is necessary to trace Brazilian agriculture through the shift from 
the post-war food regime to the corporate food regime (of which the Mato Grosso soy 
sector is a clear embodiment). 
I depart somewhat from their analysis, however, in that, rather than 
representing a mechanistic ideal of a food regime characterized by stable sets of rules, 
I use the concept to understand the ways in which the increasingly private/corporate 
orientation of agro-food restructuring does not entirely eclipse but rather grows out of 
and continues to employ many of the principles and strategies of the US-based 
industrial regime of the mid-late twentieth century.  This chapter specifically seeks to 
“denaturalize” the arrival of soy to the cerrado, uncovering the political processes by 
which this particular world market has been historically constructed.  Relationships 
between key actors such as the Brazilian state, transnational agribusinesses, foreign 
governments, agricultural researchers, and Brazilian seed companies take center stage 
in a relational understanding of the arrival of the soy export market in Mato Grosso. 
 In tracing this historical development, I specifically look at the convergence of 
state policies (sometimes extending well beyond the agricultural sector), transnational 
capital investment, and privately funded research in the creation of the Mato Grosso 
soy economy.  To McMichael and Friedmann’s concept of the food regime, I add 
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Claire Cutler’s concept of the “private international regime”, which, while adding an 
overtone of more traditional International Relations regime theory to my analysis, 
helps to concretize the specific roles of public and private actors in crafting the 
dynamic relationships that govern soy production, trade, and consumption in this 
particular place and time. 
Cutler has defined private international regimes as, “an integrated complex of 
formal and informal institutions that is a source of governance for an economic issue 
area as a whole” (2002: 29).  Here, governance of the soy industry, its economic and 
political configuration, cannot be reduced to a corporate issue or a political issue.  In 
traditional economic or political science literature, either the economic development 
of a particular market or its regulation through the interaction of domestic and 
international policy is taken as a given.  My argument, however, is that the respective 
roles of economics and politics—corporations and states—are mutually dependent in 
the accomplishment of a private agribusiness regime.  Neither can corporations be 
seen as subject to the constraints of international trade rules insofar as they help to 
shape them, not can states be seen as held hostage by the power of private capital since 
the state is, at the end of the day, the sole arbiter of the political legitimacy upon which 
the credibility of the international trade governance system rests.  As Susan Sell 
writes, “To explain the nature and exercise of private authority, one needs to examine 
the fluid relationships between private authority and state policy” (1999: 172).  While 
the food regime concept allows historicization of this political-economic process, the 
concept of private international regimes historicized the state and capital forms that 
characterize governance in each period. 
The arrival of soy in Mato Grosso happened in the context of a number of 
important historical trends in the global agro-food system that mirror trends in the 
larger global development trajectory.  First, it coincided with an international 
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movement from inward-facing, import-substitution development strategies that 
emphasized state-building, to outward-facing, export-oriented strategies that 
emphasized liberalization and removal of barriers to the free flow of goods, capital, 
and investment.  Second, in the 1970s, US grain deals with the Soviet Union in 
concert with El Niño weather patterns and other factors out pressure on US grain 
stocks and prompted embargoes on US soybean exports, which in turn caused acute 
destabilization of global grain markets and fears of global grain shortages.  This led 
large soybean importers to develop new sources of soy.  Third, the biotechnological 
advances of the Green Revolution prompted a sharp increase in funding for the kind of 
research that was eventually able to overcome climatic and ecological barriers to 
tropical soybean cultivation.  Each of these global trends was definitive of the second 
food regime and found corresponding political-economic shifts within Brazil that led 
to the establishment of a soybean-based economy in the country’s remote interior.  
While the foundation of Brazilian soy economy, therefore, laid in the political 
economy of the second food regime, its development and maturation show how those 
residual effects are being selectively dismantled by or incorporated into its successor. 
These linkages are the subject of this chapter. 
The story of the arrival of the soybean in Brazil has been told numerous times 
(da Sousa and Busch, Welch, Hasse, Zancopé, Warnken).  This chapter will 
specifically focus on what the emergence of Brazilian soy as a global agro-industrial 
product reveals about the contours of the corporate food regime, with specific 
emphasis on the strategic importance of Mato Grosso and the central-west region. 
 
East to West: The emergence of soy as an export commodity 
Until the early 21st century, the United States was the undisputed dominant 
player in the international soybean trade.  The first beans are rumored to have arrived 
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in the US in 1804 aboard the Yankee Clipper, a ship looking for emergency food 
stocks on the Chinese shores to fortify supplies for the long journey home.  One 
hundred years later, 9,000 tons of soybeans were shipped from China to England to be 
processed for use in industrial soaps (oil) and high-protein animal feed (meal).  Europe 
quickly became the most important consumer of Asian soy while most of US 
production was consumed domestically, either as seed stock or—in very small 
amounts—as industrial oils and livestock feed.  In the early 20th century, the US 
imported most of its soybeans and soy products from Manchuria (Windish, 1981). 
It was not until the late 1930s that soy became widely cultivated in the US.  Up 
to this point, farmers were not confident enough in sustained demand for the product 
to plant significant acres, and therefore the crushing industry was not confident 
enough in sustained supply of the product to invest in processing capacity.  This cycle 
was broken by the agricultural crisis of the Dust Bowl and was the direct result of 
distribution of soy seed by government and agricultural extension agencies as an 
emergency forage crop that was not vulnerable to the diseases that afflicted corn and 
could replace pasture destroyed by drought.  Planting soy ensured the survival of 
livestock during the intense Dust Bowl drought (Windish, 2). 
This coincided with what Friedmann describes as the surplus regime and 
McMichael as the US-centered regime (and which both alternatively refer to as the 
post-war regime).  Coming out of the New Deal era and coinciding with the 
international post-war priority on state-building, national regulation led to both import 
controls and export subsidies.  As Friedmann writes, “These national 
programmes…generated chronic surpluses.  As these played out, they structured a 
specific set of international relations in which power—to restructure international 
trade and production in one state’s favour—was wielded in the unusual form of 
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subsidized exports of surplus commodities” (1993: 31).  No individual commodity 
benefited from these programs more than soy. 
While the second world war increased the demand for Manchurian soy in both 
the US and Western Europe due to a shortage in fats and oils and a climbing demand 
for protein-rich foods (Windish, 15), it was really after WWII that soybeans—like all 
major US agricultural commodities—got a big boost with the adoption of Public Law 
480 (PL 480).  Also known as the Food Aid bill, PL 480 marked the beginning of the 
US’s shift from net importer to net exporter of not just soy but all fats and oils (Houk 
et al., 1972).  Often criticized as a strategy for the dumping of US agricultural surplus 
disguised as a humanitarian mission, PL 480 flooded world markets with cheap 
agricultural products from the US offered under “special terms of sale” to developing 
nations with the expressed mission of providing much-needed food supplies to poor 
countries, but with the effect of subsidizing American production, creating demand for 
and eventual dependence on American exports, and making it impossible for farmers 
in those developing countries to compete with prices set below the cost of production.  
These subsidized exports shaped patterns of both production and consumption in the 
receiving countries by introducing unfamiliar foodstuffs into local diets.  In the case of 
soy, as reported by Houck et al. writing in the early 1970s, “These concessional 
[soybean] oil exports…dwarf commercial export sales and play a key role in the 
expansion of demand for soybeans” (1972: 7). 
It wasn’t until after the 1954 passage of PL 480 that soybeans became a 
significantly traded international commodity.  Throughout the next 4 decades, the US 
dominated world soybean exports.  For much of that time, too, Western Europe and 
Japan were the primary soy importers, though by the mid-1970s analysts were already 
forecasting the rise of China and India as major importers with explosions in both 
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population and income just over the horizon.  (The impact of this era on Brazil’s soy 
industry is discussed in the next section.) 
Fulfilling this prevision, what had been a relatively consistent market structure 
began to change in the mid-1980s with the sudden expansion of South American soy 
production, most dramatically in the central-west region of Brazil—an area that had 
long been considered non-arable.  For numerous macroeconomic and political reasons 
to be discussed below, exports of whole soybeans, however, did not really surge until 
the mid-1990s.  This agricultural and economic transformation of Brazil’s vast 
western frontier that began in the 1970s was the result of specific development, 
monetary, and agricultural policies that complimented world market conditions, 
perpetuating increasing global supplies of soy through both expansion of planted area 
and technologies that increased yields per acre in producing regions throughout the 
globe.  The long-anticipated growth in Asian demand for soybeans, meal, and oil had 
begun in earnest, and international prices—combined with specific government credit 
and land programs—created the right incentives to encourage soy cultivation in new 
areas of the country. 
Today, Brazilian production has caught up with (and may soon surpass) the 
volume grown and sold by the US in international markets.  But what is the nature of 
this growth in Brazilian production, and what does it say about the changing 
configuration of global agricultural systems?  How are these changes both reflected in 
and shaped by policy and patterns of investment—by both governments and by 
transnational agribusiness—in the production, movement, and industrialization of soy?  
Before tackling these questions, it is important to understand the complicated and very 
intentional process by which soy came to be such an important agricultural commodity 
in such an unlikely place. 
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Birth of the Brazilian Bean 
 Although rumored to have first been cultivated in the country around the 
beginning of the 20th century, the soybean remained a peripheral crop in Brazil’s 
agricultural system until the 1970s (Hasse, 1996).  Coffee had long dominated as 
Brazil’s main export crop with sugar and cotton coming in a close second and third, 
respectively.  Other major crops like corn, rice, and beans were grown almost entirely 
for domestic consumption, and it was in the context of import substitution and the 
political push to increase animal protein in the Brazilian diet that soy first became an 
important crop in the country. 
 Many authors point to the post-war era as a significant period in Brazil’s 
agricultural history, as the productive profile shifted from tropical export crops to a 
focus on domestic industry and consumption (Munhoz, 1982; da Nobrega, 1985; 
Delgado, 1985; Manoel, 1986; Welch, 2006).  Although systems of rural credit had 
existed since the colonial era (beginning with funds made available by the Portuguese 
Companhia das Índias Ocidentais for the purchase of slaves and equipment in the 
Pernambuco sugar industry in 1808 (da Nobrega, 1985), it wasn’t until 1937 and the 
creation of the Carteira de Crédito Agícola e Industrial (CREAI) that a comprehensive 
package of federal assistance to rural producers was implemented that included loans 
for production and storage, price protection, special lines of credit for perennial 
products, all the way to construction of schools and improvements to rural properties 
(Munhoz, 1982).  The CREAI was modeled after the Famers Home Administration 
and the Farm Credit System in the US in the wake of the global financial crisis of the 
1930s. 
 This shift coincided with the period of transition from the first (colonial) food 
regime to the second (industrial) food regime that Friedmann describes (1993).  The 
mobilization of farm credit grew out of the dual financial and ecological crises of the 
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1930s that coincided with the collapse of settler-colonial agro-economic relations.  
The legacy of the first food regime left a class of European diasporic farms whose 
non-capitalist structure prevented them from responding predictably to the collapse of 
world wheat prices.  As prices fell, farmers scrambled to produce more instead of less 
as the law of supply and demand would suggest.  New agrarian political movements 
and the rise of US hegemony after the Great Depression set the conditions for the rise 
of the industrial food regime (Friedmann, 2005).  These new credit systems—along 
with huge subsidy packages in both the US and Europe—constituted state support of 
surplus production by independent small commodity producers (Friedmann, 1978).  
This was in contrast to the organization of production along colonial-settler lines 
where both the economic and political function of agriculture was in service to the 
colonial power in terms of materially supporting industrialization of the European 
‘core’ and consolidating the political power of the state via diasporic resettlement and 
dissemination of European (agri)culture.  These political and economic functions were 
refocused by and on the settler states themselves after World War I. 
 This period from the end of the 1930s through the post-war era saw Canada, 
Australia, and countries throughout Europe put in place similar federal subsidy and 
credit programs designed to prop up struggling rural producers and provide safety nets 
in the face of unstable world prices (da Nobrega, 1985).  This began the era of what 
Friedmann calls the surplus regime, where these programs led to massive agricultural 
surpluses, especially in the US (1993). 
While many post-colonial countries like Brazil focused on import substitution 
and producing agricultural products to feed their burgeoning internal urban 
populations the US dumped its surpluses on the world market (as described above) as 
part of a geo-political strategy to create both food dependency and markets for US 
agro-industry.  This served to depress world food prices, which in turn prompted US 
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farmers to expand production (increasing surpluses) while at the same time 
undermining third-world producers.  In Brazil, internal export quotas and an 
intentionally overvalued currency discouraged agricultural exports as the country 
focused on import substitution, and so US dominance of world markets went 
essentially unchallenged.  As Manoel writes, “The role of agriculture in the 40s and 
50s was to provide resources for the emerging industrial sectors” (1985:23).  The 
outward orientation of US agriculture was unique in the post-colonial, postwar world.  
Brazilian agriculture was shaped by US policy, and also shaped it by providing an 
important destination for PL-480 food aid.  By 1960, Brazil was the 5th largest 
recipient of aid from PL 480 (Barrett, 2006). 
 Just as agriculture was central to colonial relationships during the first food 
regime, therefore, it was central to both state-making and nation-building in the 
second.  At the same time that international financial instability was forcing the 
creation of a new agrarian politics in the US and Europe, the Brazilian government—
feeling the effects of the unraveling of the first food regime with the breakdown of 
colonial relationships and fracturing of tropical commodity markets—looked to its 
own vast interior to revive its agricultural sector.  Soy and wheat were seen as anti-
colonial cultures modeled after the US processes of experimentation and varietal 
development.  “Differently from traditional cultures, at the same time a consequence 
and effect of a bureaucratic state and a patrimonial society, the new cultures of wheat 
and soy, piloted by these new farmers, created a pedagogy of effort and not of social 
status; of merit and not of tradition; of competence and not of privilege” (Zancopé and 
Nasser, 2005: 63).  The long-term viability of Brazil’s coffee plantations came into 
question due to increasingly harsh winters and a changing world market, and the 
country began to look beyond its traditional colonial agricultural system to new crops 
as well as new territories. 
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The “March to the West” was initiated in 1930 in the wake of the international 
financial crisis of 1929.  The interior states of Mato Grosso and Goias occupied 
strategic positions within the new nationalist discourse.  They were “offered to the 
country as a transformative panacea to the unemployed populations of the coffee-
growing regions, who had been transformed into agricultural proprietors on the front 
of the expansion of Goias and Mato Grosso” (Bertran, 1988).  Despite the credit 
programs described above, however, successful colonization of the interior continued 
to be thwarted by a lack of infrastructure to support productive agricultural 
communities (Pereira, 1995).  After three decades of strong federal support for 
agriculture—and particularly for production for the domestic economy—by the end of 
the 1950s, the Brazilian economy was facing an inflationary crisis.  By 1961, costs of 
agricultural inputs had risen 130%.  In 1966, Brazil experienced a 14.6% reduction in 
agricultural production (Munhoz, 1982). 
 The 2 decades preceding this economic breakdown had also seen notable gains 
for rural workers who had successfully organized and found a sympathetic political 
advocate in the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB—Partido Comunista Brasileiro).  
Long-festering discontent between workers and landlords in the coffee and sugar 
industries reached a new level as rural workers unions succeeded in organizing for just 
pay and working conditions.  The desire of planters to undermine rural workers’ 
newfound political power helped propel the coup that toppled the government of 
President João Goulart and installed a military dictatorship that lasted for two decades 
(Welch, 2006). 
 As will be described in more detail below, colonization of the central-west in 
the context of the second food regime served a dual purpose.  First, it shored up the 
planter class’s political support for the military government, and second it helped to 
relieve the intensifying pressure on agricultural land in the south as families grew and 
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land prices rose. The application of Green Revolution technologies in the south during 
these decades transformed southern Brazilian agriculture, and those who migrated to 
the central-west brought with them both the technology and the ideology of 
“modernized” agricultural production.4  The destabilization of the post-war food 
regime in the US that was taking place at this same time—in the 1970s and ‘80s—
opened the door for Brazil’s emerging soy economy to become crucial to that global 
commodity system. 
 
Historical Convergence: Death of a food regime, birth of a new agricultural frontier 
While there is some disagreement about how the first soybean arrived in 
Brazil5, it is clear that its cultivation and industrialization were, for many decades, 
exclusively confined to the southern states.  There are 2 main reasons for this.  First of 
all, the soybean itself was a temperate crop and could not tolerate the tropical climate 
of most of the country.  Therefore, it could not be grown north of São Paulo state until 
agronomists developed a variety that would thrive in the sub-tropical cerrado.  
Development of a tropical soy variety was one of the key instances of public-private 
collaboration that made Mato Grosso what it is today.  Second, until the early 1990s 
soy was primarily a domestic crop processed into oil for human consumption and meal 
for the domestic poultry and pork industries.  The industrial and population centers 
were in the south of the country, and this more “developed” area boasted 
infrastructure—both physical and financial—that much of the northern territory 
lacked.  In addition, the small proportion of meal that was exported came out of 
                                                 
4 This included using sophisticated plant breeding techniques to identify the photoperiodism of soy, 
which allowed researcher to adapt the plant to lower latitudes, the use of chemical fertilizers and 
fungicides, and intense mechanization. 
5 Competing reports credit the arrival of soy to either Japanese or European immigrants (Hassen). 
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crushing plants located near the 2 major points of exit—the ports of Santos in São 
Paulo and Paranaguá in the state of Paraná (Hasse, 1996). 
Before discussing these facts in detail, however, it is important to describe the 
combination of political, economic, and agronomic conditions that precipitated the 
northward migration of the bean beginning in the 1980s.  As described above, 
throughout the post-war era and until the early 1970s, Brazil had maintained powerful 
import-substitution policies, especially in agriculture.  The country had a long-
standing policy of being self-sufficient in wheat, even though there are very few 
places in the country where wheat can be grown, and even then it is much less 
efficient than production in the US.  However, self-sufficiency in wheat was one of the 
pillars of Brazil’s food safety policy.  Minimum price guarantees, government buying 
programs, tariffs, and subsidized credit allowed the domestic wheat industry to survive 
despite costs of production far higher than would have survived on the international 
market (Hasse, 1996). 
This does not mean that Brazil was self-sufficient in wheat.  On the contrary, 
as mentioned above, Brazil received substantial PL 480 food aid, and much of that 
was wheat.  In fact, Brazil’s commercial plus Pl 480 wheat imports averaged two and 
a half times greater than domestic production between 1955 and 1970.  PL 480 wheat 
as a percentage of total imports increased from 24% in 155-59 to 47% in 1960-64, and 
then decreased to 16% in 1965-69.  PL 480 imports averaged 28% of total imports and 
70% of domestic production from 1954 to 1970 when wheat shipments to Brazil 
ceased (Hall, 1980: 19).  However, agricultural economist Lana Hall argues that these 
concessional imports actually stimulated domestic production of wheat in Brazil 
because of specific policies requiring that revenues earned from selling cheap imports 
on the domestic market were to be directed to supporting domestic production.  At that 
time, the National Wheat Marketing Board administrated all sales and purchases of 
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wheat, including setting consumer price ceilings and producer price floors.  According 
to Hall, “The price at which the government [sold] imported and domestic wheat to the 
millers was generally higher than that which the government paid for the imported 
wheat, but lower than the established support price which the government paid to the 
domestic wheat producer” (Hall, 1980).  Therefore, the revenues earned from the sale 
of PL 480 wheat were put back into supports for domestic producers. 
This support for the Brazilian wheat sector played a crucially important role in 
the development of the southern soy economy.  One of the reasons that soy cultivation 
first became important in the south of Brazil was as a crop to rotate with wheat.  Soy is 
a legume and fixes nitrogen in the soil, which reduces the need for chemical fertilizers.  
Partly because of this and partly because of its usefulness to the burgeoning livestock 
industry, the government created incentives to encourage domestic industrialization of 
the oilseed.  Until the mid-1990s, the Brazilian soy processing industry was dominated 
by the domestic companies Seara, Ceval, Sadia, Perdigão, and Caramuru.  The 
government’s main tool used to protect domestic soy crushing was a tax known as the 
ICMS6.  This is a tax levied on all goods destined for export.  Any time an export 
product crossed a state boundary, the producer/manufacturer/exporter had to pay a tax.  
This helped keep whole beans in the country and eased the pressure on southern states 
that housed or were proximate to the major seaports. This tax, therefore, discouraged 
the production of raw materials for export, especially in the northern states that were 
farther from points of exit; the more state boundaries that had to be crossed, the higher 
the ICMS payment. 
However, as the ‘60s drew to a close and Brazil’s rate of inflation began to 
skyrocket, pillars of the import-substitution program—like an overvalued currency—
became increasingly difficult to maintain.  As was the case with many developing 
                                                 
6 Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (Tax on the Circulation of Goods and Services). 
  36
countries at this time, rising international debt meant dismantling the import-
substitution policies that had long helped to sustain domestic industry and agriculture, 
and a switch to an emphasis on export-led growth, primarily driven by expanding 
agricultural production of commodity crops for external markets.  This also 
constituted a crisis in the US-centered food system, as massive grain deals between the 
US and the USSR caused a short-term—but world-wide—food shortage (Warnken, 
1991; Friedmann, 1993). While crucial in the creation of soybean export capacity in 
Brazil, this was necessary but not sufficient to spur soy production in the hostile 
cerrado.  National political interests provided the needed impetus for such an unlikely 
project. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the military government7 intensified the 30-year-old 
project to “colonize” the remote corners of the central-west and Amazon regions of 
Brazil that were populated at that time by cattle ranchers, loggers, native peoples, and 
a few small producers. The “March to the West” that began in the 1930s was propelled 
by both ideological and economic factors.  The movement of the nation’s capital under 
president Jucelino Kubitschek from Rio de Janeiro to the Parecís plateau in the center 
of the country in 1960—and the miraculous construction of the current capital city of 
Brasília under the “50 Years in 5” plan—was a key element of the program of national 
integration that sought to unify Brazil’s vast territory.  Brasília was seen as the 
“trampoline to the Amazon” and provided a pole of development to link the central-
west and the Amazon regions to the more populous areas of the south and west.  As 
the country’s international debt mounted in the 1970s, the government pushed the 
“March” past the capital and into Mato Grosso, Goiais, and Pará by encouraging 
agricultural settlement of the region. 
                                                 
7 In power from 1964 to 1985. 
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Interestingly, the governmental organization generally responsible for land 
redistribution, colonization, and settlement—INCRA—began in 1971 to hand over 
that responsibility to private colonization businesses, such as “INDECO S.A.” 
(Integration, Development, and Colonization). These companies administered 
generous land grants to southern agricultural migrants—mainly from the states of Rio 
Grande do Sul (the gauchos) and Santa Catarina (Catarinenses) and to a lesser extent 
Paraná and São Paulo—to establish the latifúndios that would seed the growth of 
villages and towns throughout the vast frontier (Bertran, 1988).  In this process, 
indigenous peoples were placed on reservations and tremendous tracts of land—
divided into 1,000 hectare plots—were cleared of rainforest and cerrado to make way 
for enormous plantations of cattle, rice, sugar cane, and eventually soy (Hasse, 1996). 
The federal government supported these private colonization companies by initiating 
the construction of federal highways to connect the new settlements.  These included 
the Trans-Amazon highway and the Cuiabá-Santarém highway that remains 
incomplete to this day. 
In keeping perfectly with the ideology of the industrial food regime which 
emphasized intensified monocultural production focused on domestic development, 
these new colonies represented “a great undertaking that prompted the ‘interiorization’ 
of the population.  The public power, allied with the private sector, accomplished the 
transportation of the rural population and, obeying the logic of capitalism, turned in 
the direction of transforming unproductive lands into economic value for the market.  
The colonizing companies that arose as great advancements for the solution of 
agrarian problems, reflected and accomplished the objectives defined by the policy of 
national development: the integration of the central-west into the national economy 
and the occupation of Amazonia” (Bertran, 1988).  Perhaps even more importantly, 
Bertran presents the colonization by private companies as a “major project with an 
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ideological hallmark” that “presented as a panacea for the solution to the nation’s 
agrarian problems, or, more concretely, as an alternative solution to agrarian reform” 
(113).  In other words, this was an agrarian solution that fit with both the nation-
building principle of the second food regime, but it embraced the principle of nation-
building through privatization that anticipated the third food regime. 
Clearly, the colonization of the central-west by gauchos and their southern 
neighbors was not an uncontested process.  It was, indeed, largely ad hoc and 
therefore wrought with conflict that often became violent.  While not the main subject 
of this paper, suffice to say that the colonization of the central-west was and continues 
to be one of the world’s most under recognized ongoing substatal conflicts.  To this 
day, many land titles are disputed.  Even though official policy states that producers 
must have official land titles in order to secure federally subsidized credit, oftentimes 
multiple and competing titles exist for the same tract, and forgery is often alleged to be 
rampant.  However, as is evidenced by the numerous (and relatively prosperous8) soy 
towns that dot the vast cerrado, it has been successful (at least from the point of view 
of the soy pioneers).  The conversion of the cerrado into viable agricultural land, in 
turn, has been instrumental in the explosion of Brazil as a soy-exporting powerhouse.  
By the 1970s, the colonization process was underway, import-substitution was in 
retreat, and Brazil was at the vanguard of shaping a new food regime whose 
foundation lay in the second food regime project of nation-building through 
agriculture, but that ultimately was oriented squarely toward integrating Brazil’s 
heartland into the neo-liberal global soy commodity system. 
All of this political-economic groundwork, however, did not solve the 2 major 
agro-ecological obstacles to soy cultivation in Mato Grosso.  First, the soils of the 
                                                 
8 Many of these towns boast Human Development Index (HDI) ratings far above the national average, 
though stratification is pronounced, with soy growers literally living on one side of the federal highway 
and laborers living on the other. 
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cerrado were long assumed by agronomists to be too infertile to support substantial 
agricultural production.  However, in the mid-1950s, agronomists from the federal 
agricultural research institute (EMBRAPA) along with other research foundations9 
devoted considerable attention to ameliorating the poor quality of cerrado soils, and 
by the mid-1960s the widespread application of lime to acidic soils released nutrients 
and fertility skyrocketed.  This process essentially added millions of acres of new 
farmland to Brazil’s agricultural base. 
After rice and sugar had taken hold in the region, however, soybeans were still 
a strictly temperate crop.  The length of time that it took the beans to mature left the 
plants vulnerable to rampant tropical diseases and pests that did not exist in the 
temperate south.  Also, soy could not tolerate the high temperatures that predominated 
for much of the crop year.  Researchers from EMBRAPA and the Fundação Mato 
Grosso (FMT)—a coalition of private seed companies—began working to develop a 
variety of soybean that could tolerate the tropical climate found above the 24th parallel.  
Some of the funding for this research also came from the Japanese government.  
Traditionally Japan had been the world’s biggest importer of soy, and at that time their 
sole source was the US.  However, a constellation of geopolitical, economic, and 
climatic events threatened to destabilize that commodity chain.  In 1971, the US dollar 
was devalued which both threatened financial markets and increased demand for US 
exports.  Also in 1971, an El Niño caused massive crop failures in the US.  Between 
the crop failure and the run on exports, the US began to fear for its domestic soy 
industry and imposed an embargo on soy exports.  Between an uncertain supply and 
shaky investor confidence, both Japan and Western Europe began looking in earnest 
for a new source of soy, finding Brazil.  At that point, Brazil was already producing 
significant amounts of soy, but nearly all of it was consumed domestically, initially as 
                                                 
9 Including one funded, interestingly, by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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oil and eventually also as chicken and pork.  Japan saw potential in the Brazilian 
production capacity and began paying a premium for beans from Brazil as a way to 
incentivize the development of the sector (Warnken, 1999).  It wasn’t until some 30 
years later, though, that Brazil began to show signs of someday overtaking US 
exports. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  US and Brazilian soybean production.  Source: Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geographia e Estatisitcas (2007). 
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Figure 4.  US and Brazialian soybean exports.  Source: Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geographia e Estatisitcas (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Percentage of world soybean exports.  Source: Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geographia e Estatisitcas (2007). 
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This constellation of factors—the weakening of the US hegemony over the 
international food system, the failure of import-substitution, the military government’s 
colonization project, privately funded seed research, and the involvement of foreign 
government investment—created the conditions for the first plantation of tropical soy 
in Bahia (an eastern coastal state whose western extremity extends into the mid-
country cerrado and has since become another major soy producing region) in 1980 
(Zancopé and Nasser, 2005).  Unlike the southern domestically-oriented soy industry, 
the central-west agricultural region was created specifically to serve export markets, 
and therefore also a different ideological aim.  The collapse of the US-led food regime 
opened a door for Brazil and other country governments to undermine the American 
monopoly on commodity exports and therefore shift the balance of power in the global 
agro-food system away from the industrial north.  As is described in more detail in 
Chapter 4, this power shift both manifested in and eventually fatally compromised the 
WTO negotiations over an international Agreement on Agriculture.  In a sense, Brazil 
became the leader in ushering in a new food regime based on markets organized by 
corporations with the complicity of both New Agricultural Country governments 
(Friedmann) and agricultural importers.  And this new Brazilian agriculture began 
with and continues to hinge on soy. 
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Soy Comes to the Cerrado: The arrival of the corporate food regime 
Illustration 1.  Map of Brazil with Mato Grosso highlighted. 
 
As the cattle ranches of the cerrado as well as hundreds of thousands of acres 
of virgin savannah were converted to soy, the tensions and contradictions of the 
second food regime became visible in Brazil’s agricultural sector.  These tensions 
were clearest in the attempts of agricultural policy in the 1980s to strike a balance 
between liberalization and protection of domestic agricultural production still 
vulnerable to high interest rates and volatile prices.  Availability of rural credit had 
expanded dramatically in the previous decade which helped to shore up the large 
landholdings that reflected the military government’s commitment to a certain kind of 
modernization of agricultural based on highly mechanized, large-scale commodity 
production (Munhoz, 1982; Manoel, 1986).  As external balance-of-payments 
problems grew, restrictions were imposed on rural credit disbursements, but the 
system continued to favor large operations. 
Throughout the 1970s, 80s, and into the 90s, the government maintained 
minimum price supports as well as taxes that discouraged raw material exports, which 
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together created incentives for Brazilian soy to be crushed domestically.  When the 
international farm crisis converged with Brazil’s fiscal woes in 1980, the Brazilian 
government began pushing exports in earnest through policies such as the devaluation 
of the currency (that had long been deliberately overvalued in order to discourage 
exports and make imports more affordable), abandonment of the wheat program, and 
the relaxation of the export surplus theory (dictating that exports consist only of what 
is not consumed domestically) (Warnken, 1999).  All of these policies contributed to 
rising soy meal and oil exports throughout the 1980s and 90s, but it wasn’t until after 
the one policy protecting the domestic crushing industry was repealed that the soybean 
export boom really accelerated. 
As described above, up until the mid-1990s, taxes had been in place that 
protected domestic crushers by imposing a state-to-state transport tax on all raw 
materials destined for export.  This encouraged internal industrialization and meant 
that most of the beans grown in Brazil were crushed there as well and then either 
consumed domestically or exported as meal or oil.  This was a grave disadvantage to 
the central-west soy industry, however, because domestic crushing capacity was 
already more or less saturated with soybeans grown in the south, and to get soybeans 
from Mato Grosso to a port, several state boundaries must be crossed. 
In 1996, however, passage of the Lei Kandir lifted this tax on grains and other 
primary products and in the next decade, whole soybean exports10 grew by 290% 
(Rezende et al, 2001).  Because the central-west region is far from the southern 
industrial centers and even today boasts little crushing capacity of its own, the 
skyrocketing production of soy in that area and the skyrocketing exports of whole 
beans from the country overall were mutually dependent historical processes. 
According to economist Luís Carlos Vitali Bordin: 
                                                 
10 Primarily to Japan and Europe. 
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The Constitution of 1988 consecrated the understanding that only 
industrialized products, those that produce more added value and 
generate national industrial jobs in processing and manufacturing, 
should have the benefit of immunity from taxation.  The “Lei Kandir” 
destroyed this vision and increased the dispensation of all goods.  This 
change, although positive for the international competitiveness of 
Brazilian products in general, provoked significant alterations in the 
commercialization of some economic complexes.  In the case of soy, in 
Rio Grande do Sul, the export of whole soybeans was stimulated at the 
expense of internal processing.  This had the repercussions of 
generating processing jobs elsewhere and the reduction of labor in local 
industries. 
 
This shift began to shape the Brazilian soy sector in line with the contours of 
the third food regime.  The paradigm of national agriculture for national development 
that characterized the second food regime gave way to the incorporation of national 
agricultures into global markets facilitated by transnational agribusiness.  The 
“national interest” was, therefore, redefined from self-sufficiency to market 
participation, which was eventually most clearly reflected in the Agreement on 
Agriculture that came out of the 1994 GATT negotiations creating the World Trade 
Organization. 
The radical shift in the profile of the Brazilian soy sector reflects these broader 
changes in the food regime.  The figure below shows the relative exports of 
unprocessed soybeans, soybean meal, and soy oil.  It is clear from this illustration that 
1996 was indeed a watershed year for the Brazilian soy industry, as the industry’s 
export profile changed dramatically after the passage of the Lei Kandir. 
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Figure 6.  Brazilian soy and soy product exports.  Source: USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service (2006).  
 
According to an agricultural economist at the University of São Paulo, 
transnational agribusinesses supported the Lei Kandir because it allowed them to ship 
soybeans to be processed elsewhere. However, according to a Brazilian trade lawyer, 
when the law was being discussed in the mid 1990s and most of the domestic crushing 
capacity was Brazilian-owned, the biggest soy industry trade group, the Brazilian 
Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE) opposed the repeal of the tax.  At 
that time, the head of the association was César Borges de Sousa, also the chief of 
Caramuru, Brazil’s (then) largest domestic soy crusher and poultry processor.  At that 
time, ABIOVE did not support the Lei Kandir because it essentially acted as a 
protection for domestic soybean processors—Brazilian feed, poultry, pork, and 
cooking oil producers.  At the time of my fieldwork, however, the leadership of 
ABIOVE had transferred to Carlo Lovatelli, also the chief of Bunge—headquartered 
in White Plains, New York, and currently the largest transnational corporation in 
Brazil.  Homem do Mello assured me that the Association now supports the law. 
According to Fábiano de Triguinheiro, spokesperson for ABIOVE at the time 
of my research, that organization meets regularly with representatives of the Brazilian 
government “to help, to influence in a positive way, to bring information, to bring 
  47
naturally, suggestions, suggestions for action, suggestions for partnerships, 
suggestions for strategy…”  What is interesting here is not simply that private industry 
has influence over government, nor is it that transnational businesses are enjoying 
such access to another country’s system of government.  What is interesting is that, 
despite intimate knowledge of the negotiation and passage of such acts as the Lei 
Kandir, nearly everyone I spoke with—from farmers to government officials to 
industry and TNC representatives—reified the market to such an extent that it took on 
a life of its own.  In this particular case, the passage of the Lei Kandir and the dramatic 
changes that it clearly produced in the Brazilian soy sector are not seen by private 
actors as constitutive of the “market” to which they claim to be responding. 
What is interesting is that this market is being constructed in an historical 
moment characterized by the increasing globalization of capital and production 
systems.  The Brazilian soy industry is being integrated into a global soybean system 
where the fate of Mato Grosso is at least in part determined, not only by the tax laws 
of the Brazilian government, but also by the tax laws (and market structure, and 
production standards, and intellectual property regimes, etc.) of Argentina, as well as 
China and India, and these institutional structures are not determined solely by state 
sovereignty.  At the time of my research, the tax laws in Argentina closely resembled 
pre-Kandir Brazil, where incentives to export value-added products remained in place.  
Therefore, rather than build more refineries in Brazil, it made more sense to crush 
Brazilian soy in Argentina, or in China or India, the location of the end-user.  Clearly 
Brazil’s tax structure helps to configure not only Brazil’s market, but also the markets 
of other countries integrated into to the global soy commodity system.  While I cannot 
go so far as to say that Cargill has a master plan that involves manipulating tax law to 
discourage the industrialization of soy in Brazil, Cargill’s investment patterns 
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(mentioned above) show a strategy that fits well with the policy developments in 
Brazil encouraging the export of whole beans. 
This also reflects the transition from the second food regime where the 
“national interest” was defined in terms of domestic industrial development to the 
third food regime where “national development” is seen to be facilitated by increasing 
exports and integration into global markets.  This is what Hall and Biersteker call “the 
authority of the market”.  They argue, “When state leaders proclaim that the “forces of 
the global market” give them little room for maneuver or independent policy choice, 
they are participating in the construction of the market as authoritative.  They are not 
only ceding claims of authority to the market, they are creating the authority of the 
market” (2002: 6).  What is fascinating is that the vast majority of people I 
interviewed participated in the same construction, and the fact is that transnational 
corporations do it too.  When I asked Pedro Camargo, president of the pork producers’ 
association, whether the soy TNCs had a strategy for configuring the global market in 
a particular way, he said, “They will export what the market wants to buy.  If the 
market wants to buy meal and oil they will export meal and oil.  If the market wants to 
buy the bean they will export the bean”.  This kind of statement puts the market “out 
there”, beyond both the corporations and the state when clearly as can be seen from 
the example of the Lei Kandir, the interaction of the private sector and the state 
created a particular market in Mato Grosso that articulates with markets in other states 
that are similarly configured.  It was in the context of the historical shift in both the 
structure and the ideology of the food regime that soy cultivation in Mato Grosso 
finally surpassed southern soy production and the structure of the Brazilian (and 
indeed global) soybean market changed dramatically. 
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The Private International Soy Regime in the Central-West 
 Today, there exists in the central-west a private international soy regime that is 
made up of transnational corporations, trade industry groups, rural producers and their 
unions, public-private partnerships for infrastructure development, research institutes, 
and local, state, and federal governments.  The “economic issue area” (Cutler, 2002) 
that these parties participate in structuring is the larger soybean complex, which 
includes everything from road construction and financing to the production of the 
beans themselves.  The concept of a regime—in both the “private” way I use it here as 
well as in the slightly different context of the “food regime”—allows for the 
reorientation of our analysis away from state-centric structures of governance toward 
an understanding of how non-state actors participate in the construction of the material 
reality of a particular market and its underlying legitimated authority (Hall and 
Biersteker, 2002). 
 Insofar as there is a consensus among scholars that a third food regime is or 
would be built at least in part upon a corporate-centered rather than state-centered 
system of food production, distribution, and consumption, the theory of a private 
regime helps to concretize some of the particular ways in which corporations and other 
private actors work in concert with the state to orient national economies toward 
global markets.  According to political theorists, private regimes rest upon the 
legitimation of private authority, a process with which both states and private actors 
actively participate (Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Cutler, 2002).  The soy regime can be 
defined in terms of the structures of the soy market itself but also by the ideology that 
legitimates its expansion throughout the central-west and allows it to triumph over 
vociferous and plentiful protests from the environmental and landless peasant 
communities who argue that soy cultivation results in environmental degradation, 
exploitative labor relationships, land concentration, and violence.  Hall and Biersteker 
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argue that the difference between power and authority is that authority is legitimated, 
institutionalized power and that it involves a level of trust between the authority and 
the subject.  They write: 
People, institutions, and states recognize the authority of tradition, the 
authority of expertise, the authority of moral claims, and sometimes 
even the authority of a “natural” inequality.  These forms of authority 
“import some general claim on human trust into a social relationship in 
order to introduce an additional pressure for conformity beyond that 
which the relationship itself can exert…if obedience is the counterpart 
of power, trust is the counterpart of authority (2002: 9 [Kreiger, 1977: 
259]). 
Embedded in the authority of the soy regime in Mato Grosso, therefore, is trust that 
the environmental and social costs of soy production are outweighed by the economic 
(and presumably therefore developmental and social) benefits to the “nation”.  In 
interview after interview, deforestation within the Amazon region and allegations of 
slavery were downplayed if not absolutely denied.  There is a widespread belief in the 
soy sector that the international focus on soy by environmentalists is really a ploy by 
the North to undermine the competitiveness of Brazilian agriculture.  The discussion, 
therefore, is framed in the context of “national” interests versus foreign interests, be 
they environmentalists, politicians, or farmers.  The president of the National 
Agricultural Confederation in Brasília told me: 
I think there is a lot of misinformation out there, for example, about the 
environmental question in BR.  That soy is expanding through the 
deforestation of the Amazon.  And clearly there is a relationship that 
we recognize.  There is a relationship between the expansion of soy in 
the central-west region through the cerrado, the savannah…. But the 
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growth of soy in the central-west is generally taking the place of 
degraded pasture.  Most of the growth has been in productivity, not in 
new areas planted.  And so this senator [Grassley—referring to a letter 
sent by Grassley about US concerns about Brazilian soy production] is 
concerned about environmental issues, the deforestation of 
Amazonia…… A recent report produced in Brazil shows that 
deforestation in the Amazon has fallen.  It has increased in the cerrado 
but has decreased in Amazonia.  And so I think a big worry of the 
lawmakers in the US is really the increase in production of soy in 
Brazil, because we can compete in soy. 
The president of the Mato Grosso Agriculture Foundation frames this 
competitiveness in clearly in terms of the greater social good when he says: 
We’re trying to stimulate production to try to help make up the lack of 
proteins, no only for our brothers in the Northeast, the Brazilian, who is 
often dying from malnutrition, but this is also a problem of our African 
brothers and in Eastern Europe where people have a lack of protein.  
And so…the rich countries [must] begin to give Brazil credit for all of 
these questions for all the ways that we are helping the world. 
The national interest is defined, then, in specifically relational terms and in a 
specifically global frame.  This includes competitiveness in corporate-centered 
international markets that are structured in the neo-liberal model. 
 As is discussed in the next chapter, this is expressed in specific terms in 
the relationships between soy farmers and agribusiness that dictate the 
conditions of production and are underpinned by moral authority of market 
rule.  In examining Mato Grosso’s incorporation into a global soy market with 
the specific role as source of raw material for an industrial soy complex, the 
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theory of private regimes helps to specify the mechanisms of the third food 
regime by rejecting state-centric notions of authority and crystallizing the role 
of private actors in a project that resolves apparent contradictions between 
“national interests” and “corporate interests” by using the moral authority of 
the market to define the former in terms of the latter.  In other words, in the 
case of Brazilian soy, engagement with and competitiveness in international 
markets becomes a national priority, which puts pressure on farmers to reduce 
costs and increase profitability.  This is in direct opposition to previous policy 
models that privileged inefficient, uncompetitive domestic production over 
what could be gained from the world market specifically because the “national 
interest” was defined in a different way—in terms of ‘developing’ the ‘national 
community’ (economically speaking at least) as opposed to participating in the 
global market place. 
 Specifically, there are many avenues by which the private regime has 
transformed the landscape of Mato Grosso into perhaps the largest agricultural 
monoculture in the world.  First, a partnership between the state and private 
capital was instrumental in contributing to the research that yielded the tropical 
soybean.  Second, the gradual selling off of Brazil’s domestic-owned crushing 
capacity to foreign investors shifted the focus of the industry away from 
domestic meat production and towards integration into a global 
bean/meal/oil/feed complex.  Finally, it is clear from patterns of corporate 
investment in storage and processing facilities that Mato Grosso plays a 
strategic role in the global soybean networks that are controlled by these 
companies11.  It appears that Mato Grosso is being “cultivated” as a source of 
                                                 
11 The influence of these corporations in politics—particularly at the federal level—will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
  53
industrial raw material for ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus’s crushing 
plants in Argentina, China, and India. 
 One of the first examples of this was in the development of the tropical 
soybean seed.  The seed industry in Brazil has long been the arena for the emergence 
of a variety of public-private partnerships between (mostly domestic) seed companies 
and various government agencies coming together to conduct research on both seed 
development and soil fertility.  Many of these types of partnerships preceded the 
formation of The Fundação Mato Grosso (Mato Grosso Foundation—FMT), but the 
FMT was uniquely the “fruit of collective action of soy seed producers [and] an 
example of an organization of the private sector assuming roles previously assumed by 
the State” (Nasser, 1998).  This foundation was crucial to the development of the Mato 
Grosso soy industry, and specifically succeeded both economically and 
technologically where a long list of state institutions and public-private partnerships 
between EMBRAPA and private seed companies and producers had failed.  Nasser 
argues that the FMT succeeded primarily because it was able to eliminate the “free 
rider” problem (all farmers benefiting from research even if they hadn’t contributed to 
funding it) that had stifled the capitalization of other ventures by selling quotas of new 
seed varieties in advance to multiplicadores, or companies that would grow out and 
sell the seed to farmers.  These quotas allowed the multiplicadores exclusive license to 
sell the seeds.  Intense concentration of the Mato Grosso seed industry (there existed 
then only 40 discrete seed companies) facilitated monitoring of these agreements 
(Nasser, 1998).  In this way, this unique private agricultural initiative both allowed 
and was allowed by the particular capitalistic structure and high level of concentration 
in the Mato Grosso soy industry. 
 Second, as the domestic soy crushing industry lost the implicit protection it 
enjoyed before the passage of the Lei Kandir, TNCs quickly bought up the struggling 
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sector.  In 1997, Sadia’s soy processing arm was acquired by ADM and Bunge 
purchased Ceval Alimentos, which was at that time the largest soy processor and 
leading producer of soy meal and oil in Brazil.  In 2004 Cargill Agricola (the US 
company’s Brazilian unit) acquired Seara Alimentos and with that, 3 of the 4 largest 
domestic soy processors passed to foreign hands.  This helped connect Brazil’s soy 
industry to international markets by incorporating Brazilian growers into the global 
networks managed by these transnationals. 
Finally, it is clear from patterns of investment that TNCs are keen to develop 
Mato Grosso to fit a particular niche within the global soy commodity system.  
Throughout the central-western soy boom, transnational agribusiness has been 
reluctant to invest in additional regional crushing capacity.  Many corporate officials 
say this is because Mato Grosso’s infrastructure is so poor that it doesn’t make 
economic sense to invest any more money than necessary in the region.  Although it 
may seem counter-intuitive to produce and export on a massive scale a low-value, 
high-volume product from a remote area with unpaved roads as the only outlet, it 
makes perfect sense for agribusiness.  By exporting whole beans rather than buying 
and processing them domestically, these companies are able to pass on nearly all of 
the cost of transportation to the producer because the price paid at the farm gate is 
discounted by the cost of transport—alarmingly high in the remote towns of the 
cerrado.  The farmers themselves even pay three-quarters of the cost of paving the 
roads upon which they then have to pay to have their beans trucked.12  The beans can 
then be shipped—often via the companies’ own rail cars or ocean liners—to their 
subsidiary crushing plants, feed mills, and oil refineries in China, bringing the 
processing of the final product much closer to the consumer base. 
 
                                                 
12 See Chapter 3. 
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Figure 7.  China and Brazil soybean production and crush.  Source: USDA 
Economic Research Service (2009). 
 
Although two of the largest crushing plants in the world are located in Mato 
Grosso’s two largest cities—Rondonópolis and Cuiabá—both ADM and Bunge were 
quick to implement massive layoffs at the first rumblings of the 2005 soy crisis.  
While foreign investment in Brazilian crushing did increase in tandem with the soy 
boom in the early 2000s (mirroring contractions in North American crushing), it is 
clear that ADM, Cargill, Bunge, and Dreyfus are looking towards the tantalizingly 
undeveloped consumer markets of China and India when deciding to invest in new 
crushing capacity.  Goldsmith et al. (2004) point to clear trends that corporate 
strategies favor expanding production in Brazil, but expanding crushing in Argentina, 
China, and India while shrinking industrialization in North America and the EU.  The 
annual growth rates for soybean crushing capacity tell the story: Brazil—7%; India—
14%; Argentina—15%; China—41% (FAS, 2006). 
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But markets are not the only factors influencing corporate investment 
decisions.  Pedro Camargo—a trade lawyer who orchestrated the Brazil WTO cotton 
case (described in Chapter 4) and current head of the Brazilian pork industry 
association, as well as a member of the influential International Agriculture and Trade 
Policy Council (IPC)—insists that the TNCs do not have a specific political strategy 
and that they are just responding to “market forces”.  He says, “Around the world you 
have a different market for meal and oil.  One country wants to import mostly oil, 
another mostly beans, so sometimes you need to process it somewhere else.  But these 
are market forces”, suggesting that they are independent of policy decisions.  But then, 
in the next breath he says, “And this affects not only Brazil but it affects, like 
Argentina has a very different policy than Brazil with their export tax.  A differential 
export tax between beans and meal so that of course affects their…..they are extremely 
competitive, and it affects the way transnationals decide where they are going to put a 
new plant, how well this export tax protects the industry or not”.  Essentially, 
Camargo is first denying then asserting that policy structures competitiveness. 
By presenting “market forces” as something outside of and independent from 
the actions of states and firms—something to be reacted to or taken advantage of—the 
leader of one of Brazil’s largest agro-industry trade groups legitimates market 
authority at the same time that he clearly acknowledges the importance of state action 
in constructing, shaping, and facilitating those disembodied “market forces”.  This is 
an important point in understanding the convergence between the third food regime as 
I specify it here in this chapter and private authority.  Despite the fact that “national 
economies [are] being subsumed and rearticulated into the global system,…National 
borders are not irrelevant.  Nation-states have differing interests and objectives, and 
attempt to enforce their will on firms and other governments; national boundaries still 
create ‘significant differentials on the global economic surface’.  The critical point, 
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however, is that globalization implies that the national economy is no longer the unit 
of economic accounting or the frame of reference for economic strategies.” (Kobrin, 
2002).  In the third food regime, therefore, the state does not disappear, and what 
appear to be state-centric agricultural policies persist in some places, though 
irregularly.  The significant point is that market comes to be seen as arbiter of last 
resort.  To say that ADM, Cargill, and Bunge are responding to “market forces” by 
exporting whole beans rather than soy meal and oil is at least somewhat misleading 
due to the fact that those exported soybeans are being crushed in plants either wholly 
owned or operated in partnership by those very same corporations. 
These geo-economic trends in production and processing signal a new era for 
the global soy commodity system.  For the first half of the 20th century, Western 
Europe and Japan were the decided leading importers of soybeans, meal, and oil.  
However, even in 1972, Houck et al. predicted that “by 1975, large net imports by 
India and Mainland China are anticipated, which will add these countries to the list of 
major world importers” (14).  In 2003, China imported a record 20.7 million tons of 
soybeans and surpassed the European Union to become the world’s largest importer of 
whole beans, and imports have continued to rise dramatically since then (Tuan et al., 
2004). 
Chinese oil and meal consumption have increased dramatically in recent years 
due to rising population and incomes, but it is interesting to note that imports of these 
products have not kept pace with imports of whole beans. 
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Figure 8.  Chinese soy production and trade.  Source: FAS, IBGE (2008). 
 
In fact, while China is by far the largest single importer of soybeans—
responsible for more than a third of total world imports—it remains a net exporter of 
soybean meal (Tuan, 2004).  This is where the link between China and Brazil, and 
particularly between China and the state of Mato Grosso, becomes important.  With 
the passage of the Lei Kandir, Brazil made a specific decision to shift the marketing 
focus of its soybean sector from industrialized soy products (meal and oil) to whole 
soybeans.  The subsequent rise in whole bean exports mirrors almost exactly the rise 
in China’s whole bean imports.  What this shows is that Mato Grosso’s soy economy 
is being constructed with direct reference to agro-economic changes taking place in 
China.  The soybean industry there is not simply something in which Brazil has a 
natural comparative advantage and therefore produces in order to fulfill some national 
developmental goal.  The state of Mato Grosso is being specifically cultivated by 
TNCs as a source of industrial raw material to feed the burgeoning Chinese meat and 
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oil sectors.  This is an arrangement that is almost reminiscent of the first colonial food 
regime only now the colonial power is not a state—it is Cargill. 
In the last decade, TNC investment in soy crushing has quietly exploded in 
China.  As Koh Chin Ling of the International Herald Tribune reports, “Bunge, the 
world's biggest oilseed processor, is leading a charge by overseas companies to buy 
soybean-crushing factories in China, where demand for animal feed is rising as people 
eat more meat” (2006).  In reality, Bunge is a relative latecomer to direct investment in 
Chinese crushing capacity, following first ADM and then Cargill by almost a decade 
(Li, 2003).  While Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus are responsible for almost 90% of soy 
exports to China, they are also controlling an increasing share of crushing capacity 
there.  Thirty percent of ADM’s worldwide crushing capacity is located in China. 
India, too, is an increasingly important demand market in the global soy 
system.  As demand for edible oil rises in India, these companies are concurrently 
looking to locate more brute oil refining in that country (Li et. al, 2003).  In 2004, 
market disruptions in China related to avian flu temporary destabilized soy demand 
and soy prices there (Tuan et al., 2004), and so while there is consensus that in the 
long term that market will continue to grow, farmers were prompted to turn their 
attention more actively toward India.  This is the case for US soy producers as well, 
and in December 2006, in an unprecedented show of transnational cooperation among 
large soy producers, farmers from the US and Mato Grosso participated in a “joint 
grower trade mission” to Mumbai, India designed to improve market access in that 
country (American Soybean Association, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, while farmers are often thought 
to be the unwitting victims of the corporate food regime, they are inexorably 
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incorporated into and therefore dependent on it.  More importantly, though, they 
become its agents, promoting its extension as a way to preserve their own livelihoods 
even as the total value of what they produce is expropriated by the companies that rule 
the regime.  In fact, farmers themselves contribute to the legitimation of the regime’s 
authority in the specifically Gramscian way that Cutler, Hall and Biersteker, Korbin, 
and others describe.  As was apparent during the Brazilian agricultural market crisis of 
2005/06, “national citizens lay responsibility for financial crises and for their 
resolution squarely at the door of national governments”, which I argue reinforces the 
legitimacy conferred upon market rule by the public sector (Pauly, 2002: 76).  As was 
the case with the government bailout of soy farmers, rarely do the state actions that 
result from these crises fundamentally challenge the corporatist ideology of the 
productive system.  Rather, they serve to support and reinforce it.  What appear as 
moments of conflict and challenge of the neo-liberal market mechanism are what 
Gramsci deems consent in disguise.  I argue that the corporate food regime does not 
cast the state aside, nor does it necessarily replace state supports and protections for 
national agricultures with rules mandating greater market liberalization.  It is not 
necessarily about free markets, but rather profits for agribusiness underpinned by neo-
liberal ideology legitimated by state collusion (that is specifically not always about 
liberalization) (cf. Peine and McMichael). 
As described in the introduction, there appears to be a lack of consensus 
among scholars as to what the third/corporate food regime looks like, what defines it, 
and whether or not it is here yet.  I argue, however, that if we use the corporate food 
regime as an analytical tool rather than trying to pin it down as a static category, it can 
illuminate the nature of relations that define the current historical moment in the 
global agro-food system.  Scholars working to develop the private regime concept are 
generally trying to move away from state-centric notions of governance that dominate 
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international relations and to elaborate a theory of private international regimes that is 
historically specific and captures the growing authority of private actors in the current 
neo-liberal conjuncture.  This is useful to attempts to specify a third food regime 
insofar as it is generally understood to be a move away from state-centric agricultural 
policy to a corporate-centric system of organization.  What that actually looks like on 
the ground is the subject of the next chapter.  The historical perspective presented here 
shows how Brazil’s soy industry is the product and exemplar of the new state and 
corporate strategies to integrate national and regional agro-economies into global 
markets that are governed increasingly by private actors and public-private networks 
that define the third food regime. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FARMING CAPITAL ON THE BRAZILIAN SOY FRONTIER 
 
  Illustration 2.  A soy truck in Campo Novo dos Parecís. 
 
Introduction 
 The soy industry in Mato Grosso is one of the most dramatic agricultural tales 
of our time.  In most versions of the soy story—whether lauding soy’s role in the new 
Brazilian era of geopolitical and economic power (Hasse, 1996; Zancopé and Nasser, 
2005) or decrying its contribution to environmental destruction, labor exploitation, and 
the disappearance of local food systems (Steward, 2007; Wallace, 2007; Lilley, 
2004)—the main protagonist is ‘agribusiness’.  This category is generally assumed to 
include both the corporations that buy, transport, process, and trade soy as well as the 
large latifúndios that produce it.  This category of ‘agribusiness’ is often further 
juxtaposed with the category of ‘small (family, peasant) farmers’ (Wittman, 2005), 
suggesting that these two categories of rural producers are mutually exclusive and 
defined by distinctly recognizable sets of interests.13  This chapter argues that these 
                                                 
13 Other authors such as Helfand (1999) do a very good job of disaggregating categories of producers. 
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essentialized categories play into the hegemonic discourse of the corporate food 
regime, both by defining economic and productive significance as directly 
proportionate to the level of integration into the global food system that the producer 
experiences, and also by obscuring the tensions, conflicts, and exploitation present 
within the ‘agribusiness’ category.  The first task of this chapter is to examine the 
juxtaposition and political-economic significance of these two categories.  The second 
is to disaggregate the ‘agribusiness’ category in order to expose both the power 
relations that obtain within the soy regime, and the ways in which the state is deployed 
by private interests, both producers and by firms. 
Here I elaborate the lived experience of the corporate food regime, which 
highlights important nuances missed by a purely institutional analysis.  Moran et al. 
make an important intervention in food regime scholarship by addressing the social 
foundation of global regulatory structures.  The authors argue that there is a gap in the 
food regimes literature wherein the “way that farmers are integrated into world food 
systems and the reasons why they have been able to influence this integration” have 
been ignored (Moran et al., 1996: 248).  In a sense, then, they render the food regime 
concept dialectical and nuanced beyond an instrumentally regulatory understanding.  
Like these authors, I see soy farmers as active participants in the soy regime and 
specifically use the regime concept to highlight relations of regulation and control in 
the soy industry. 
Primarily, I argue that the Mato Grosso soy farmer is not simply a 
homogenous, complementary component of a unitary international soy regime.  
Rather, Mato Grosso soy farmers constitute a heterogeneous and complex group of 
actors in the construction of that regime whose relationships to agribusiness 
corporations, the state, nature and community are varied and often contradictory.  The 
interests of soy farmers do not coincide directly with the interests of agribusiness 
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companies, and the exploitation of soy farmers by these companies is often hidden by 
including them in the category of ‘agribusiness’, the presumed perpetrator of 
exploitation (of nature, labor, the state, etc.).  This chapter seeks to highlight the 
complexity of those relationships in order to understand the political and economic 
influence of the private international soy regime and its internal contradictions. 
Again, it is important to point out the theoretical implications of using the 
conceptual term ‘soy regime’ or ‘agribusiness regime’ as opposed to simply 
‘agribusiness’.  The arguments of this chapter are predicated on a critique of that latter 
term insofar as it tends to equate the interests of firms and individual soy farmers.  
This obfuscation is common in literature criticizing soy cultivation in Mato Grosso 
and other parts of north-central Brazil for its contribution to deforestation, evidence of 
labor exploitation, associated land-grabbing, and other environmental hazards such as 
the use of agro-chemicals and GMOs (cf. Wallace, 2007; Lilley, 2004; Kenfield, 2008; 
Scott, 2009).  Soy farmers are demonized as agents of “agribusiness” and are often 
referred to as one and the same14.  I, on the other hand, separate ‘soy farmers’ 
(constituting a complex and varied group themselves) from ‘agribusiness’, arguing 
that the interests of the two categories—to the extent that they themselves can be 
distilled—are actually often in conflict.  Environmental groups that lump farmers into 
the same categories as TNCs, therefore, not only aim at the wrong target, I argue, but 
also provide cover for the agency of the soy regime to subvert the attempts at social 
regulation of the sector. 
In addition to the rhetoric of the NGO sector, the elision of the distinction 
between corporations and farmers also results from a level of abstraction employed by 
government officials and industry representatives when discussing international trade, 
                                                 
14 For example, see Rainforest Action Network’s piece “What Is Agribusiness?” at 
http://action.ran.org/index.php/What_is_Agribusiness%3F 
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monetary, and farm policies that benefit corporate interests.  By including producers in 
the category of ‘agribusiness’, these policies can enjoy greater political legitimacy 
because ‘citizens’ rather than simply corporations (many of them transnationals) are 
said to benefit.  Therefore, the inclusion of producers and corporations in the same 
category is useful to both the environmental/social and corporate agendas (whether the 
term ‘agribusiness’ takes on pejorative or nationalistic overtones), but it does not 
reflect the reality of the relationship between farmers and firms.  This is an important 
point because the fractured nature of the category has implications for the deployment 
of both movements against exploitative agricultural systems and domestic policy 
designed to assist the “national agricultural sector”. 
By any account, the creation of Mato Grosso’s soy sector is a dramatic story.  
In 1980, Mato Grosso produced just over 100,000 tons of soy.  In 2008, farmers 
harvested nearly 180 million tons (FAMATO).  Often, the tale of soy’s colonization of 
the central-west region includes an image of the soy farmer alternatively as a 
marauding land-grabber or Brazilian national hero, either way impelled by the military 
government to “settle” the Amazonian frontier, subdue the wild landscape (both 
natural and human) and serve the Brazilian national project by cultivating soybeans 
for the export market, thereby helping to pay down Brazil’s international debt and 
usher Brazil into the new class of “emerging economies”.  As described in the 
previous chapter, Mato Grosso’s soy farmers were born in the waning years of the 
industrial food regime, and this chapter specifies the ways in which they anticipate a 
model of the third, or corporate food regime.  Key to understanding the relations of 
power and accumulation that underlie this regime, I argue, lies in disaggregating this 
category. 
Deploying ‘agribusiness’ as a category that encompasses both producers and 
TNCs disguises some of the most important mechanisms of accumulation that operate 
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in the neoliberal agricultural paradigm.  Relations of exploitation that exist between 
farmers and firms are one of the main sources of accumulation, and although soy 
farmers in Mato Grosso are relatively well-off compared to many subaltern social 
groups, understanding their exploitation is crucial to understanding the power of 
transnational corporations to shape the food system. 
This chapter disaggregates the conceptual category of ‘agribusiness’ based on 
3 primary empirical observations: 1) the government’s role in reinforcing essentialized 
categories of rural producers; 2) the significance of the credit relation; 3) the blurred 
line between the public and private sectors.  In other words, federal farm policy, 
credit, and the privatization of public works like infrastructure provide three specific 
locations where the conflation of soy farmers’ and corporate interests have serious 
implications for the social and environmental outcomes of both soy farming and small 
family farming in Brazil. 
As this chapter will show, soy farmers do indeed often benefit from the status 
quo at the expense of other (mainly smaller, poorer, and often indigenous) farmers.  
However, to conflate soy farmers and agribusiness corporations obscures the relations 
between them that clearly place the farmer at a disadvantage in his or her ability to 
actually participate in and benefit from the international market.  This has serious 
implications for the future of food and farming, concentration of corporate power in 
agriculture, and global market integration.  In order to understand the functioning of 
the international soy market, we must understand the relationship between commercial 
farmers and transnational agribusiness corporations.  First, however, it is important to 
understand why the political bifurcation of agriculture is useful to the international 
agribusiness regime and what the implications are for agricultural policy, access to 
resources, and the structuring of production. 
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Classifying Farmers: ‘Peasant’ vs. ‘agribusiness’ 
In Brazil, the category of ‘agribusiness’ has been strategically constructed as 
oppositional to ‘peasants’ or ‘family agriculture (agricultura familiar).  Here, farmers 
are commonly divided into 2 groups by size (large farmers/latifúndios and small 
farmers/camponeses) and/or degree of market integration (commercial/empresarial 
and family/familiar).  Within these classifications, assumptions about technological 
advancement, productivity, and economic contribution are deeply inscribed.  Those 
assumed to be producing for subsistence or small local markets, and those who 
produce for industry are usually analyzed as distinct and mutually exclusive, as are 
their respective modes of production.  Despite real-life farmers constantly 
confounding that distinction—commercial farmers who maintain a kitchen garden or 
subsistence farmers who sell surplus to agribusinesses—the ideal-typical categories 
persist in both academic analyses (e.g., De Lacerda, 1985) and in policy. 
These distinctions are not merely instrumental.  The bifurcation of agricultural 
production has certainly been an animating dynamic throughout Latin America and the 
world in the era of structural adjustment and the industrial food regime.  The particular 
form of agricultural restructuring that has taken place in Mexico (Cabello, 2003), the 
Dominican Republic (Raynolds, 2000), Chile (Murray, 2006), and of course Brazil 
(Murray, 2006; Welch, 2006) since the 1980s in the context of neoliberalism has 
resulted in a drastic transformation of the Latin American countryside, as well as food 
systems across the continent.  Intensifying land concentration, the divestment of 
millions of small farmers, and urbanization followed agricultural reform and the Green 
Revolution of the 1960s.  The increasing dominance of latifúndio agriculture and the 
configuration of agricultural policy to specifically privilege this type of production has 
resulted in the dramatic restructuring of agricultural systems as is discussed in Chapter 
2. 
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However, to take these categories of peasant and agribusiness as 
undifferentiated obscures the processes of exploitation through which much of the 
world’s food supply is produced.  In order to understand this, the categories must be 
disaggregated.  Harriet Friedmann provides a good example of how this can be done in 
her 1978 article “World Market, State, and Family Farm” where she unpacks the 
“commercial farmer” at the turn of the 20th century.  She argues that within the 
category of farmers producing for the export market there existed 2 significant sub-
groups: capitalist and simple commodity producers.  What differentiates the two is that 
the former group hires its labor and the latter depends on family labor, while both 
produce tradable commodities for the world market (as opposed to subsistence 
producers whose primary use of their product is direct reproduction of the family unit 
(Friedmann, 1978). Of course, Friedmann’s categories are historically specific and my 
intention here is not to argue that we can still find these same categories of producers 
today.  Rather, her method of differentiating modes of production based on far more 
dimensions than simply subsistence versus market is useful in the Brazilian context in 
that these distinctions shed light on important differences in wage, property, and 
production relations.  Second, the presumptive duality of “small” versus “commercial” 
farms is starkly reflected in federal policy, and this reveals interesting assumptions 
about agriculture and how it is shaped by the state. 
In her discussion of the “environmental soy” movement in Brazil, Corrina 
Steward categorizes “soy actors” as “local government, agribusiness, conservation 
NGOs, and small farmers” (2007: 107).  The absence of “large soy farmers” as a 
category and their subsumption within ‘agribusiness’ is significant.  Steward’s 
category of “small farmers” includes farmers that both participate in the market and 
produce for their own subsistence, while the category of “agribusiness” includes both 
large, “capitalist” soy producers and agribusiness corporations.  This is significant 
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because one aim of Steward’s article is to determine the “winners” and “losers” of 
Amazonian development.  By situating soy farmers and agribusiness together in 
opposition to the colonos, or “small farmers” as she defines them, Steward perpetuates 
a commonly simplified view of ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ in the Amazon: soy versus 
forest, soy versus small farmers.  It is undeniable that soy has indeed been directly or 
indirectly responsible for the dramatic transformation of the central-west landscape in 
the last 20 years, as has been well-documented by scholars, NGOs, and popular media 
alike (Wallace, 2007; Lilley, 2004; Kenfield, 2008; Scott, 2009; Zancopé and Nasser, 
2005; Fearnside, 2001; Hasse, 1996).  However, the complex stories of the soy 
farmers themselves are rarely the subject of critical analyses.  I argue that the internal 
dynamics of the private international soy regime, including the collusion and conflict 
between corporate capital and the state, are obscured when large farmers are 
uncritically folded into the category of agribusiness. 
This classification is common in academic, policy, and advocacy circles.  The 
assumption is that the interests of large capitalist producers and agribusiness 
corporations generally coincide.  As my research from Mato Grosso shows, this is not 
at all the case.  I argue that in order to understand the successful advancement of the 
export-oriented soy industry in Mato Grosso and the successful obfuscation of the 
political construction of that market, it is crucial to analytically disaggregate large 
farmers from corporations (to unpack the category of ‘agribusiness’) and examine the 
relationship between them.  This relationship is evidence of the processes by which 
private rule over a market is accomplished, and more generally, the role of neoliberal 
ideology in that process. 
The capitalist development of agriculture cannot be understood by the Marxist 
industrial metric because family farmers’ mode of production does not fit into 
conventional categories of wage and profit relations (e.g., Lewontin, 2000; Friedmann, 
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1978; Friedmann, 1987; Abramovay, 1998).  The proletarianization of the artisan that 
characterizes industrial development in the manufacturing sector has not been 
mirrored in agriculture.  Although land ownership and production have indeed become 
drastically more concentrated, production remains rather diffuse compared to other 
industries.  Also, “corporate” farming (characterized by an absentee owner of a large 
operation run by a manager with a large labor force), while more common in some 
sectors such as horticulture and increasingly dairy, has not overtaken agricultural 
production on balance (Lewontin, 2000).  Part of the reason for this is because 
economies of scale do not improve with farm size after a certain point (Reidinger and 
Kang, 2000; Lewontin, 2000).  Even as farmers increasingly hire occasional—and 
usually seasonal—labor, these operations are failing to take on the aspect of “factories 
in the fields” as foreseen by Marxist theory (Goodman and Watts, 1997; Friedland, 
Sorj and Wilkinson, 1995; Sorj, Goodman, and Wilkinson, 1987). 
One of the primary constraints is the wage/profit relation.  As Kautsky 
predicted, the capacity of family farms to maintain competitiveness through self-
exploitation helps guard against the development of classical agrarian capitalism 
(Goodman and Watts, 1997).  Most farms that survive in the US are able to reproduce 
no more than the family unit (often supplemented by off-farm income).  Excess profits 
are often invested in machinery that stretches the capacity of the farm family’s own 
labor.  Again, with notable exceptions like meat, horticulture, and increasingly dairy15, 
farms in the US context tend to expand to the point that the land can still be worked 
using primarily family and occasional supplementary wage labor.  In explaining the 
competitive superiority of US family-based agricultural production in the early 20th 
century, Friedmann argues that the household mode of production must meet “a very 
                                                 
15 Although the majority of dairy farms in the US still maintain herds of less than 100 cows, a small 
number of mega-dairies account for a large percentage of production (cite Guptill). 
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strict condition: that technical requirements allow combination of means of production 
with the quantity of labor on average available within commercial households” (563). 
In other words as farms get bigger, tractors and combines must increase in size in 
order to allow cultivation of a greater area with the same number of workers. 
While this remains true, increasing concentration continually pushes the limits 
of family labor.  At some point, mechanized milking operations cannot accommodate 
additional cows without additional human labor.  This is one reason for the increase in 
illegal labor on US dairy farms.  The “family farmer” can no longer keep it in the 
family.  While family labor still accounts for the majority, expenditures on outside 
labor become necessary.  And so yes, “family farms” still account for a significant 
proportion of US agricultural production.  Yes, “family farmers” employ primarily 
unpaid family labor.  But yes, these same farmers—to infinitely varying degrees—do 
rely on wage workers.  So who is the “family farmer” and who is the “capitalist 
producer”?  Friedmann usefully untangles these categories at the turn of the last 
century, specifying variations within the category of “family” or “small” farmer as 
well as specifying the role of state policy in constructing that particular type of farmer.  
Similarly, I set out to disaggregate the category of ‘agribusiness’ in modern-day Mato 
Grosso in order to specify the respective roles of corporations, soy farmers, and the 
Brazilian state in (re)producing the farmers and modes of production found on the 
Mato Grosso soy frontier. 
 
Who are the Soy Farmers? 
The majority of soy farmers in Mato Grosso were part of or descended from 
the wave of immigrants from the southern states that began when the military coup in 
1964 precipitated a land-grab that continued in earnest through the 1980s (see Chapter 
2).  They brought with them the customs and accents of the south, and you still see 
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many tractors equipped to carry a thermos of hot water and a clay mug for the mate (a 
type of tea) that the gaúchos (Brazilians from the state of Rio Grande do Sul) drink all 
day long.  Most of these farmers left the south in search of new lands after their family 
farms in the south could no longer be subdivided to reproduce multiple generations of 
farm families.  Often one brother would stay on the family farm while the other(s) 
would head north for the newly available lands of the cerrado.  Besides the land give-
away, many government programs such as subsidized credit to invest in machinery 
created incentives for these migrants to establish very large estates. 
The average farm size in the center-west region of Brazil is 5,224 acres, more 
than 15 times the size of the average Iowa farm (353 acres).  In Mato Grosso, 
therefore, farm size has outgrown the ability of technology to decrease labor 
requirements.  In the central-west region of Brazil, 217 hectares are required to 
produce one rural job in conventional, export-oriented agriculture (Wittman, 2005: 
30).  However, even within the category of “soy farmer” which Steward generalizes to 
a homogenous set of identity and production relations, great variability exists in: 1) the 
farm owner’s reliance on hired labor; 2) the degree to which the proprietor acts as an 
“owner-operator” or a manager of others’ labor; 3) the degree of independence from 
transnational agribusiness corporations; 4) the ability to freely participate in the 
international soybean market; and 5) the degree to which the owner sees him/herself 
either as a “farmer” or as an entrepreneur. 
There does seem to be a pervasive identity that resonates among central-west 
soy farmers.  As Steward argues, “Soy farmers view themselves as fulfilling national 
economic goals when they purchase land, clear it, prepare it, and cultivate soy for the 
export market.  As one farmer explained, ‘Soybean farmers believe they are national 
heroes’” (2007: 111).  This was confirmed by my research as well.  One farmer I 
interviewed proclaimed, with a sweeping gesture indicating a vast swath of virgin 
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cerrado land, “In 5 years this will all be soybeans.  We are the pioneers”.  As recently 
as April 2008, it was reported in the Folha de São Paulo that the governor of Mato 
Grosso, Blairo Maggi, argued that deforestation is Brazil’s national duty to help 
alleviate the food crisis gripping much of the developing world (www1.folha.com.br).  
As Brazil’s economic perspective has shifted from a focus on import-substitution to a 
global, export-oriented view, it makes sense that soy farmers specifically producing 
for the global market are furthering the “national interest” while small family farmers 
are more likely regarded by the federal government as vestiges of a previous 
developmental period and while they must be supported for the sake of poverty 
alleviation and political stability in the countryside, their economic relevance is 
dwarfed by the vast quantities of soy flowing through Brazilian ports.  This distinction 
is institutionalized in the very structure of Brazilian farm policy. 
 
A Tale of Two Agricultural Ministries: Privileging the capitalist production relation 
 In the Brazilian federal government, two separate ministries oversee 
agricultural policy: the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply (Mapa) 
which represents big, industrial, export-oriented agriculture, and the Ministry of 
Agrarian Development (MDA) which represents “family farmers” (their term), 
subsistence farmers, and landless settlements.  In this way, the federal government 
separates 2 classes of agricultural policies: those that are framed as dealing with 
‘agricultural’ issues, and those that are framed as addressing ‘rural poverty’.  This 
division succeeds in marginalizing the policy priorities of the latter group, as is easily 
seen when comparing the annual budgets of the 2 ministries: in 2005 Mapa’s annual 
budget was R$2.54 billion, while that of the MDA was only R$1.4 billion—just over 
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half.16  By defining one set of policies as oriented towards the alleviation of misery 
and the other towards the promotion of economic growth, the representation of each 
group’s contribution to the “national interest” is skewed, especially since “family 
agriculture” is crucial to domestic food security in Brazil; seventy percent of Brazil’s 
domestic food supply is produced by agricultura familiar (www.mda.gov.br). 
 The assumption embedded in this division, however, is that Mapa is supporting 
production of commodities for the market, while the MDA is supporting reproduction 
of poor rural communities.  In keeping with the urban bias embedded in theories of 
modernization, rural life is by definition equated with poverty.  As one federal official 
in charge of the agriculture department in the ministry of foreign trade in Brasília told 
me, “I pretty much agree with Marx that a farmer is just a sack of potatoes.  The 
idiocy of rural life is not for me.  My grandmother had a banana tree in her back yard 
and some people may find that beautiful, but I just see poverty”.  So the anti-rural bias 
exists even in government ministries charged with setting agricultural trade policy.  
Clearly this man would agree with Marx on another point as well, that farms becoming 
“factories in the fields” is part of capitalist development, and industrialization 
succeeds in “rescuing a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural 
life” (Marx, 1888/1978: 469).  This reflects the Brazilian government’s separation of 
its duty to alleviate the misery of the rural population from its duty to promote 
industrial agricultural production in the “national interest”. 
This is because smallholder agricultural production is not seen as contributing 
to a neo-liberal economic development program that requires industrialization and 
modernization of the agricultural sector.  In an article coauthored by prominent 
Brazilian agricultural economist Marcos Jank, the stark division is put this way: 
                                                 
16 Which corresponded, roughly, to the contribution of each sector to Brazil’s GDP in 2003: 20% for 
agronegócio patronal and 10% for agronegócio familiar (MDA, 2004). 
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If Brazil continues to trade off economic development with support to 
small-scale farmers, it will suffer the consequences of the "visibility 
curse." As the country has progressed as a global economic force it has 
greater influence, but at the same time comes under greater scrutiny. 
Increased market share and activity in global agrifood trade requires 
that the country be increasingly vigilant as to how it comports itself. 
Resorting back to subsidy programs and import barriers of a bygone era 
in order to help small farmers survive could affect the country's ability 
to negotiate for freer markets and gain access to important foreign 
markets (Chaddad and Jank, 2006). 
 
The authors argue that the creation of the MDA in 2000 clearly drove a 
political wedge between agricultura ‘patronal’ and agricultura ‘familiar’ and they 
warn against the “rhetorical backlash” that funneled more resources to land reform 
during the latter years of the Cardoso government than in previous administrations.  
The authors clearly claim that this is a movement “backward”, away from the progress 
and modernization in agriculture led by the soy sector that Brazil has accomplished 
since the 1980s. 
However, the separate jurisdictions of the 2 ministries are really aiming at the 
same thing: providing a safety net that guarantees the reproduction of rural producers, 
and by extension, the relative forms of exploitation to which they are subject.  
Although Friedmann was examining family farming on the US agricultural frontier at 
the turn of the previous century, her point that agricultural production is not possible 
without the reproduction of rural populations, and vice versa, is relevant here.  
Although both categories of farmers are essentially being reproduced by state 
programs, the rhetorical construction of small family farmers as the reproducers of the 
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rural and urban poor and large commercial farmers as the producers of agricultural 
export commodities allows for the marginalization of the former, as the latter is 
privileged in the neoliberal development model.  This division of labor is favorable to 
capital because it essentially enables the proliferation of ‘independent’ commodity 
producers who assume the risks of farming while leaving the reproduction of poor 
urban and rural populations (a decidedly less profitable business than producing 
industrial “HVFs” (high value foods) for middle class consumers) to smaller, poorer 
producers. 
The assumption that some farmers are primarily producing while others are 
reproducing justifies the unequal resources of the two ministries and by extension the 
availability of resources to different groups of producers.  Ever since ISI began to be 
replaced by export-oriented economic structures on order of the World Bank and IMF 
as conditions for the receipt of development investment and currency-stabilizing loans, 
governments were required to privilege production for export (in order to earn much-
needed foreign exchange) over production for the domestic market.  This legacy 
continues to this day, although it has been strategically de-politicized by the ideology 
of neoliberalism.  As David Harvey argues, 
this treatment [the requirement of neoliberal policy reforms in 
exchange for a financial bailout] became standard after what Stiglitz 
refers to as a ‘purge’ of all Keynesian influences from the IMF in 1982.  
The IMF and World Bank thereafter became centers for the 
propagation of ‘free market fundamentalism’ and neoliberal orthodoxy.  
In return for debt rescheduling, indebted countries were required to 
implement institutional reforms, such as cuts in welfare expenditures, 
more flexible labor market laws, and privatization.  Thus was 
‘structural adjustment’ invented (2005: 29). 
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Despite a great leftist hope when Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva was elected president of 
Brazil in 2002 on a populist platform and largely by the urban poor, the Lula 
government has proven to be a classic example of what Harvey calls a “neoliberal 
state apparatus”, and the state government of Mato Grosso is leading the federal 
government by example in privileging a model of economic growth that is founded on 
robust agricultural exports.  Despite industry claims that the government is 
disproportionately supporting small farmers, the supply of subsidized agricultural 
credit for industrial agriculture tells a different story.  At the state level, the 
privatization of infrastructure development has become a model of investment for the 
country as a whole, and the unique economic relationship between farmers and private 
(and largely foreign) agribusiness anticipates a prototype of the corporate food regime. 
 
Political Construction of Markets through Credit Distribution 
Throughout the world and at various scales of production, agriculture runs on 
credit.  The distribution of credit in Brazil, from both public and private sources, is 
one of the most contested aspects of agricultural policy.  Access to credit appears in 
any discussion of the viability of rural populations in every country in the world.  Lack 
of access to credit is responsible for farmer suicides in India that result from farmers 
entering predatory relationships with moneylenders (Sengupta, 2006).  As dependence 
on technology increases, the need for credit intensifies as well, as inputs become 
increasingly commodified where they may not have been before.  (Farmers may buy 
seeds where they used to save and replant their own, or buy chemical fertilizers where 
they used to use waste from their own livestock, green manure, or crop rotation to 
increase soil fertility). 
While the need for rural credit is nearly ubiquitous, the institutional structures 
that make it available, both public and private, vary tremendously from country to 
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country.  In order to understand how the structuring of agricultural credit in Brazil 
codifies the neoliberal bifurcation of agriculture and reinscribes exploitative 
relationships between farmers and agribusiness (particularly in Mato Grosso), it is 
useful to explore the differences between Brazil’s credit model and that of another 
large agricultural exporting nation: the United States. 
Farmers large and small need credit for many reasons: 1) to purchase inputs 
such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides and other agrochemicals, and professional services 
such as soil analysis; 2) to purchase or pay rent on land; 3) to purchase equipment; 4) 
to build structures for storage of both grain and equipment; 5) to reproduce the 
household.  Because of the cyclical nature of agricultural production, farmers do not 
have a steady flow of income throughout the year, which often means that the time of 
year when purchases need to be made does not coincide with the time that they are 
selling their produce.  Also, though some farmers earn enough surplus that they are 
able to save and self-finance their following year’s planting, most earn just enough to 
keep themselves and their families alive until it is time to plant again, requiring them 
to borrow in order to finance planting.  Hopefully, then, they earn enough from a 
year’s harvest that they are able to pay off their planting loan and sustain their families 
until the following crop year. 
 Because of the cyclical nature of farm income, access to credit becomes a 
crucial resource for most farmers, from the most modest family-run operation to huge 
industrial producers.  Farmers in different countries around the world rely on different 
combinations of public, semi-public, and private institutions to provide the financing 
that is their lifeblood.  In the US, the biggest provider of credit nationwide is the 
farmer-owned and government-sponsored Farm Credit System (FCS), which provides 
about 30% of US agricultural lending (www.farmcredit.com).  While at this point 
entirely privately funded, the FCS was created by the federal government in 1916 and 
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still enjoys an implicit federal guarantee on securities it sells on the global market.  
This allows the FCS to borrow funds at a cost just slightly higher than the federal 
funds rate and therefore to extend credit to rural markets that might be abandoned by 
banks or other commercial lenders (Jolly and Roe, 2005). 
 Farmers who cannot get credit from a commercial source because of a lack of 
capital (usually beginning farmers or those suffering substantial financial or 
environmental setbacks) can apply for loans directly from the USDA that guarantee a 
4% reduction on prevailing interest rates (USDA).  The 2002 Farm Bill relaxed some 
of the requirements for receiving USDA loans which expanded the base of eligible 
borrowers and made it easier for beginning farmers to secure funds.  Loans from 
private banks and dealer financing of equipment purchases also figure into the US 
rural credit landscape, but they are less significant than the sources of credit listed 
above.  Clearly, access to credit is crucial to the US agricultural system, but investing 
in the rural economy can be risky and low-yielding.  This reality is not limited to the 
US context. 
 Though the risks of agriculture are universal, credit instruments are not.  In 
Brazil, two primary challenges face farmers seeking credit: 1) a prevailing interest rate 
far higher than that in the US, and 2) far less diversity in terms of sources of rural 
credit.  As of the time of this writing (August 4, 2008) the current federal reserve rate 
in the US stands at 2%.  In Brazil, the current interest rate is 13%.  Therefore, access 
to international credit markets is crucial for farmers there, which usually comes 
through either the Banco do Brasil or transnational agribusiness. 
 Throughout my research in Mato Grosso, one of the biggest challenges that 
farmers perceived was access to credit.  Though credit is a nearly ubiquitous concern, 
it is a different kind of problem for farmers in Mato Grosso than it is for farmers in the 
older agricultural regions of southern Brazil.  Just as the southern states of Rio Grande 
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do Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná, and São Paulo comprise the traditional center of 
agriculture in Brazil, farmers there are also more reliant on traditional forms of credit.  
First of all, farms in the south tend to be smaller.  In 1996 (the most recent data 
available), 72% of farms in the south were less than 500 hectares, while 78% of the 
farms in the central-west region are larger than 500 hectares.17  In fact, one 
cooperative in Paraná cites 65% of its members holding less than 50 hectares 
(Gasques, 2004).  Partly because of size but also because of climate and proximity to 
ports of entry for imports, the cost of production is lower in the south.  According to 
the Organization of Cooperatives of Paraná (Ocepar), “the technology of Paraná is 
quite varied, but the general mode is not very dependent on resources from outside the 
establishment.  It uses little fertilizer, little agrochemicals, the farmers buy seed 
varietals (which are seeds produced by farmers themselves).  This means less demand 
for credit, because the establishments are not terribly complex productive units” 
(Gasques et al., 2004: 11).  Here, fewer farm inputs are commodified and the scale of 
agriculture is smaller (requiring less land and equipment); therefore the reliance on 
foreign agribusiness is greatly diminished.  By extension, access to subsidized credit is 
less important. 
 Most farmers in the south get credit from the Banco do Brasil or from 
members of cooperatives such as Ocepar.  In 2002, the credit offered by cooperatives 
in Paraná went predominantly to small farmers—64% to farms under 50 hectares.  In 
Mato Grosso, a soy farm of less than 50 hectares is almost unheard of.  This is because 
of the way that land and credit18 was distributed during the military government, 
which reinforced the state’s objective to encourage the production of export 
commodities on the agricultural frontier.  Because land was practically being given 
                                                 
17 Source: Ministério de Agricultura, Pecuaria, e Abastacimento. http://www.agricultura.gov.br/ 
18 For example, the MODEFROTA program that subsidized purchases of large equipment. 
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away, large latifúndios became the norm in Mato Grosso.  In the early period of the 
frontier’s development, many southern farmers proved unable to adapt to the 
drastically different growing conditions of the sub-tropical region and land 
concentration intensified as abandoned holdings were absorbed neighboring farms.  
Farm size has a huge impact on a producer’s need for extra-governmental sources of 
credit because subsidized credit is allocated by producer, based on the product.  So for 
example, each individual soy farmer is limited to a maximum of R$200,00019, 
regardless of how many hectares (s)he plants.  Therefore, subsidized credit makes up a 
much smaller percentage of a central-west farmer’s financing than a southern farmer, 
simply because the scale of production in Mato Grosso is so much more expansive and 
cost of production is so much higher. 
In Brazil, R$200,000 is enough to finance about 115 hectares of soy.  But the 
average farm size in Mato Grosso hovers around 2,000 hectares (that’s about 5,000 
acres).  In the 2004/05 harvest season, the resources available at this subsidized rate 
accounted for only around 6% of total production costs in Mato Grosso.  The other 
94%, at an interest rate of around 15%, came directly from agribusiness (Menegheti, 
2005).  While some southern states actually received more federal funding for 
commercial agriculture than Mato Grosso, this can be attributed to the fact that, 
because farms are smaller, there are more producers receiving the per-farmer limit. 
But what does this mean exactly?  Why does it matter where rural credit is 
coming from?  First, the availability of government-subsidized credit both expresses 
the developmental priorities of the state, clearly divides farmers into 2 distinct groups, 
and marginalizes smaller producers.  This is clear in that the federal government 
outspends on “commercial” agriculture 5-1 over “family” agriculture (Mapa, 2008).  
However, contradictions arise within the category of “commercial” farmers with the 
                                                 
19 Credit allotment as of 2004. 
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comparison of “commercial” farmers in the south/southeast and those in the central-
west.  This comparison shows that that the perception of privilege masks the ways in 
which the large soy farmers of Mato Grosso are locked into a market structure that is 
arguably more exploitative than the one in the south.  It is difficult for critics of the 
Brazilian soy economy to see soy farmers as exploited.  However, in order to fully 
understand the political economy of the emerging Brazilian soy regime, it is important 
to more closely investigate the category of the privileged, capitalist soy farmer and to 
take a critical look at how credit relationships between these producers and 
agribusiness exploit the farmer in the interest of agribusiness, and to look beyond soy 
farmers and agribusiness as a unitary category. 
 
Soy Farmers and Agribusiness: An uneasy partnership 
It seems clear that the contract functions simultaneously as both a means of 
subordination and a point of resistance. 
—Michael Watts, Living Under Contract 
 
 Like many “middle-class peasants” producing for export markets throughout 
the global south, soy farmers in Mato Grosso depend on contracts with agribusiness to 
both access those markets and to finance each planting season.  As argued above, most 
soy farmers in Mato Grosso get only a small percentage of their financing from the 
Banco do Brasil or any of the other federal programs designed to help them.  The 
majority of their funding comes directly from the soy buyers/brokers/processors that 
line the roadsides of every single Mato Grosso town: ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Maggi, 
Coinbra (Louis-Dreyfus).  Contracts in Mato Grosso serve to guarantee TNCs a steady 
and reliable flow of beans.  They also allow companies to tie purchase of soy to sales 
of inputs as farmers pay off their agrochemical costs in sacks of soy.  These businesses 
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are not banking institutions.  They are soy exporters.  Therefore, most of this farmer 
debt is held in soybeans, not in currency.  According to one farmer, “agriculture has 
three currencies: soy, dollar, and real.  When I’m insecure I guarantee all my loans in 
sacks of soy.  This is the most stable currency” (Menegheti, 2005). 
However, when the farmer ceases to have control over his or her produce, 
when a corporation has a claim on the soybeans before they are even harvested, the 
farmer is unable to participate in the market.  While some growers may find a degree 
of stability in having a guaranteed market for their produce, it is not hard to see why 
many are unsatisfied with this arrangement that is in many ways much more favorable 
to agribusiness.  For one thing, farmers must sell their beans to their creditors first, 
which means these businesses buy beans at harvest time when prices are at rock 
bottom.  Second, in the event of crop failure, farmers have no other way to pay back 
their loans, and so they must promise a larger proportion of their harvest in the 
subsequent year.  Eventually, most if not all of their product is owed in advance to one 
of these 4 major buyers.  The president of the Mato Grosso farmers’ association 
(FAMATO), Homero Pereira, expressed his discontent with this system: 
We do not have an alternative form today.  As long as the government 
doesn’t liberalize resources for rural credit, the producer doesn’t have 
any other option than to be bound to the transnationals.  We know that 
it is not the desire of all producers to be in these relationships.  The 
desire of the producer is to get capital from a source of financial 
resources, and to owe in financial resources as well, rather than in 
produce.  Because the biggest problem that we have with the system 
here today is not so much the interest rates that you pay to the 
transnationals, but the market opportunities that you lose.  Because 
when you get financing you tie yourself, you compromise so many tons 
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of grain and so you lose sometimes a market much larger than your 
own interest rate.  And so to be in debt to a financier and to remain in 
control of your own product is obviously much better. 
What Pereira is expressing here is something that recurred often in my conversations 
with farmers: frustration at the lack of independence they felt as producers, despite the 
equally widespread rhetoric that they were able to produce soybeans without 
government assistance.  As Michael Watts argues, “The contract, to the extent that it 
ties the grower to the buyer or broker through credit, carries the potential of 
transforming the independent grower into a sort of bonded laborer, or at the very least 
of eroding the purported autonomy of independent and “uncaptured” peasants” (Watts, 
1994).  By specifically holding debt in product rather than cash, agribusiness is in 
effect thwarting the mechanisms of both financial and agricultural markets, 
guaranteeing a captured supply of raw material at interest rates of their own 
determination.  The reality of agricultural commerce in Mato Grosso, therefore, in no 
way resembles a ‘free market’. 
Pereira however, like many farmers I interviewed, expressed a deep market 
fetishism, regarding markets as a priori mechanisms through which the laws of supply 
and demand operate like the laws of gravity and thermodynamics.  In describing this 
type of market fetishism, Polanyi writes, “Their [economic liberals’] whole 
philosophy hinges on the idea that laissez-faire was a natural development, while 
subsequent anti-laissez-faire legislation was the result of purposeful action on the part 
of opponents of liberal principles. …  While we assert the inherent absurdity of the 
idea of a self-regulating market system would have eventually destroyed society, the 
liberal accuses the most various elements of having wrecked a great initiative” (1944: 
141, 145).  This philosophy crept into discourse about the Brazilian soy industry 
throughout my research, from farmers, government officials, and agribusiness alike.  
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In particular, in an age where markets are truly global, the failure of laissez-faire 
principles can be ideologically traced to unfair government intervention in other soy-
producing countries whose policies undermine the ‘great initiative’ of the Brazilian 
soy industry.20 
Interestingly, however, farmers were as critical of corporate concentration in 
the soy sector as Adam Smith would have been.  They regarded the contracts that they 
must enter into with agribusiness as perversions of free market principles since they 
are unable to operate as free and independent actors in that system.  Of course, the 
existence of a soybean market in the state of Mato Grosso in the first place is, as 
described in the previous chapter, a construct of the state.  In addition, the credit 
system itself and the macroeconomic factors that influence it—interest rates, currency 
values, etc.—are creations of state policy.  In short, farmers signing contracts with 
transnational agribusiness are participating in the market form that has been structured 
through cooperation between capital and the neoliberal state. 
Clearly, although financially far less desirable a situation, debt peonage to 
agribusiness is more in concert with neoliberal principles than reliance on government 
subsidies.  This is reflected in the rhetorical tendency of farmers to profess their 
independence from government handouts, while nearly in the same breath 
complaining about being under the thumb of Cargill.  This illustrates what Harvey 
might call one of the internal “tensions and conflict” within the theory of the 
neoliberal state whereby markets allow for or create externalities that threaten their 
own foundations (2005: ch. 3).  The example of Mr. Pereira shows clearly how the 
interests of soy farmers and corporations are often at odds despite their 
interdependence, and complicates the inclusion of farmers in the conceptual economic 
category of “agribusiness”. 
                                                 
20 See Chapter 4. 
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 This is not to oversimplify the situation and say that farmers are bound to only 
one source of credit or that their relationship with corporate agribusiness is unitary.  
These relationships are constantly being re-negotiated, but farmers remain, as 
McMichael says of the antebellum cotton regime in the US south, “bound to the credit 
system in general” (1991:19).  Like the cotton plantations that McMichael analyzes, 
soy farms in Mato Grosso are only able to exist due to their absorption into the global 
credit facility (1991).  By de-monetizing the credit relation, however, producers are 
unable to actually participate in markets, and cease to be the owners of the commodity 
they produce.  When a farmer’s debt is held by a corporation in sacks of soy, the 
farmer loses the freedom to make marketing decisions about his or her own produce.  
In any given harvest season, the degrees of freedom may vary (this is one thing that 
distinguishes soy production from the type of contract farming seen in US pork and 
poultry industries).  This is not a unitary process and de-monetization is not 
ubiquitous, but the degree to which this occurs proportionally limits the degrees of 
freedom that the individual farmer enjoys to take advantage of or insulate her/himself 
from the vagaries of the market. 
 The informal nature of many of these credit relationships also reflects the 
realization of neoliberal preferences in structuring markets.  While neoliberal 
rationality certainly favors formal rules of commercial interaction, it is the particular 
ways in which these rules are circumvented that contribute most significantly to the 
governance of the soy market by agribusiness.  In other words, functional rationality is 
trumped by substantive rationality when formal means are not the most effective at 
achieving neoliberal ends.  For example, farmers are formally required to possess land 
titles in order to receive either public or private credit.  While this requirement may be 
enforced in the public realm, it is strategically overlooked in the private one.  Many 
farmers I spoke with claimed that if you’re big enough, have a good production 
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history, or have a personal relationship with a buyer, the corporations will overlook a 
missing or obviously forged land title in granting commercial credit.  In theory, a 
contract ensures a mutual relationship between two parties, enforced by some rule of 
law, which adheres to the rules-based rationality of neoliberal economics.  However, 
the asymmetrical enforcement of this relationship in practice serves to deepen the 
power of transnational capital over “independent” growers (cf. Watts, 1994).  The type 
of contract most common in Mato Grosso has a minimal a priori structure, which 
allows maximum manipulation of market power by TNCs. 
 The most common type of credit contract in Mato Grosso is the Cédula do 
Produtor Rural (CPR).  This is a very simple and flexible type of contract that 
essentially is a promise on the part of the producer to deliver a certain quantity of 
grain at harvest time.  The company, therefore, has a claim on X number of sacks of 
that producer’s grain.  The amount is determined by the costs of the inputs that that 
producer receives from the company.  For example, if the producer has a need of 
US$150,000 in input costs (fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, herbicides, etc.) the 
company figures out how many sacks of grain the producer needs to deliver to cover 
that amount.  The price is generally set at 30% of the price on the futures market.  
Although prices have risen significantly since the time of my research, the prevailing 
prices at that time serve as an illustrative example to show how the contracts work.  In 
2005, Cargill set the price at $5/sack.21  With US$150,000 in input costs, the producer 
must sign a CPR promising to sell 30,000 sacks of grain to Cargill at the end of the 
season.  Cargill, of course, pays more than $5/sack when it comes time to buy and the 
price is supposedly determined by the Chicago Board of Trade.  But, if the producer is 
locked into selling that grain at an unidentified price, the company is able to pay 
                                                 
21 Even at that time there was little chance the price would be that low at harvest, but this price 
guarantees that the farmer will commit enough grain to pay off the debt. 
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significantly less than if it had to buy on the open market.  Still, according to one 
Cargill employee in the town of Campo Novo dos Parecis, the price is determined by 
the Bolsa do Chicago.  He said that in January of 2005 it was going for $9/9.5 but by 
February when we spoke—just one month later as the harvest began in earnest—there 
was essentially no market as farmers with no on-farm storage capacity rushed to 
deliver soy straight to the armazéns of the big transnationals. 
 Multiple degrees of CPRs determine who has the primary claim on a farmer’s 
grain in the event that—due to weather, pests, or unfavorable market conditions—
there is not enough soy or money at the end of the season to pay all the debts.  The 
first degree CPR usually goes to large agribusiness while second and third degree 
contracts go to local service providers like Rural Tech in Campo Novo dos Parecís, a 
local soy broker and provider of inputs like fertilizers and agrotoxins as well as 
irrigation systems and technical assistance like soil analysis.  An employee of Rural 
Tech named Luiz told me that even if a producer comes up short in a given season, the 
holder of the CPR will usually dar um jeito22 to help the producer get through to the 
next season.  But usually this means that an even greater proportion of the farmer’s 
crop is preemptively committed before the seeds are even planted in the ground. 
Sometimes these credit relationships are informal and rely only on a verbal 
agreement, but according to Luiz, “the informal agreements are based on the 
assumption that there is no way the fazendeiro (farmer) can go under, which is why 
they only happen with the biggest producers who have a history of good yields”.  The 
biggest producers also enjoy preferential price agreements with the TNCs.  According 
to Luiz: 
                                                 
22 This is an expression in Brazilian Portuguese that basically means “to find a way”.  In the face of 
nearly any bureaucratic or formal roadblock, it is usually possible to dar um jeito, or find a way around 
it.   
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The bigger the producer, the more favorable the terms, meaning they 
can get better prices for their inputs because they can deal direct with 
the TNC rather than going through these other intermediaries, they can 
get better interest rates, etc.  This individual, direct relationship with 
the TNCs is only the domain of the biggest producers.  When they say 
big they are talking more than 3,000 hectares. 
 
 These larger producers enjoy other advantages not available to smaller farmers.  
Formally, land titles are crucial to securing credit from TNCs for most farmers.  
Employees from ADM, Bunge, and Cargill all insisted that legal land titles are a 
prerequisite for securing a CPR with the company.  However, land titles are 
notoriously questionable in Mato Grosso, with forgeries common.  Often, multiple 
competing titles exist for the same parcel of land, or no title exists at all for a parcel 
under cultivation by the same family for decades.  These difficulties are the direct 
result of the ad hoc settlement of Mato Grosso that occurred in the 1970s and ‘80s, 
and the difficulty of monitoring property rights over such an immense area with very 
little government investment in bureaucracy (Wittman, 2005).  It is clear, though, that 
this system affords the most favorable terms of trade to the largest farms with while 
also reinforcing the interdependent relationship between TNCs and hyper-capitalized 
producers.  According to Luiz, “whether the producer must present a land title to use 
his land to guarantee the loan depends on the value of the loan and the reliability of the 
producer”.  Not only are soy farmers a heterogeneous group, but even the economic 
heavyweights are often forced into exploitative relations with firms because of the 
debt relation. 
 So, if this arrangement is so unfavorable, why do not farmers in Mato Grosso 
just take out bank loans like farmers in the US do?  As has been mentioned above, 
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prevailing interest rates in Brazil remain exponentially higher than international 
markets.23  According to Fernando Homem do Mello, an agricultural economist at the 
University of São Paulo, domestic businesses do not have access to international credit 
markets as easily as TNCs do.  Therefore, TNCs are able to offer credit to farmers at 
rates lower than the national bank rate but still far higher than the rate they are paying, 
thereby substantially increasing their returns.  According to do Mello, the TNCs are 
able to borrow on international credit markets at more favorable rates than domestic 
Brazilian businesses and even the Brazilian government.  Therefore, companies like 
Cargill and Bunge can offer interest rates to producers of around 11-12%, while 
private banks in Brazil charge as much as 18%.  The subsidized rate offered by the 
Banco do Brasil is around 8-9%, but as described above, this is only enough to finance 
a small portion of the average Mato Grosso soy farmer’s yearly planting. 
Since the vast majority of chemical inputs are imported by the same companies 
that buy soy, producers have an even greater incentive to finance the cost of their 
fertilizers and fungicides in sacks of soy promised for delivery to the purveyor of 
those chemicals at harvest time.  The ability of farmers to access the resources of 
TNCs on favorable terms, therefore, depends on the degree to which the farmer’s 
mode of production conforms to the substantive rationality of the corporate interest.  
In other words, farmers often have to conform to recommendations from these 
companies such as how many times to spray their crop with fungicide to stave off 
Asian rust, how much fertilizer to apply, or at what percentage moisture to harvest 
their crop.  Also, the bigger the customer, the more favorable the terms of credit and 
more importantly, the more flexibility or leeway the farmers gets in terms of when and 
                                                 
23 At the time of my research, interest rates in Brazil hovered around 15%.  Although they have fallen to 
around 12% currently, this is still far higher than rates available on international markets of around 4-
5%.   
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how to pay off the debt, and  the concessions they are given in being advanced more 
credit after a disappointing harvest. 
 Alvater and Mahnkopf (1997) observed, “…it is credit schedules which 
determine the rhythm of global time regimes.  The maturing of debts, and no longer—
as in agrarian societies—the harvest cycle—or as in large-scale industry—the rate of 
circulation of fixed capital, defines the horizon of action and the periodization of the 
cycles within globalized finance capitalism.  In this way money’s logic determines 
global society” (455).  Here, the debt maturation period converges with the harvest 
cycle to make the terms of repayment most favorable to agribusiness and least 
favorable to farmers.  Because industrial agriculture is so capital intensive, farmers 
must borrow every single season in order to plant the next year’s crop.  Because of the 
power of TNCs, they are able to stitch “money’s logic” into the natural cycles of 
planting and harvest.  They can set the maturation of debt to coincide with harvest, 
guaranteeing a delivery of soy when prices are lowest, thus maximizing their profit 
and minimizing the farmer’s return. 
Instead of the rural credit system responding to and ameliorating the vagaries 
of volatile agricultural systems and markets as the New Deal era system in the US was 
designed to do, the TNC-dominated credit system in Mato Grosso exacerbates 
agricultural risk in two ways.  First, farmers lose autonomy and are therefore unable to 
make the best marketing decisions for themselves, instead submitting to the buying 
conditions of a monopsony (a kind of ‘Wal-Mart effect’ of soy).  Second, there is no 
political accountability embedded in the credit relation (as there is in the US 
agricultural credit system).  Embedded within a state-sponsored rural credit system is 
an implicit safety net that is specifically structured to cushion farmers when they are 
most vulnerable to the inherent risks of agricultural production (weather, market 
fluctuations, etc.)  Here in Mato Grosso, the structure of the credit relation is designed 
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to maximize farmer dependency and the expropriation of wealth from independent 
producers to firms. 
Although soybeans challenge money as an important medium of exchange in 
the Mato Grosso soy economy, international financial markets still drive its logic.  “A 
capitalist economy creates a specific hierarchical order of markets: the money market 
directs the goods market…” (Altvater and Manhkopf, 1997).  Therefore, international 
financial markets shape the credit structure of the Mato Grosso soy economy, thereby 
shaping the processes of production.  The priorities of capital are imposed on the 
production system, often at the expense of the ability of farmers to participate in 
international markets in such a way as to maximize their own personal utility.  By 
extension, to return to the arguments made above about the bifurcation of agriculture, 
this discrimination in favor of the private soy regime rationalizes the privileging of 
export-oriented production over small-scale commercial or subsistence agriculture at 
national level as well. 
 
Interdependence Works Both Ways: Reproducing the Mato Grosso soy farmer 
 As crucial as transnational agribusiness and the federal state have been to the 
development of soy farming in Mato Grosso, soy farmers themselves and their 
presumptive political agent—the provincial state—have also participated in 
constructing the political-economic as well as physical infrastructure to enable the soy 
sector to flourish.  The point here is that the soy farmer is not a political construction 
of “the state” and “capital” alone, but s/he participates in unexpected ways in the 
configuration of the market as a whole.  The clearest example of this participation is in 
addressing the problem of infrastructure. 
Everyone I talked with in Mato Grosso agreed that the biggest obstacle facing 
the industry there was infrastructure.  I experienced this problem several times 
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throughout my travels. What follows is a vignette I wrote shortly after such an 
“experience”: 
On my way to Sapezal, a soy town in the north of the state of Mato 
Grosso, an endless line of soy trucks stretches out on either end of the 
bus like dusty jewels on a string.  The line moves along past endless 
miles of soy fields as fast as the ruined chassis can tolerate the 
cavernous potholes that must plague every truck driver’s dreams.  As 
we approach the border of the indigenous reserve, however, the 
substrate gives way and we are traveling over mud roads that—now, in 
the height of the wet season—resemble something between quicksand 
and glue.  It is not long before the grossly overloaded soy trucks are 
mired in the goop.  The bus stops.  We all poke our heads out of the 
bus’s windows to see a gaping mud pit before us with a bulldozer 
crawling back and forth across it, pulling soy trucks behind it one by 
one.  One southbound truck, one northbound truck, one southbound, 
one northbound, at an achingly tedious pace.  I lean out the window 
with my camera and a young woman behind me says sadly, “Please do 
not take a picture of this.  It is the shame of our country.”  I snap some 
photos anyway, laughing and saying that we’re all in the same boat 
now, right?  And what are we going to do?  Luckily for us, there is a 
southbound bus on the other side of the mud pit.  Drivers of 
immobilized soy trucks swarm around the bus, shouldering our luggage 
and trudging off through the mud to cross the pit.  Women in stiletto 
heels totter for a few steps and then abandon their shoes altogether.  
Soon we meet another group of bus riders crossing the miasma to claim 
our seats.  In short order we’ve switched busses and are back on our 
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way.  In a few miles we leave indigenous territory and the asphalt 
returns along side endless stretches of green soy plants and we’re back 
up to speed, bouncing over fissures in the pavement that no one has the 
time or money to fix. 
 
 
 Illustration 3.  Soy trucks stuck in the mud outside of Sapezal. 
 
This is how it works in Mato Grosso.  Roads get paved wherever citizens are 
willing and able to pay for it themselves while billboards erected alongside gleaming 
stretches of new blacktop proudly pronounce “Another Public Works Project Brought 
to You By The State of Mato Grosso”.  The condition of the hundreds of thousands of 
kilometers of remote highways in Mato Grosso that soy must traverse by truck in 
order to reach distant ports of exit is of great concern to both the state and federal 
governments.  It is considered to be one of the greatest barriers to Brazil’s overtaking 
the US as the world’s largest soy exporter.  However, what is often considered a 
public service in other countries, paving roads in Mato Grosso is a matter of private 
responsibility.  Blairo Maggi, the governor of Mato Grosso and largest single soy 
producer in the world, pioneered a system of “public-private partnerships” between 
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the state government and soy farmers dividing the cost of paving roads.  If the local 
“highway association” (made up of participating soy farmers who contribute a 
percentage of their annual income to the association) can put up the money for 
preparing the roadbed, the government will pay for the asphalt.  Most of the money 
that the government pays comes directly from a tax levied on soy farmers themselves.  
So in a sense, the farmers are paying for the road twice.  Finally, the large soy 
companies dock the price they pay to the farmers by the cost of transportation to the 
port, which means that, in a sense, the companies are externalizing the cost of the 
roads to the farmer while at the same time acting as by far the largest users of a 
“public good” financed through a partnership between the soy farmers and “the 
public”, which is, in this case, largely soy farmers. 
The case of infrastructure development in Mato Grosso provides the clearest 
example of how soy farmers, the state, and transnational capital work together to 
construct and perpetuate the underpinnings of the private international soy regime.  By 
the standards of neoliberalism, this is an ideal arrangement.  Public functions are 
turned partially over to the private sector and the result is a more smoothly functioning 
market.  Presumably.  Anyone witnessing the infrastructural fiasco through which I 
slogged would be hard pressed to argue that the system is “smooth”, but so far the 
cost/benefit ratio works out well enough to encourage growth of the sector.  As global 
demand for soy skyrockets due to the double force of changing diets in Asia and the 
diversion of soybeans and corn for biofuels, agribusiness must exploit new sources of 
the crop to keep their industrial oil, lecithin, and animal feed operations churning. 
 
Breaking the Chain: Opting out of the TNC system 
As has been described above, corporations, the state, and farmers all 
participate in constructing a market that distributes economic benefits among all of 
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these actors (but not equally) in such a way as to mask or minimize resistance to the 
power relations embedded within that market structure.  This is not to say, however, 
that TNC power is totalizing and that farmers across the region simply bow under their 
conditions.  Some farmers are actively seeking ways out of this closed-circuit 
economic exploitation.  The most common strategy is to form cooperatives that are 
able to compete on par with the big TNCs.  In Portuguese, the word for “cooperative” 
is condomínio, and the Condomínio Marechal Rondon in Campo Novo dos Parecís—
named after the famous explorer of Mato Grosso known for his alliance with native 
peoples and for creating the Xingu National Park—is a prototypical model of such an 
attempt to opt out of the private soy regime.  The cooperative has 12 members 
producing soy, cotton, corn, rice, sorghum, sugar cane, peanuts, popcorn, and 
sunflower on over 50,000 hectares (or 100,000 acres).  They have built what amounts 
to a small city on the outskirts of Campo Novo that employs 1,200 people in farming, 
facilities for storing grain, producing fertilizers, and refining cotton.  They are 
planning to build a biodiesel plant as well. 
What is interesting about this project is that it allows soy farmers to be more 
than just soy farmers.  It reveals the inherent insufficiency of the market alone to 
perpetuate itself.  Just as the majority of family farmers in the US depend on some off-
farm income to reproduce the household, the members of Condomínio Marechal 
Rondon have found that in order to decrease the precariousness of their economic 
situation, they have to look beyond the soy market. 
However, the other thing these cooperatives enable farmers to do is, 
essentially, compete at the level of the transnationals.  This emphasizes that fact that 
the structure of the global soy market affects farmers here as much as the specificities 
of roads and contracts in Mato Grosso.  This situation is not limited to the central-west 
region of Brazil.  Especially to big agribusiness, the market is global and its 
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particularly industrial nature requires industrial-scale production of a standardized 
commodity.  Soybeans must meet particular benchmarks of protein and oil content in 
order to be useful to the industrial machine.  These benchmarks are pushed 
increasingly upwards by ever-advancing seed technology that seeks to maximize these 
qualities, as well as other factors that make the crop more suitable to an industrialized 
system: fungus resistance, shorter maturation period, etc.  Therefore, even when 
farmers manage to break away from the immediate need for financing from big 
corporations, the cooperative alternative—at least insofar as it operates in Brazil—
may actually only be eliminating one of the links in the chain rather than breaking it 
altogether. 
But the elimination of the transnational link at the local level is not 
insignificant for farmer livelihoods.  A farmer named Vitório told me that one of the 
main advantages of belonging to a cooperative is that by opting out TNC financing, 
farmers can hold onto their crop until months after harvest when prices are higher.  
Farmers whose soy is committed through a first-degree CPR to an TNC must deliver 
at the time of harvest, when prices are lowest.  Vitório claims that the cooperative 
commands a price an average of 25% higher for its members.  He says, “It is difficult 
to work in groups, but the return is undeniable”. 
Some farmers, including Vitório, talked hopefully about the potential of 
biotechnology to create “boutique” varieties of soy engineered for specific 
characteristics of value to the consumer (greater oil or protein content, nutritive or 
disease-fighting qualities, etc.).  Vitório seemed to think that this was the only way to 
loosen the monopsony power of the large traders.  In some areas I did see evidence of 
space within the market for alternatives, such as one Brazilian trader called Ovetril 
had a sign prominently displayed in front of its loading dock that read “We Do not 
Take Transgenic Soy”.  I talked to the broker for this company and he said they are a 
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small trader that works with a handful of buyers in Europe and Japan to deliver soy 
certified to be non-transgenic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Illustration 4.  “We do not take transgenic soy”. 
 
As soy cultivation in the Amazon region becomes increasingly politicized and the 
“environmental soy” movement gains steam, these kinds of specialty markets may 
provide legitimate opportunities for soy growers in Mato Grosso to opt out of the mass 
market by offering a product that is more socially and environmentally sustainable.  
However, one could draw parallels with the dairy industry and speculate that these 
markets will remain niches until transnationals see the profit potential in offering this 
specialty product, at which point it will cease to be a real “alternative” for farmers. 
 
Conclusion 
 Neoliberal theory argues that trade barriers and other government policies that 
affect the flow of goods onto global markets distort those markets and undermine 
countries’ abilities to use their comparative advantage.  These comparative advantages 
are presumed to be “natural” attributes, derived from cheap and abundant natural 
resources, a low-wage labor force, climate, geography, etc.  However, comparative 
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advantages are not “natural”.  They are historically constructed through relations of 
colonialism and the facilitation of capitalist expansion by corporations and the state.  
Many in Brazil make the argument that the central-west has a comparative advantage 
in large-scale commodity production based on the quality of the soil, predictability of 
rains, and cheap land prices.  However, this advantage was constructed historically 
through government colonization policies and funding for large-scale agricultural 
development.  Today, Mato Grosso’s comparative advantage remains dependent on 
subsidized credit and, even more importantly, on intense levels of foreign capital 
investment and saturation of the soil with unprecedented levels of petrochemical-
based fungicides, fertilizers, insecticides, and other agrotoxins. 
The central-west region of Brazil does indeed have “natural” advantages, 
principally the tropical climate, which offers highly predictable precipitation patterns 
and an extended growing season that allows for two harvests (a primary crop and a 
smaller inter-cycle “safrinha” of some other product such as corn, cotton, or rice).  But 
this climate is the reason for the perpetuation of and difficulty in fighting a wide range 
of diseases, fungus, and insect predators that compromise Brazilian production.  And 
ironically, the exploitation of Brazil’s other “natural” advantage, vast tracts of 
unconverted land, is causing a destabalization of the schedule of rains that make the 
region so attractive to farmers, as is evidenced by the 3rd year running of drought in 
the southern region of the country and the retreat of the rains that shadows the retreat 
of the forest (Wittman, 2005). 
But for Brazilian farmers, the proof of their competitiveness comes partly from 
a political comparison with the US.  From their perspective, they are able to survive 
international markets dominated by heavily subsidized American producers without 
the help of government supports.  Because heavy infusion of transnational capital into 
the productive system is seen as a legitimate “market” activity, while infusion of state 
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money is not, their dependence on an external source of capital does not theoretically 
undermine their competitiveness.  On the contrary, they argue that the reason these 
corporations continue to invest in Mato Grosso is because they recognize its inherent 
competitiveness.  Brazilian farmers would love their government to step in and make 
more credit available to them and guarantee a minimum price, but recognizing that 
their government has neither the will nor the capacity to do so, they see their 
“independence” from state supports as proof of their superior efficiency and 
productivity.  The fact that they are in fact completely dependent on transnational 
corporations not only to finance their operation but to provide nearly all of the inputs 
that they use in the productive process and so therefore are not producing pelos 
próprios pés (on their own two feet), however, does not contradict the logic of neo-
liberalism and therefore is a legitimate politico-economic strategy. 
Drawing on Gramsci, Jacobson writes that the “ongoing social contests to 
define the context within which key animating notions are forged as to who 
legitimately gets what, when, and so on – a struggle, in short, to define ‘common 
sense’” is being won by the interests of capital (1998, 2).  The goal of these interests is 
not merely to foist a particular world order on a resistant public, but to gain the 
approval of the very society that is inevitably threatened by such an order.  He writes: 
If citizens are persuaded…that markets exist apart from the social 
relations that have created them and sustain them, that public control in 
any form is authoritarian whereas private control is not, that private 
operators are always efficient and public ones are not, then one likely 
beholds a stable if fatalistic political culture. If markets are believed to 
be perfectly just allocative mechanisms, losers would be no concern of 
public policy. Indeed, a neo-liberal orthodoxy apparently has eroded 
the post-war “bargain of embedded liberalism,” which…affirmed state 
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intervention to regulate business cycles and to protect citizens against 
egregious inequities.  An antiquated 19th century image of a market 
system is now taken seriously, at least in higher socioeconomic strata, 
as if it were a brand new process (Jacobson, 1998). 
In Mato Grosso soy, the “allocative mechanism” is a highly concentrated market 
dominated by the investment of 4 transnational agribusinesses and Groupo Maggi.  
These firms, together with the Fundação Mato Grosso, the state, public/private 
highway associations, industry groups, rural unions, and soy farmers comprise a 
private international soy regime that structures agricultural production.  The extent to 
which the result does or does not reflect broader society’s goals (of development, 
sustainability, etc.) is of little concern to the state government, since its executive is 
the premier soy magnate himself. 
In my interview with the state secretary of Rural Development (otherwise 
known as the secretary of Agriculture), Otaviano Pivetta, he said “The commercial 
agricultural sector is taking care of itself.  We’re really not concerned about that.  
We’re more focused on assisting family agriculture.”  This quote reveals two things.  
When asked about the dominance of transnational corporations and their 
overwhelming economic power in the sector that is responsible for a large portion of 
the state’s revenue, Pivetta responded by saying that the view that this could be 
potentially problematic is simply wrongheaded, and that TNC investment has done 
more to advance Mato Grosso’s development than anything else in the last 20 years, 
and so the sector doesn’t need the state’s intervention. 
And so, the degree to which this economic relationship undermines the 
independence and “freedom” of producers is not seen as a contradiction.24  The role of 
the federal government in constructing that competitiveness—through subsidized 
                                                 
24 See David Harvey (2005) on how “freedom” is defined under neoliberalism. 
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credit, land give-aways, failure to enforce land use regulations, and increasingly 
through its negotiations in the WTO (see next chapter)—clearly challenges the notion 
that comparative advantage is only something that can be fully realized if the state gets 
out of the way.  The view expressed by Pivetta above that commercial agriculture can 
take care of itself while family agriculture “needs” the state reflects the general 
assumption that the former fits into a neoliberal growth model while the other is a relic 
of the welfare state.  The neoliberal assumption is that agricultura familiar would 
eventually be eliminated entirely by the evolutionary growth of market efficiency, but 
that it does indeed serve a social function and so, although it is not economically 
relevant, it is important to the survival of poor communities. 
A glaring irony exists in juxtaposing this reality with the argument that 
industrial agriculture is necessary to produce cheap and abundant food for the world’s 
growing population.  As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, between one 
third and one half of the world’s population survives through subsistence or small-
scale farming.  The reality is that industrial food is not cheap, and its true price is 
masked because the burden of the externalities associated with its production (things 
like environmental degradation, air and water pollution, obesity, malnutrition, animal 
welfare, unemployment, soil compaction, deforestation, etc.) is borne by the public 
sector.  As the true costs of industrial food become ever more evident, the 
contradictions within agrarian capitalism will become increasingly difficult to 
reconcile.  As crises of energy, credit, fertility, disease, water, and climate intensify, it 
is possible that smaller, family farmers will emerge, exhibiting advantages in soil and 
water management, energy consumption, and other important factors of production.  
For the time being, however, the Mato Grosso soy farmer remains as an ideal-typical 
construct of state and corporate collusion in the neoliberal market system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 
OF AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-DOHA ERA 
 
The concept of a regime needs to be broadened to include social institutions 
created by non-government actors that generate transnational norms and rules 
that guide behavior by private actors25 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses private governance at the global level, examining the 
interactions between public and private actors in establishing and enforcing the rules 
that govern the soybean economy.  The apparent collapse of the Doha “development” 
Round of WTO trade negotiations has dramatically changed this landscape.  This 
collapse appears to leave behind a vacuum of leadership at the global level, but 
practically speaking, the WTO has been paralyzed since the first fiery collapse of 
negotiations in 1999 in Seattle.  Since that time, bilateral agreements have proliferated, 
and cases continue to be tried in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO on 
the basis of the (supposedly binding) Agreement on Agriculture that was negotiated in 
the Uruguay Round.  Rules are, therefore, being made and enforced even in the 
absence of a multilateral institution to provide a centralized location where we can 
find governance happening.  I argue in this chapter that the neo-liberal era requires a 
non-state-centric understanding of governance in order to allow us to see where the 
processes are taking place, both sub- and supra-statally, with the explicit participation 
of social movements, corporations, industry trade groups, and other private actors 
                                                 
25 Webb, 1999:54. 
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interacting with states to create the new global governance of non-state-centric global 
agricultural systems. 
 The collapse of the Doha round appears to reflect the clash of countervailing 
trends in the global trading system.  On the one hand, emerging economies seem to 
have managed to effectively refuse an agreement that threatened their farm sectors by 
refusing to accept the US’s high threshold (140% surge in imports) for triggering of 
protective tariffs (ICTSD, 2008).  On the other hand, it also represents the failure of 
the multilateral system to effectively dismantle the massive US and EU subsidy 
payments that have fueled overproduction and dumping for the last 50 years.  Critics 
decry the evasion tactics used by these agricultural powerhouses of shifting subsidy 
payments into superficially WTO-friendly categories (decoupled income support 
rather than countercyclical or loan-deficiency payments), while at the same time 
demanding greater market access from the poorest countries in the world (Sharma, 
2004; IFG, 2003; Peine and McMichael, 2005; IATP, 2004). 
 From the point of view of food regime analysis, it can appear that the WTO 
stalled as a result of its failure to reconcile the contradictions between the industrial 
and corporate food regimes.  Bill Pritchard calls this the “hangover” from the second 
industrial food regime that was sufficiently institutionalized in the WTO to prevent 
across-the-board market liberalization.  He argues that the institution was built upon 
the foundation of the second food regime but has as yet been unable to adapt to the 
third.  Pritchard argues that “the pursuit of [an agenda to recompose national 
agricultures into global agriculture (McMichael, 2005: 281] has been complicated and 
compromised by the entity’s very structure.  Expectations that a new, comprehensive 
WTO agreement would swiftly enshrine a new global politics of agriculture have 
proven unmet” (forthcoming: unpaginated).  But have they?  My argument in this 
chapter is that in an attempt to locate a “global politics of agriculture”, state-based 
  105
institutions are perhaps the wrong place to look.  While a new food regime has yet to 
be institutionalized in a cogent multilateral governance organization, it is being 
implemented in piecemeal fashion through WTO dispute settlement, bilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and other more 
fractured processes.  The second point is that just because the Doha Round is at best 
on life support, one must not discount the importance of the WTO in laying the 
foundation for the corporate food regime.  I argue in this chapter that the uneven 
landscape of liberalization that it has ushered in is in fact more conducive and 
favorable to a food system organized in the corporate interest than the across-the-
board liberalization for which the WTO rhetorically calls. 
 Moran et al. write: 
Socio-political forces of particular nations are sufficiently distinctive 
and powerful to differentiate national and regional organization of rural 
production in space and time.  Such international socio-political 
diversity is expressed in the formulation, writing and interpretation of 
legislation.  Once legislation is in place, by the very processes involved 
in its administration and interpretation, it creates an inertia which 
ensures that some components of previous agro-food systems are 
maintained (1996). 
 
The apparent contradictions that have persisted and even been increasingly 
calcified in the WTO system through dispute settlement, therefore, must be 
understood as products of the distinctiveness of the individual nation-state 
members of the organization.  The attempts to understand the WTO as a single 
seamless system of global governance that obviates state sovereignty overlooks 
the crucial importance of spatial, historical, and political-economic context.  
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This chapter uses Brazil as a point of inquiry to understand how and why these 
contradictions—Pritchard’s “hangover”—persist. 
 Brazil’s rise to power on the international trade-negotiating stage has occurred 
concurrently with the rise of its soy economy.  The emergence of New Agricultural 
Countries (NACs)—former colonies that began in the late 20th century to compete 
with northern industrial powers in traditionally northern agricultural markets like 
wheat, rice, and soy (Friedmann)—refocused attention on the imbalances in rules 
governing agricultural trade.  The intransigence of governments on both sides of this 
historical divide (traditional versus emerging agricultural exporters) made agriculture 
one of the most significant roadblocks to a successful negotiating round.  The same 
year that the WTO met in Seattle, Brazil steeply devalued the real, prompting a surge 
in exports.  Almost as soon as Brazil began competing directly with the US and EU in 
agricultural markets (namely soy, cotton, and sugar), the WTO talks came to a halt due 
to developing countries’ refusal to accept an agreement they had no hand in drafting.  
The absence of a new agreement, however, did not stop Brazil from moving ahead 
with its challenge of US hegemony in the global trading system.  At this same time, 
the Brazilian government also began to explore the utility of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) in furthering their challenge of US and EU agricultural policies on a 
commodity-by-commodity basis as will be described in more detail below. 
 I argue in this chapter that although WTO negotiations are at a standstill, one 
cannot discount the importance of the Uruguay Round in paving the way for the kinds 
of market restructuring (usually, but not always, in the direction of liberalization) that 
has been furthered via dispute settlement within the WTO as well as alternative trade 
agreements outside of it.  Examining Brazil’s evolving role and strategies in the 
international trading system provides a clear window into how rules are being 
contested and shaped at the international level by an emergent private soy regime that 
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incorporates the Brazilian government, transnational agribusiness, producers, and 
other private interests, while still anchored (in interesting and contradictory ways) in 
state legitimacy.  It also illustrates how the increasingly fractured processes of global 
trade governance continue to codify the principles of market liberalism into legal 
structures—a process that Steven Gill (1998) describes as the “new constitutionalism” 
of market rule—while at the same time opening new and varied spaces for its 
resistance. 
 
Constitutionalization of Market Rule through Dispute Settlement 
Despite the fact that WTO negotiations have been stalled for the last 10 years, 
individual cases have proliferated in the DSB that challenge individual countries’ 
policies regarding particular commodities.  Since the transition from the GATT to the 
WTO in 1995 to the time of this writing, there have been 380 cases mounted in the 
DSB.  They span a vast array of products and policies and have been used to both 
weaken and strengthen government regulation.  For instance, they have consistently 
challenged anti-dumping and countervailing duties, food and product safety 
regulations, and import quotas.  But, they have also been used to challenge lax 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and certain tax exemptions.  It seems that 
where negotiations have failed, countries are strategically using the DSB as a de facto 
forum for advancing their trade agendas. 
Pritchard argues, as I do here, that the legal jurisdiction of the DSB over 
sovereign state policy is an important mechanism for the constitutionalization of 
“disciplinary neo-liberalism” at the global level whereby “legal processes represent a 
formal superstructure for the enforcement of economic and political power” that 
explicitly demonstrates “an overarching preference to facilitate trade liberalization” 
(2005: 781, 782) despite claims that the DSB is an unbiased rules-based system that 
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‘levels the playing field’ between rich and poor countries.  Pritchard presents evidence 
suggesting that due to a lack of popular political accountability in the dispute 
settlement process, the Appellate Body demonstrates worrisome inconsistency in its 
interpretation of agreement texts, and could effectively push liberalization beyond 
what is called for in the original agreements (2005).  The process is also employed 
much more often to address perceived trade barriers to strategic products in which 
countries with the means to take advantage of the DSB have an interest.  Brazil has 
challenged policies on coffee, orange juice, and poultry, for instance, and 12 of 
Argentina’s 14 cases have regarded agricultural products. 
While the US and EU are at the forefront of this movement to use the DSB as a 
tool to selectively advance their interests—acting as complainant on 90 and 79 cases, 
respectively—Brazil comes in fourth (behind Canada with 30 cases) with 23.  This is 
by far more than any other “developing country” and reflects Brazil’s position as a 
country with the resources and professional legal expertise to use the DSB 
strategically.  Of those 23 cases, 9 were against the US, 6 against the EU, and 3 
against Canada.  Brazil has used the DSB to challenge the EU on preferential 
treatment for coffee, tariff rate quotas on poultry, customs classifications of chicken 
parts, and sugar subsidies.  It has challenged the US on the patent code, countervailing 
duty disbursement (the “Byrd Amendment”), excise taxes on citrus, upland cotton 
subsidies, and most recently, domestic agricultural subsidies in general.  Many, if not 
all, of these cases have been successful.  One of the major goals of the negotiations for 
a new Agreement on Agriculture was to close the loopholes left in the Uruguay Round 
AoA that countries like the US and EU had continued to exploit by repackaging 
subsidies, export credits, and domestic protections as WTO-friendly and non-trade-
distorting.  Despite the failure of negotiations, Brazil appears to be advancing this 
agenda through the DSB, one policy or commodity at a time. 
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For example, in 2007 Brazil called for a panel to examine specific years (1999-
2000, 2001, and 2004-2005) in which they believe that the US exceeded its 
commitment levels for agricultural subsidies as established during previous 
negotiations.  Brazil has also taken on policies like the EU’s definition of salt content 
for packaged chicken cuts.  Brazil argues that a newly established designation of salt 
content subjects frozen chicken to higher tariffs, and therefore acts as an unfair trade 
barrier.  Perhaps the most famous case was the one mounted against US cotton 
subsidies, where the DSB found that marketing loan payments, market loss assistance 
payments, and counter-cyclical payments caused sufficient harm to Brazilian cotton 
producers via price suppression to warrant withdrawal under AoA agreements. 
In this way, then, Brazil and other countries are challenging what they see to 
be their rivals’ efforts to skirt negotiated obligations.  But this is not simply a project 
undertaken by the government.  While a new broad-based agreement is the priority of 
the trade negotiator, individual cases in the DSB are the purview of private interests.  
Much has been made of the investment title of NAFTA and the ability of private 
corporations to challenge the domestic policies of sovereign states under the Chapter 
11 investment title.  In a way that is more heavily cloaked in traditional intra-
governmental politics, essentially the same thing happens through the DSB, as 
participation by the private sector is filtered through the representation of national 
governments. 
Despite the fact that the sugar and cotton cases (against the EU and US, 
respectively) are what Brazil is known for, it was actually soy that started Brazil down 
the path of WTO dispute settlement.  Pedro Camargo—former Secretary of Production 
and Trade in the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture who later worked as a trade lawyer 
in the private sector and was the primary author and litigator of the successful case in 
the WTO against US cotton subsidies—tells the story: 
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When I entered government I really decided to do the [dispute 
settlement] case as a negotiating strategy because with a case you get 
more to feet on the ground, more explicit, you have to understand, you 
leave speech and go to practice.  So the first case that caught our 
attention—I had been thinking of this before entering government—
was a case on soybeans.  Because soybeans during the Uruguay round 
was a cash crop in the United States.  It did not have a target price or 
loan deficiency payment.  It was outside more or less of agricultural 
policy.  And then suddenly they approved, included agricultural fixed 
target prices for soybeans and we thought that was not…that was a 
back-stab.  On what theoretically the Uruguay Round had produced.  
The Uruguay Round had produced an Agreement on Agriculture that 
did not give us much, but was not supposed to give us a back-stab.  
And we saw a back-stab on soybeans.  So we went to analyze what was 
happening with soybeans.  Soybeans had zero subsidies in the Uruguay 
Round and went to $2 billion in 2000/2001.  So we mounted a case, 
identified a case, challenged soybeans, and Guilherme Dias did the 
econometric modeling for us, estimating the loss Brazil had because of 
the American subsidies.  And when it took us a little time to file the 
case, and then prices went up because of climatic problems in the US 
and China and everything else, and then subsidies disappeared and we 
didn’t have a case anymore.  So we were happy.  It’s better to have 
prices than have a case.  But then we kind of learned the route and we 
started the cotton case and the sugar case against Europe.  I was still in 
government when we filed the case—the Fernando Henrique 
government—and the Lula government continued the process and we 
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won.  Of course it is under appeal26, it is still being absorbed I guess in 
the US, but it certainly has implications. 
The implications are that, as in any legal system, each case sets a precedent for future 
cases.  According to Camargo, Brazilian producers would be emboldened by the 
success of the cotton (and sugar) cases to address what they see as the unfair trade 
practices embedded within the US farm bill. 
Camargo claims that without the private sector, the cotton case never would 
have been brought to the DSB.  He argues that there must be a combination of private 
interest and political will, but that with the expense and technical expertise needed to 
mount a case, the support of producers and industry is crucial.  To the extent, then, 
that the DSB is used to codify the rights of private capital to challenge government 
policy, that process is more readily available to and successfully exploited by both 
governments and private sector groups with the greatest resources.  Therefore, while 
there is obvious unevenness between the governments of the global North and South 
in their ability to take advantage of the DSB, farmers with highly coordinated 
advocacy organizations (soy, cotton, sugar, beef) are much more likely than producers 
of domestic food crops to bring their grievances as well, despite the fact that these 
same trade policies affect farmers across the board in both direct and indirect ways. 
                                                 
26 As of May, 2008, the DSB had rejected the US’s most recent appeal. 
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Illustration 5.  A billboard in Rondonópolis, MT, that reads: 
“Congratulations producers and Brazil for the cotton victory in 
the WTO”. 
 
The process of codification of capital rights via the DSB is therefore a highly 
fractured one.  It fractured along two particular lines—commodities and states.  First, 
not all commodities will receive the same attention in the DSB.  Clearly sectors that 
are more deeply embedded in global markets will experience more litigation.  
Commodity sectors in Brazil like manioc and dry beans which serve a mostly 
domestic market will obviously not figure highly into WTO disputes regardless of 
how greatly they may be indirectly affected by WTO negotiations that require 
elimination of domestic protections for such products.  Commodities like soy, 
however, will receive much closer scrutiny because market ‘distortions’ caused by 
government policies are more likely to affect corporate profits both broadly (across 
many national markets) and deeply (in terms of total volume and profits).  
Commodities that are more heavily traded on international markets characterized by 
high levels of corporate concentration (sugar, cotton, coffee, bananas and other 
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tropical fruits, wheat, etc.) account for most of the agriculture-related cases in the 
DSB27. 
So, too, will certain states appear much more frequently than others as 
complainants in WTO disputes. One of the primary criticisms of the WTO from 
insiders (and often ignored by NGOs) is that the DSB process is prohibitive to the 
majority of signatory countries. After lauding the benefits of the rules-based system—
“The new DSB provides WTO member states with an automatic right to lodge a 
complaint, entitles them to use an independent appellate review and offers them a an 
effective enforcement mechanism.  It provides a system that guarantees the framework 
of predictable, enforceable, and generally stable rules for traders”—Speyer tacks on 
the following qualifier: “The DSB is used actively by all member states, with the 
notable exception of the poorest, especially African, countries” (275).  This is due at 
least in part to the rising cost of bringing these complaints to the DSB.  While all 
countries technically have access to the mechanism, there is no provision for assisting 
developing countries in covering legal costs.  The Advisory Center on WTO Law 
(ACWL) was established in July, 2001, but it acts only as an information and training 
center (Orozco, 2002: 25).  What many countries of the Global South critically lack 
are the political and financial resources to take advantage of any of the WTO 
bureaucracy.  Delich writes: 
Article 21.7 mandates that when a matter is raised by a developing 
country, the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] is to consider what further 
action might be appropriate to the circumstances.  To date, this 
provision has not been used by a developing country, perhaps because a 
precondition is that the country devote resources to analyzing and 
                                                 
27For details on DSB cases by product, see the WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#agricultural_products  
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following cases.  This involves checking arguments, issues, and 
possibilities and comparing experiences and results; exploring new 
legal as well as economic arguments; and domestically, building up an 
efficient and transparent liaison between the state and industry in order 
to obtain up-to-date information on trade problems in which developing 
countries have a stake.  Developing countries lack the high-level 
expertise and resources to devote to such activities (2002, 74). 
Camargo argues that Brazil is the “limit” for countries able to participate in the DSB.  
He says: 
An African country cannot bring a case against the United States.  They 
will never have a chance.  Is it not only the technical aspect, the cost of 
the lawyer, it is the political courage to file against the empire.  So if 
you look at society, the way we live here outside, if a rich man causes 
some injury to a poor man it is the public defender that enters against 
the rich man.  You do not require the poor man to have the 
understanding of the law.  In the WTO you do not have a public 
defender.  You have a supposedly member-driven organization with 
members with equal rights, but members are very different from one 
another.  So you have an institutional major problem which will never 
work.  Brazil is at the limit. Below Brazil you can not bring a case 
against the United States.  …  It is a huge shortcoming of the 
organization. 
As of 2008, the US and EU brought nearly half of all complaints to the DSB, and the 
US has reserved its third party rights in almost every other major case.  While Brazil 
and other ‘developing’ countries brought the imbalance of power in trade negotiations 
to light during the Seattle talks, the imbalance built into the very structure of the DSB 
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has received far less attention.  As long as the legal arm of the WTO process is 
inaccessible to poorer countries, this supposedly impartial rules-based institution 
contains a fatal flaw that allows it to be manipulated by powerful countries in the 
corporate interest. 
 Another way that the DSB is biased against developing countries lies in the 
ultimate softness of what is supposed to be a binding process.  Speyer writes: 
“The weakness…is that there is no mechanism that compels a losing 
party to implement a panel’s decision properly.  By doing something, 
but not enough, a defendant can still drag out the whole process almost 
indefinitely, because the complainant must challenge the new, still non-
compliant measure anew” (2001: 277) 
Perhaps even more problematic is the enforcement measure of last resort, which 
allows the complaining country to levy sanctions or suspend concessions formerly 
afforded to the defendant (Qureshi, 1996: 105).  This amounts, ultimately, to a lack of 
real enforcement, especially when it comes to a complaint brought by a poor country 
against a wealthy one.  Brazil rejected tariffs as a retaliatory mechanism against US 
non-compliance with the DSB’s cotton ruling arguing that raising tariffs on US 
imports would make capital goods prohibitively expensive and would ultimately hurt 
the Brazilian economy far more than the much larger US economy (ICTSD, 2005—
bookmarked).  Therefore, despite the argument that the WTO is an unbiased, neutral 
mechanism, in the end, it comes down to individual economic power after all.  The 
rules-based system is a myth, because a country with the means to withstand sanctions 
is able to drag its feet, while the country without is crippled by noncompliance. 
 As the US dallied in implementing reforms to its cotton subsidies, Brazil 
proposed a novel retaliatory tactic.  Previously, countries judged by the DSB to have 
been injured by non-compliance with WTO agreements were allowed only to impose 
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tariffs (or otherwise suspend trade concessions agreed to in WTO negotiations) on the 
offending country.  In 2005, however, Camargo (on behalf of AMPA, the Brazilian 
cotton growers association) approached the Brazilian Congress with a proposal to 
suspend the intellectual property rights of US-based corporations as long as the US 
government remained non-compliant with DSB rulings.  In other words, if the US 
failed to suspend the offending cotton subsidies, Brazilian farmers could stop paying 
royalties on their Round-Up Ready seeds bought under license from Monsanto.  This 
tactic has been approved in at least 2 other cases so far (related to online gambling in 
Antigua and bananas in Equador).  Rather than simply imposing tariffs on imported 
goods, therefore, this ruling can affect the business of subsidiaries operating within the 
country and, in a way, challenges the basic property rights of corporations as 
negotiated in the WTO. 
What is significant about this retaliatory tactic is that it brings the private 
sector in to what is cosmetically a “political” issue by directly threatening corporate 
profits, and not just in the agricultural sector.  One may argue that import tariffs do the 
same thing by threatening profit and therefore creating incentive for businesses to 
pressure governments to change the offending laws.  However, suspending intellectual 
property rights threatens the property rights of corporations in a more fundamental 
way that reveals the political vulnerability of these legal arrangements.  This strategy 
targets state power via the corporations that stand to profit and/or suffer from the 
state’s non-compliance.  An explanation of the particulars of this strategy can help 
crystallize an understanding of the relationship between the state and private firms that 
Cutler and her colleagues are working to define through the development of a theory 
of private regimes. 
First, the complaining country must request permission to cross-retaliate 
against a defending country that has both been ruled against by the DSB and has failed 
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to change the offending policy.  The WTO must then determine whether or not it 
would be ineffective for the complaining country to withhold trade privileges from the 
defending country.  This often occurs when a small economy challenges a large one 
and a suspension of trade privileges would cause greater injury to the small economy 
than to the country in violation of WTO agreements.  If the WTO allows the 
suspension of TRIPS, then manufacturers can produce generic versions drugs and IP-
protected seeds without paying royalties to the companies that hold patents for those 
products.  Suspension of TRIPS could also affect movies, music, trademarks, and any 
other form of intellectual property.  This tactic allows governments to rally the power 
of capital against state intransigence on agricultural protections.  Companies like 
Monsanto and Pioneer have fought long and hard to guarantee the protection of 
proprietary seeds and chemicals in countries like Brazil—to rescind patent protection 
could provide the necessary impetus for these companies to pressure the US 
government to bring its cotton policy in line with the DSB decision. 
 Revolutionary as this approach may seem, it still requires that the retaliating 
country be a significant trading partner.  LDCs would remain at a disadvantage.  This 
is all to say that the general fairness and effectiveness of the DSB is greatly disputed.  
Speyer argues that the high rate of finding in favor of plaintiffs in cases brought before 
the WTO proves that the DSB is being used as it was intended, and “cases brought so 
far have merited the charge” (276).  Iida argues, in contrast, that the high rate of 
conviction suggests that the WTO is an organization driven by a particular ideology 
rather than an impartial set of rules.  In a way, both can be true.  Many authors argue 
that the role of the WTO is not necessarily always to liberalize economies. Although 
the general principles of liberalization are written into agreements, exceptions and 
loopholes allow powerful countries to selectively retain strategic market protections.  
Therefore, some say that the purpose of the WTO is to enforce the WTO agreement.  
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It has a “negative function”, that is, “it responds to complaints by telling nations if the 
burdens their regulations impose on international commerce are disproportionate to 
the objectives they are seeking to achieve or otherwise violate WTO rules on 
permissible trade restrictions” (Vogel, 1997:5).  The appeal process rests on “negative 
consensus…that is, all members must agree not to proceed or not to adopt panel and 
AB [Appellate Body] recommendations or rulings” (Delich, 2002: 71) Put another 
way, “The basic philosophy of the WTO…is non-discrimination.  Member 
governments agree not to discriminate against the trade in goods and services of other 
members…” (Das, 2001: 2).  Vogel, however, goes on to acknowledge that “there is 
often a fine line between a legitimate health and safety regulation that is more difficult 
for a foreign producer to meet and a disguised form of protectionism” (5).  The role of 
the judicial branch of any governing body is the interpretation and enforcement of 
rules.  The DSB, therefore, is a necessary mechanism, as many aspects of trade 
agreements are written intentionally broadly to allow for interpretive flexibility.  
However, it is clearly a tool much more readily available to powerful players. 
 It should not come as a surprise, then, that the WTO’s effectiveness in 
instituting across-the-board liberalization has been only partial.  Broad agricultural 
subsidies and other protections in rich countries are much more likely to have 
withstood WTO restrictions than those in poor countries.  If one looks at the WTO 
from the perspective of the new constitutionalism as described by Gill—as an 
institution that works to legally codify the rights of capital through an iterative process 
of dispute litigation—the failure of the WTO to dismantle agricultural subsidies 
appears less of a contradiction.  In reflecting on the history of food regime analysis, 
Pritchard writes that “much initial food regime scholarship was animated by the 
prospect that the Uruguay Round would cause agriculture to become subject to an 
internationally-binding set of rules that would progressively eliminate nations’ 
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capacities to subsidize their rural economies, and thus bring into being a new food 
regime” (Pritchard, forthcoming: unpaginated).  The uneven levels of domestic 
support that persist under the AoA between Northern and Southern countries do not 
contravene this project.  Rather, this unevenness allows agribusiness to leverage North 
against South and vice versa as southern producers are forced out of production by 
northern dumping, which further depresses northern prices and inscribes subsidy 
programs ever more deeply (McMichael, 2005).  In fact, agricultural economists 
Daryll Ray and Daniel Ugarte have shown that subsidies are both triggered in response 
to and exacerbate low commodity prices on the world market, which clearly benefits 
agribusiness (Ray, 2006b). 
 
Economic Citizenship Rights and Governance through Dispute Settlement 
The point here is that neo-liberalism as expressed in the corporate food regime 
does not require the differences between countries to be smoothed out by 
liberalization.  In fact, as Gill points out, liberalization is not necessarily the end goal 
of the new constitutionalism.  Rather, it is ensuring the rights of private property and 
capital over other social rights (2000). 
[N]ew constitutionalism can be understood historically as part of the 
longue durée of liberal state formation as well as a political project to 
“lock in” the power gains of capital on a world scale in the 1990s and 
beyond . … The World Trade Organisation and other organisations of 
governance such as the international financial institutions are 
attempting to create a set of long-term economic and political reforms 
that gain constitutional status, thus underpinning the extension of the 
disciplinary power of capital on a world scale (2000, 7). 
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Arguably, that is what is happening via the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO 
and also various other bilateral and regional agreements (including Bilateral 
Investment Treaties) that have proliferated in the wake of Seattle.  The relative ability 
of governments to participate in these mechanisms of governance comes down to 
economics. 
Saskia Sassen calls this substantive economic citizenship. The formal terms of 
economic citizenship are based on the fundamental right of all people to participate in 
and benefit from the global economy.  In the context of the WTO, one could extend 
the concept to mean the fundamental right of all countries to participate in and benefit 
from the rules-based system governing global trade.  Substantively, however, these 
rights are limited to those with the capacity to participate, which excludes the vast 
majority of WTO member states. The dominance of economic citizenship is 
continually re-inscribed through this unequal power.  Sassen writes, “…global capital 
has made claims on nation-states and these have responded through the production of 
new forms of legality” (2000: 384).  The DSB, as a legal form supporting economic 
rights, substantively works to prise open certain markets to certain interests while 
allowing others to remain protected under the jurisdiction of the national state.  
Commodities that are more deeply embedded in global markets or policies that 
directly undermine transnational profit potential are much more likely to be the subject 
of WTO arbitration. 
Soy is an interesting case in this vein because it is the quintessential global 
industrial food commodity.  Inedible by humans without at least some processing 
(which can be as simple as home fermentation or as complex as industrial crushing 
and extrusion) soy is a durable and versatile industrial food additive.  Additionally, up 
until 2000, soy received relatively few subsidies in the US.  As cited above, the 
change in these policies caught the attention of the world’s other largest soy exporter 
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and prompted legal inquiry, but economically speaking, soy remained robust on the 
world market throughout the first half of the decade.  Officials in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply (MAPA), speaking in 2005 just before a 
major market crisis plunged Mato Grosso soy farmers into debt, put it this way: 
This is a product that has the freest markets in the world. More than oil, 
more than gold, is soy.  Soy is a commodity that is almost pure, 
because it is a very homogenous product, there is very little restriction 
on international trade, from the point of view of market access and 
export subsidies, and essentially you have 3 producers: the US, Brazil, 
and Argentina.  In Brazil and Argentina, our governments do not have 
the capacity to subsidize the sector.  So, the sector is extremely free in 
terms of trade and has little government intervention.  The Americans 
have a strong intervention in soy.  Until the 1996 Farm Bill, there was 
little intervention in soy.  American agricultural policy never reached 
the target price for soy.  There’s a target price for corn, for wheat, never 
for soy.  From ‘96 until now there have been many instruments 
introduced for soy.  The Brazilian product with the greatest freedom in 
trade we call “soy”.  From the production of an orgulha through the 
entire chain…it is a thing sui generis.  You have practically free 
exchange to negotiate, you have practically no intervention by the 
government to buy, finance, commercialize…  It is entirely financed by 
the international market.  You were in Mato Grosso you know that the 
producer there in Mato Grosso, in Rondonópolis, in Sorriso, is linked to 
Chicago every day, he knows the exchange rate every day. 
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The “purity” of soy as a freely traded global commodity, however, lasted only 
as long as macroeconomic conditions, oil prices, and currency values remained stable.  
From the beginning of the soy boom in the mid-1990s up until the 2005 harvest, 
Brazilian soy was highly competitive on the world market and soy farmers enjoyed 
healthy profits.  During this meteoric rise in production, gains gleaned from 
converting new land to soy and technological advancements in seed varieties and 
disease and soil management kept ahead of the volatile agricultural market.  But by 
June 2005, rising oil prices increased costs for both agrochemicals and transport, the 
dollar fell relative to the real, and Brazil’s interest rate remained stubbornly high.  
Brazil’s production began to level off, and US production rebounded from a series of 
poor harvests.  Soon soy profits began to erode, and farmers from Mato Grosso drove 
their tractors onto Congress’s lawn and burned piles of soybeans in the streets.  Just 
two years after the height of the soy boom and a mere few months after the above 
interview was recorded, the government was refinancing Bank of Brazil loans and 
holding soy auctions to pass premiums on to producers. 
Because, like most developing countries, Brazil’s domestic support remained 
well below its WTO commitment levels it was able to include soy in its government 
buying program that essentially acts as a minimum price guarantee.  Interestingly, 
however, a brand new instrument had to be constructed in order for this system to 
work for soy.  Because the majority of each year’s soy crop is committed through CPR 
contracts to transnational agribusiness before it is even harvested (see Chapter 3) few 
producers were able to participate in traditional auctions.  The government, therefore, 
had to develop separate auctions for farmers and agribusiness, essentially passing 
premiums to farmers through the corporations that hold their contracts.  If a company 
is willing to take a slightly lower market price, it wins the auction, receives a subsidy 
payment from the government, and passes the different between the government 
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minimum price and the CBOT spot price to the farmer.  In this way, the government is 
directly subsidizing private debt and protecting agribusiness profits.  This is, of course, 
happening in the context of the AoA, which had consistently contributed to the 
reduction in supports such as minimum price guarantees and subsidized credit for 
producers.  Clearly this is an inconsistent and contradictory process, which illustrates 
how closely government and industry are interwoven in the structuring and 
maintenance of markets, despite the ideology of liberalization. 
This process of government intervention in markets also shows how 
substantive economic citizenship rights are awarded to certain types of producers over 
others, which is reflected in both the extension and intensification of market 
integration of those farmers producing crops most relevant to industrial food 
companies, and in the litigation taking place in the DSB.  Cutler and her colleagues 
have worked to move us away from state-centric understandings of economic 
citizenship, however, by arguing that though political legitimacy is a crucial element 
of private authority and the state remains a key arbiter of that legitimacy, the exercise 
of authority comes increasingly from the private sector.  I argue that, in order to 
understand the current conjuncture in the agro-food system, we must expand the 
theory of food regimes to make room for the kind of private authority that Cutler 
describes.  Only then does the unevenness and conflict within the governance system 
of global agricultural trade begin to make sense, because the contradictions that 
animate the emerging food regime are not only geopolitical, but economic as well.  
Just as the disputes in the DSB are nominally arbitrated by governments and 
substantively constructed by the private sector, the emerging contours of the third food 
regime are defined through the interactions of states and agribusiness in both 
cooperation and conflict. 
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Cutler et al. argue that “the private sector [is] a major player in organizing the 
international system and increasingly in establishing the rules of the game.  These 
rules concern who gets to play, what are the limits on play, and often who wins.  This 
means that we should be concerned about the increase in private international 
authority on a number of counts.  First, what does this mean for the continued 
functioning and existence of the state itself?  Second, who gets to participate in 
making decisions given that corporations are not democracies?  Third, are the rules the 
private sector establishes fair and equitable, incorporating mechanisms for access and 
accountability?” (1999: 369).  These questions are all relevant in examining the role of 
agribusiness in establishing trade rules, and even determining which trade rules are 
challenged and which are not. 
 
Negotiating Politics: Private regimes and setting the trade agenda 
When it comes to the political process of negotiating trade agreements, of 
course, transnational soy companies have to engage in a delicate balancing act.  In a 
market as globalized and highly concentrated as soy, the same 4-5 companies exert 
market influence in countries with seemingly very different trade policy positions.  
However, when one begins to look at the international network of research institutes, 
trade associations, and high-level advisory committees, one begins to get a sense of 
multiple and often hidden ways that corporations are able to exert their influence 
across the globe, and the invisible hand of the market is revealed as the visible hand of 
the private regime. 
 In Brazil, the single most influential organization in agricultural trade policy is 
the Institute for the Study of Trade and International Negotiations (ICONE).  This 
organization is a research group, and claims not to involve itself in issues of politics or 
policy advising.  However, the majority of the research and studies upon which 
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Brazilian trade policy is based come from this institute.  ICONE claims as its partners 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply as well as two university 
research and study groups dedicated to agribusiness issues. 
ICONE is funded by various trade and industry associations, including the 
Brazilian Agribusiness Association (ABAG) and the Brazilian Oilseeds Association 
(ABIOVE) as well as pork, poultry, beef, and sugar interests, and its board of directors 
consists of representatives from these associations. ABIOVE is, in turn, funded 
directly by the Brazilian affiliates of transnational companies: Cargill Agícola S/A, 
ADM Brasil Ltda., Bunge Alimentos S/A, Comércio Indústria Brasileiras Coinbra S/A 
(a subsidiary of Louis-Dreyfus).  ABAG is funded by these and many others including 
Monsanto, Pioneer, Bayer Crop Science, AGCO, etc.  Carlo Lovatelli, president of 
both ABIOVE and ABAG at the time of writing, is also the director of Bunge Brasil. 
According to a researcher at ICONE, all of the major agribusiness sectors 
except orange juice are associated with the institution.  Industry groups commission 
research, and these studies are passed on to the government only after passing the 
approval of companies via their trade or industry associations, headed by their own 
executives.  While ICONE claims not to have a political agenda or to be a political 
actor, they characterize their work as “technical support” for those advocating at the 
political level for agribusiness interests.  And, insofar as their research is directly 
approved by businesses with interest in increasing the flow of exports all around the 
world, it is clear why their focus is market access first, domestic support second, and 
issues like food security, sensitive products, and special and differential treatment not 
at all. 
Even though the G-20, under Brazil’s leadership, is advocating Special and 
Differential Treatment (S&DT) and sensitive products as priorities for negotiation in 
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Hong Kong, ICONE is not lending its “technical support” to these issues.  According 
to a researcher, 
Brazil, within the G-20, says to the countries of the G-20: you who 
have concerns about food security, make a proposal about food 
security.  There exists a certain division of labor within the G-20.  
Brazil has done all of the technical work about the issues of market 
access and domestic subsidies.  And everything related to special and 
differential treatment, food security, livelihood needs, food 
sovereignty…the countries that are interested in this need to do this 
work. 
 
Clearly, there are parties within Brazil who are interested in these issues—like 
the landless workers’ movement, small farmers’ organizations, and the Ministry of 
Agrarian Development (MDA, different from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, 
and Food Supply: MAPA)—but they lack both the resources and the access to make 
those issues part of the Brazilian government’s trade agenda.  As is discussed below, 
the ways in which trade positions are determined in the Brazilian government 
structurally privilege agribusiness interests.  The limited influence of the MDA and 
absence of non-governmental or grassroots groups (with the exception of ICONE) 
ensure that agribusiness interests top the trade agenda. 
 
Setting the Agenda: MAPA versus MDA28 
Brazil’s trade agenda is determined through a two-tiered structure; the first 
level is comprised of technical advisors and researchers that come to decisions about 
trade issues, who then advise those at the second, or political, level made up of 
                                                 
28 Differences between these 2 ministries are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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ministers and negotiators.  According to an official at the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (MDA), until 2005, the ministry only had representatives at the technical 
level.  If advisors at the technical level were unable to come to consensus on an issue, 
it passed to the political level, where the interests of landless and small farmers were 
not represented.  Though as of 2005 they did have representatives at the political level, 
they still only had 3 staff members working on issues of importance to these 
constituents; MAPA had more than ten times that number. 
It is no surprise that Brazil’s most influential advisors would prioritize the 
issue of market access, given their ties to international advocacy and advisory 
networks backed by transnational agribusiness.  According to an official at the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Brazilian government recognizes that promoting 
market access among members of the G-20 could cause problems for the integrity of 
the coalition, but “if there is a critical mass of agreement, the others will fall into line.  
The point is that there is no other game in town for these [smaller] countries.  They 
would be taken advantage of if they were alone.”  The G-20, therefore, becomes a 
platform for the extension of the type of trade liberalization sought by corporations 
among some of the countries that may be most resistant to it. 
But corporate influence, like corporate capital, does not stop at state 
boundaries.  Corporations must operate in very different political contexts across the 
globe.  In their respective studies of international mineral markets, intellectual 
property, and maritime transport, Michael Webb, Susan Sell, and Claire Cutler29 
present examples of different ways in which private firms work with and across state 
boundaries to establish politically legitimate and coordinated market structures, norms, 
and rules that smooth out global commerce.  None of the authors argues that this is a 
unitary or complete process.  Rather, they show the complexity and contradiction built 
                                                 
29 Chapters all appear in Cutler et al., 1999. 
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into the establishment of a private regime and how that complexity shapes the way in 
which private actors govern in conjunction with states. 
Webb shows how cooperation among mineral firms to stabilize markets and 
support prices constitute a private regime, but that the regime is often undermined by 
the inconsistency in the political and ideological landscapes in which it operates.  
Webb’s emphasis on the contradictory nature of a private regime is important in 
nuancing the public/private relationship.  The processes through which governance is 
accomplished are not unitary or uncontested, and still, political interests that 
contravene those of capital shape the contours of the regime.  In terms of soy, this can 
be seen in the highly contested movement towards private certification of 
“sustainable” soy that both responds to and deflects concern that the encroachment of 
soy into the Amazon region could have huge implications for climate change.  In 
2006, Greenpeace convinced ABIOVE (Brazilian Oilseeds Association) to agree to a 
moratorium on purchasing soy grown in newly deforested regions.  Arial photographs 
taken in the first months of 2009 show that soy cultivation in newly deforested areas 
has slowed significantly, and the moratorium is being credited with this progress. 
Groupo Maggi, the Brazilian soy company owned by the governor of Mato 
Grosso, began requiring environmental audits of many of the farms from which it 
purchased soy as early as 2005.  In Sapezal, one of my research sites, Maggi required 
all farmers to fill out a form detailing their environmental conservation measures.  
While this formally enhanced the corporation’s environmental credibility, not a single 
farmer I interviewed reported that anyone from the Maggi corporation ever actually 
came out to verify the information reported on the form.  While the rules of the game, 
therefore, are negotiated by competing interests (in this case agribusiness firms, 
environmentalists, farmers, and the state), the stated outcome of these negotiations (in 
this case, soybeans produced more sustainably) can not be taken for granted.  The 
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process of contestation shapes the behavior of these companies in some ways, but in 
this instance they are also able to turn the criticism to their advantage. 
In the case of subsidies for soy as well, inconsistencies in farm and financial 
policies across countries can both complicate and work in favor of corporations’ 
interest in a stable market.  While domestic subsidies can help stabilize prices and 
smooth out market volatility, individual countries’ currency policies and interest 
rates—as seen in Brazil—can dramatically affect patterns of foreign investment and 
can either undermine or enhance producers’ competitiveness.  When the Brazilian real 
strengthened against the US dollar in 2005, Brazilian soy exports immediately felt the 
effect.  However, tax policies that encourage raw material exports from Brazil give 
that country’s soy farmers an edge in export markets over their competitors in 
Argentina (the world’s third largest producer of soybeans behind the US and Brazil).  
TNCs take advantage of these differences as can be seen in the pattern shown in the 
development of whole bean exports and crushing in Brazil and Argentina.  The graph 
below shows that, although Brazil and Argentina’s respective soy production has 
increased apace, Argentina’s crushing has outstripped Brazil, while Brazil’s exports of 
whole beans have clearly and decisively topped Argentina’s. 
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Figure 9.  Soybean production, exports, and crush.  Source: FAS, 2009. 
 
As complex and contradictory as the process is between individual nation-
states, in another example, Sell shows how interfirm cooperation in politics can 
happen at the transnational level.  She argues that private firms directly created public 
law for the entire world in the creation of the WTO TRIPS agreement through a 
coordination of “domestic interindustry counterparts, domestic governments, foreign 
governments, foreign private sector counterparts, domestic and foreign industry 
associations, and international organizations” (1999: 172).  Much as in the 
agribusiness industry of Brazil and the cases brought before the DSB, she argues that 
“the transnational leadership of these US-based corporations was decisive in the 
achievement of the TRIPS accord” (172).  As has already been described in the case of 
Brazil’s action in the DSB and the determination of trade policy at the federal level in 
Brazil, corporations are heavily influential in configuring trade law both nationally 
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and internationally.  Cutler addresses this dynamic as well in arguing that the line 
between public and private international trade law in maritime transport is actually 
quite blurry but that the rhetorical distinction between the two  “serves to enhance the 
authority of corporate actors while simultaneously rendering such actions politically 
unaccountable”  (283). 
Because agribusinesses are both transnational and grounded within particular 
political contexts that are defined at least in part by “national agricultures” and farmer 
constituencies, private governance at the global level must navigate conflicting 
political interests.  It could become problematic, for example, for Cargill Agrícola to 
support an organization that attacks US soybean subsidies.  But as the above authors 
describe in their respective cases, agribusinesses find ways around these difficulties. 
For example, ABIOVE is a member of the International Association of Seed 
Crushers (IASC), along with its US counterpart, the National Oilseed Processors 
Association (NOPA).  Researchers from ICONE attend all of the international 
meetings of the IASC, and an ICONE researcher claims that 
…they [at IASC] do not talk about [domestic] subsidies.  Never. They 
discuss market access, and also distortions.  For example Brazil is very 
critical of North American export credits.  And the businesses of 
NOPA recognize that it is necessary to make a level playing field in the 
market.  And so today there exists work by IASC to promote a level 
playing field in the soybean market.  Like eliminating all [export] 
subsidies in the soybean chain for oilseeds, oil, and meal.  And to 
eliminate all distortions, export credits, and export taxes. 
 
And this is where a vision of the private international regime begins to 
coalesce.  ICONE is also affiliated with the International Agriculture and Trade Policy 
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Council (IPC), an international coalition based in Washington, D.C. that counts among 
its members executives from Cargill, Nestlé, Syngenta, ADM, Bunge, Kraft, and 
Monsanto, as well as former agricultural secretaries, world bank officials, trade 
advisors, and leading agricultural economists from top universities.  These members 
hail from agricultural exporting countries all over the world. This organization—also 
funded by Cargill, ADM, and Bunge (also including Syngenta, Monsanto, Unilever, 
Nestlé, Rabobank, etc.)—has a specific agenda of total trade liberalization, and though 
it is based in the US and funded primarily by US agribusiness, its members hail from 
around the world.  The IPC recently invited Pedro Camargo to sit on its board of 
directors.  As mentioned above, Camargo is a former Secretary of Production and 
Trade in the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture and was the primary author and litigator 
of the successful case in the WTO against US cotton subsidies. 
While the IPC does argue for reductions in northern domestic subsidies 
(insofar as they are trade-distorting), it never does so without in the same breath 
downplaying special and differential treatment and arguing that developing countries 
must promote market access. 
“With their newfound influence, developing countries can obtain a 
strong agreement that goes beyond the narrow confines of S&D to 
promote their integration into the world economy and provide an 
opportunity to compete in the marketplace.  First and foremost, that 
means developed countries must substantially reduce trade-distorting 
subsidies and expand market access. Indeed, for most developing 
countries, an ambitious outcome that increases market access, 
eliminates government funded export competition, and reduces trade-
distorting domestic subsidies will deliver greater benefits than 
traditional S&D ever could. 
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In the Doha Development Round, developing countries should 
also insist that both developed and developing countries be required to 
adhere to the same set of rules.  Separate rules or exemptions from the 
rules for developing countries sets a dangerous precedent.  As has been 
evident in 2004, when developing countries won cases against the 
United States and the European Union in the WTO, the rules-based 
trading system is particularly important for developing countries 
precisely because all countries, regardless of size or power, are bound 
by the same rules.  If developing countries insist on a different set of 
rules, developed countries could more easily rationalize skirting the 
rules for their own benefit.  It took many years to address agriculture 
under the GATT because agriculture was subject to special exemptions 
that kept sensitive commodities off the negotiating table.  It is 
extremely dangerous to go back down that road.” (IPC, 2004). 
Aside from the condescending tone of the language, the IPC at once purports to 
empower developing countries to embrace their newfound standing in negotiations, 
while at the same time cautioning them not to ask for too much.  The IPC undercuts 
the importance of special and differential treatment by arguing that the same rules 
should apply to all countries, and amazingly, that S&D could set a “dangerous 
precedent” that might embolden northern powers to skirt the rules.  The fact that US 
subsidies have remained largely unchanged since the Doha Round began shows the 
absurdity of this argument. 
Interestingly, the IPC argues that, while exceptions for the northern subsidies 
were bad for the talks, exceptions for vulnerable markets in developing countries 
would be bad for development.  In fact, in an article on the food crisis, they state 
clearly: “Counterintuitively, subsistence farming cannot solve the most basic needs for 
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food security” (IPC, 2005), citing data showing that countries with a greater reliance 
on subsistence farming tend to be more impoverished.  It seems that today, at least at 
the time of this writing, amongst talk of reimagining the Bretton Woods institutions 
and Bill Clinton’s speech to the UN (where he admitted that distributing food aid in 
the form of commodities rather than money—which undercuts local producers in poor 
countries—was a monumental mistake that contributed significantly to the food crises 
of the late 2000s), there is some mainstream acknowledgement it has been at least in 
part the policies of liberalization—not small farming—that have robbed populations of 
their subsistence.  A study conducted by the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) acknowledges that 
the paradigm of the industrial and corporate food regimes are not capable of 
addressing the needs nor taking advantage of the promise of local agriculture in 
developing countries. 
For many years, agricultural science focused on delivering component 
technologies to increase farm-level productivity where the market and 
institutional arrangements put in place by the state were the primary 
drivers of the adoption of new technologies. The general model has 
been to continuously innovate, reduce farm gate prices and externalize 
costs. This model drove the phenomenal achievements of AKST 
[agricultural knowledge, science, and technology] in industrial 
countries after World War II and the spread of the Green Revolution 
beginning in the 1960s. But, given the new challenges we confront 
today, there is increasing recognition within formal S&T organizations 
that the current AKST model requires revision. Business as usual is no 
longer an option. This leads to rethinking the role of AKST in 
achieving development and sustainability goals; one that seeks more 
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intensive engagement across diverse worldviews and possibly 
contradictory approaches in ways that can inform and suggest strategies 
for actions enabling to  the multiple functions of agriculture (IAASTD, 
2008: 3-4). 
As McMichael recounts, however, the report was largely ignored in favor of an 
emphasis on facilitating private investment in agriculture at the FAO’s 2008 world 
food summit in Rome (2008). 
Though an entire paper could be dedicated to analysis of the synergy between 
IPC’s policy positions and corporate membership, suffice to say that this organization, 
especially with its connections to other industry trade groups and agricultural and 
trade ministries around the world, is an exemplar of what Cutler et al. would identify 
as a constitutive element of a private agriculture regime precisely because of a) the 
extreme market concentration of the sector that allows close and effective cooperation 
between firms, and b) the explicit inclusion of the state in the association itself.  
Clearly, corporate leaders are connected to one another and to the public sector, not 
just through economic or market networks, but through political and advocacy ones as 
well.  The IPC is one important node in the private agribusiness regime wherein “the 
interfirm cooperation…operates on multiple levels in complex ways, and often 
involves extensive interaction and cooperation with the state”.  Cutler goes on to argue 
that, “Indeed, one of the most important analytical goals in studying private 
international regimes is to understand the degree to which the private actors in a 
regime are dependent on the public ones” (Cutler et al., 1999: 14).  As I have shown 
above, the participation of the private regime in governance of agriculture in general 
and the soy sector in particular provide an excellent illustration of how business and 
IR literatures’ tendency to treat strategic alliances of transnational firms and interstate 
regimes as distinct (respectively) fails to capture the ways in which “private authority 
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emerges both from the interactions of firms and from the interactions between firms 
and the state” (Cutler, 1999: 335). 
This is, however, a fractured and contradictory process.  Most notably, India 
scored one for domestic protection of farmers in this last round of negotiations.  
Pressure from grassroots groups, NGOs, and social movements have brought 
environmental sustainability and food security into mainstream trade policy debates, 
and many of these organizations cite the collapse of Doha as a signal that society is 
reasserting control over the market in a Polanyian swing of the double movement.  
However, I maintain that to argue that we are seeing a re-embedding of trade policy is 
an overly state-centric view, and that such a focus obscures the fractured ways in 
which the new constitutionalism of capital in agriculture continues with little attention.  
Globalization scholars Trebilcock and Howse point to an “unfortunate semantic 
legacy” of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, which is that in the global 
economy we have “countries trading with one another.  This of course, is rarely the 
case.  [Rather], private economic actors are trading with each other” (Trebilcock and 
Howse, 1995: 3).  The significance of this legacy cannot be overlooked, because from 
the discourse of globalization to the bureaucratic structure of the WTO, the taken-for-
granted unit of analysis remains the nation-state, which obscures the role of private 
actors and complicates how we understand civil society, the nation, and the “public 
interest”. 
 
Conclusion 
 Pritchard argues that in the WTO-DSB, “the rule of law [is] over-determined 
by the institutionalized politics of the WTO” (2005: 796).  In this chapter, I have 
shown how the “institutionalized politics” are driven by neo-liberal ideology that is 
ushered in via the participation of transnational corporations in the processes of 
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governance and reinforced by the exclusion of other constituencies.  This is a crucial 
element of the accomplishment of authority by the private international soy regime as 
business interests are increasingly able to exert political influence beyond their 
national borders, often being explicitly provided with a seat at the international trade-
negotiating table (Cutler et al., 1999).  As regulatory frameworks become increasingly 
diffuse, however, particularly in light of the collapse of the Doha Round, opportunities 
are opening up for civil society just as they are opening up for private regimes.  
Fridmann refers to the environmental regime as a new non-governmental vector of 
regulation that emerges in response to increasing popular concern over production 
processes and their outcomes (2005).  Lipschutz and Fogel look at this issue from the 
‘regime’ perspective, arguing that popular ‘moral authority’ informs the creation of 
transformative campaigns through civil society-based regulatory regimes that govern 
labor in the apparel industry, small arms trade, and toxic waste among others (2002). 
 Aside from, or in addition to, the circumspect ‘victories’ for developing 
country governments mentioned above, these observations highlight the contradictions 
of governance within the corporate food regime and the opportunities for alternative 
visions to gain traction, particularly given the increasing attention in mainstream 
discourse on re-localization and food sovereignty as real solutions to intensifying food 
insecurity (see Chapter 5).  McMichael argues that the importance of the food regime 
analytic in the context of the neo-liberal food crisis is that it politicizes food and brings 
it to the center of a host of debates, not least among them that of emerging structures 
and processes of governance (forthcoming). 
 However, even as WTOs negotiations remain at a standstill, the codification of 
market rule continues through channels even more obscure than negotiations 
themselves.  Scholars must train the analytical lens—as Pritchard has usefully done—
on dispute settlement as an avenue for neo-constitutionalism as the processes of 
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governance are increasingly informalized.  This requires a move away from state-
centric regime analysis to a theorization of private governance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 At the time of this writing, the world appears to be in a moment of profound 
transformation.  Global food, energy, financial, and environmental crises are 
converging to destabilize once and for all the post-war hegemonic order over which 
the US has presided for the last 50 years.  Because the WTO has remained impotent 
since the breakdown of negotiations in 1999 under intense protest from the public and 
developing country governments—and now appears definitively unable to resolve the 
conflicts of global trade politics—it is no surprise that the food regime concept is 
being revisited.  In this dissertation I have argued that to understand the organization 
of the global agri-food system at this historical moment, it is crucial to look beyond 
the state, not just at how private actors influence or undermine governments, but rather 
at whole systems of private governance, whereby networks of public and private 
actors and institutions collude to shape markets in the neo-liberal image.  I argue that 
what may often appear as contradictions from a state-centric perspective—i.e., the 
persistence of northern country agricultural subsidies—make more sense as part of a 
system of rule by private regime. 
 I have, therefore, theorized a private international soy regime—following 
models put forth by scholars of political science and international relations—in order 
to help the food regime concept illuminate the current moment in which, I argue, the 
Brazilian soy industry is emerging as a prototypical organizational form of global 
agriculture in the context of neo-liberal globalization.  I argue that, when used as an 
analytic, the concept of a ‘food regime’ is useful in highlighting relations of power in 
production, consumption, and trade.  Intuitively, Mato Grosso seems to represent a 
clear departure from business-as-usual in global agriculture, as any US soybean farmer 
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would tell you.  Unlike the corn market (the other pillar of the global industrial food 
system), the soy market has undergone a significant geographic shift in the past 20 
years.  Many US farmers were caught unawares by the meteoric rise in South 
American production, which in itself caused great anxiety in the US.  Biological 
obstacles such as fungus and pest infestations, and political controversy over the 
environmental impact of soy in Mato Grosso, have tempered Brazil’s assault on the 
US as the world’s primary soy producer, but every season Brazil challenges the US for 
that top position. 
 My analysis in this dissertation tries to makes sense of the historical 
development of Mato Grosso’s soy industry in terms of larger political-economic 
shifts in global agricultural governance, while also investigating the experience of that 
development on the ground in the soy towns themselves.  While Chapter 2 addresses 
the former question from alternately historical-economic and geo-political 
perspectives, Chapter 3 more directly addresses the second thread.  Finally, Chapter 4 
begins to look ahead at what the Brazilian model of agricultural governance might 
mean for the trajectory of agricultural governance at the international level. 
What links all three chapters together, aside from a multifaceted exploration of 
the Mato Grosso soy phenomenon itself, is an explicit focus on the private sector and 
its role in the processes of governance at multiple levels.  As post-war structures of 
governance continue to break down, I argue that such an understanding will become 
increasingly crucial to any study of multilateral political relations. 
We are in an historical moment where the very structure and function of the 
Bretton Woods institutions are being reexamined.  These institutions have long 
embodied, promoted, and enforced the fundamental principles of export-led neoliberal 
development.  However, these principles are now clearly in question, particularly as 
they apply to the way in which the global North addresses hunger through aid.  In a 
  141
speech to the United Nations’ World Food Program, Bill Clinton directly questioned 
the wisdom of his own administration in placing food aid at the service of US 
agribusiness rather than African communities, acknowledging that using food aid as 
an outlet for US agricultural surpluses has contributed directly to intensified food 
insecurity in Africa’s poorest nations.30  The fact that treating food as a commodity is 
being vocally questioned by a former (and still influential) US president signals a 
dramatic shift in the “common sense” of economic liberalism, at least as it pertains to 
food.  These questions will continue to be raised as climate change and biofuels focus 
new attention and put pressure on global food stocks and agricultural production 
methods. 
The Brazilian soy phenomenon—and particularly its integration into deepening 
global agri-food networks—raises numerous questions that span broad new areas of 
inquiry.  Already, many scholars are focusing on the social and environmental 
consequences of soy production in the pan-Amazonian region, with particular 
emphasis on landless workers, indigenous communities, deforestation and climate 
change.  This issue also raises questions of governance (both national and multilateral) 
as environmental problems are increasingly recognized as global, and as charges of 
“green colonialism”31 challenge private conservation efforts by both firms and 
international NGOs.  These debates are particularly centered on intensified soy 
production in the Amazonia Legal region of Mato Grosso, Pará, and other northern 
Brazilian states (Jowit, 2007).  An extensive and graphic story appearing in National 
Geographic in 2007 did much to bring these issues to mainstream attention (Wallace, 
2007). 
                                                 
30 On October 23, 2008 CBS News ran the following headline: Bill Clinton: “We Blew It” On Global 
Food: Ex-President Tells U.N. World Erred In Treating Food As A Commodity Instead Of Vital Right 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/23/world/main4542268.shtml?source=RSSattr=HOME_4542
268 
31 Cf. Luke, T. W. (1997-8); De Boeck, G. (2000). 
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In this context, the role of transnational agribusiness has received ample 
attention.  In particular, the construction of a port on the Amazon River at Santarém in 
the state of Pará has fostered intense controversy and a flurry of ongoing academic 
inquiry.  As detailed in Chapter 3, however, much of this inquiry lumps the 
corporations together conceptually with soy farmers, thereby ignoring the larger 
structures of exploitation that entrench destructive systems of production.  In order to 
understand these relationships more completely, and beyond what I have presented 
here, scholars must push past easy conceptualizations of ‘power’ and ‘resistance’.  
Elsewhere I have argued that bringing a social movements analysis to an examination 
of the planter class in Mato Grosso informs our understanding of capital mobilization 
on the soy frontier (Peine, forthcoming). 
This will become increasingly important as the energy and food crises 
converge on the point of biofuels, and as the growing cooperation between 
agribusiness and energy companies suggest an emerging private international regime 
that is helping to shape a new bio-energy complex.  This is clearly not a unitary 
process, however, as the systemic crises also open new spaces for civic engagement in 
the food system.  At the same time that a corporate-centered private regime is 
redefining the relationship between food and energy, we also see increasing attention 
to the concepts of ‘food sovereignty’ (the rights of people and countries to determine 
their own food policies) and re-localization as strategies for a new generation of 
community-based food, energy, and credit policies.  After decades of structural 
adjustment policies wiped out local agricultures in poor countries, the idea that local, 
sustainable agriculture is essential for national food security is once again gaining 
ground in mainstream discourse.  I argue that this is part of—rather than resistance 
to—the same process of redefining food regime governance that is producing alliances 
between agribusiness and oil companies.  I analyze this dialectic from the perspective 
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of Polanyi’s “double movement”, but go one step farther to argue that the underlying 
assumptions of each model offer fundamentally different visions of the future of food, 
as well as the future of global governance. 
Another vector that promises to be significant in shaping the emerging food 
regime and could be a crucial site of inquiry for a broader examination of the private 
soy regime is the intensifying relationship between South American soy and Asian 
meat.  As I point out in the dissertation, traditional centers of production and 
consumption are shifting, and south-south trade may soon dominate the “spaces of 
flows” in the global soy network.  This study of Brazilian soy, therefore, could serve 
as a starting point to examine the empirical dynamics of the emerging soy economy 
with China and Brazil as its anchoring points.  Since Brazil’s agricultural profile 
began to change dramatically in the 1990s from an import substitution to an export 
driven model, commensurate changes have taken place in global commodity flows.  
As traditional northern exporters (the US, Canada, Australia, etc.) face new 
competition from South America, traditional import markets (the EU, Japan) are being 
eclipsed by skyrocketing demand from China and India.  An important question arises, 
then, of how transnational corporations mediate the links between these newly 
emerging producer and consumer countries, especially given the drastically different 
political context of the Chinese agricultural sector. 
As Moran et al. argue that the differences in political contexts affect how the 
food regime is accomplished, the particularities of the new sending and receiving 
countries—in terms of domestic governance of their agricultural sectors and their 
relations with other countries in the WTO and beyond—will require close 
investigation.  Corporations are very savvy at negotiating and even exploiting these 
inconsistencies, but they can also sometimes cause difficulties, as evidenced by the 
complexities of international property rights enforcement.  This is one area in which 
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much effort has been made by Monsanto and other firms toward “harmonization” with 
only limited success.  However, firms have ways of disciplining states as I saw in my 
research when I visited the second largest port in Brazil at Paranaguá in the southern 
state of Paraná and saw ports standing empty because the state government had 
enforced a ban on genetically modified soy.  In retaliation, the large soy traders were 
diverting their shipments to the port of Santos in São Paulo and Paranaguá was as a 
result facing severe unemployment and fiscal difficulties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 6.  Soy loading bays at Paranaguá stand empty. 
 
 All this is to say that the importance of understanding the role of private 
interests in governance is not diminishing but rather becoming even more important in 
light of the fracturing of the institutional bases for those relationships.  As I learned 
from this project, conducting research on corporations, particularly large private 
corporations like Cargill, is not an easy task.  But understanding the goals and 
strategies of the private sector in political projects is absolutely imperative for any real 
understanding of how governance happens.  As argued at length in different parts of 
this dissertation, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the particulars of private 
governance.  This dissertation has begun a line of inquiry that I will continue to 
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develop in hopes of making a continuing contribution to the scholarship on private 
governance, food regimes, and the future health and resilience of global agriculture. 
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